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A B ST R ACT. Judicial deference to executive statutory interpretation - a doctrine now com-
monly associated with the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council-is one of the central principles in modern American public law. Despite its significance,
however, the doctrine's origins and development are poorly understood. The Court in Chevron
claimed that the roots of judicial deference stem from statutory interpretation cases dating to the
early nineteenth century. Others, by contrast, have sought to locate Chevron's doctrinal roots in
judicial review's origins in the writ of mandamus. According to the standard narrative, courts in
the pre-Chevron era followed a multifactor and ad hoc approach to issues of judicial deference;
there was little theory that explained the body of cases; and the holdings and reasoning of the
cases were often contradictory and difficult to rationalize.
This Article challenges the standard account. It argues that the Supreme Court in Chevron, and
scholarly commentators since, have misidentified nineteenth-century statutory interpretation
cases applying canons of construction "respecting" contemporaneous and customary interpreta-
tion as cases deferring to executive interpretation as such. It further argues that, although the
standard for obtaining a writ of mandamus was central to judicial review in the early Republic,
statutory developments in the latter half of the nineteenth century (significantly, the enactment
of general federal-question jurisdiction in 1875) ultimately mooted the relevance of that standard.
Finally, it discusses the intellectual challenges to the traditional interpretive framework begin-
ning in the early twentieth century; the Supreme Court's embrace of these intellectual challenges
in the early 1940s; and Congress's attempt in the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) stand-
ard-of-review provision to reject the Court's interpretive experimentation and corresponding de-
viation from the traditional canons. The Article thus seeks to establish-contrary to the sugges-
tion in Chevron and recent cases -that there was no rule of statutory construction requiring
judicial deference to executive interpretation qua executive interpretation in the early American
Republic. And it contends that the governing statute of administrative law-the APA-was in-
tended to codify the traditional interpretive approach and to reject the experimentation of the
1940s Court. Taken together, these conclusions cast doubt on much of the received wisdom on
the doctrinal basis for the rule announced in Chevron.
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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of judicial deference to executive interpretation casts a long
shadow over the entire field of American public law. That doctrine-now
commonly associated with the Supreme Court's opinion in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council -provides that a reviewing court must "defer" to an
administrative agency's reasonable interpretation of the organic statute that it
administers.' It does not stretch the imagination to believe that, on every single
working day of the year, there exists in the employ of the federal government a
judge, an executive officer, or a legislator who expressly invokes or formulates
policy premised on Chevron.
From where did the concept of judicial deference to executive interpretation
originate? At first blush, the concept may appear inconsistent with Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's assertion, in Marbury v. Madison, that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"2 -a ten-
sion that has prompted some to characterize Chevron as the "counter-Marbury"
of the administrative state.' But Chevron itself claimed provenance in a series of
precedents stretching back to the Marshall Court that demonstrated that the
Court had "long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer."' The perspective that Chevron's origins date to the nineteenth cen-
tury seems also to be a majority view among commentators, at least judging
from the regular (though offhand) statements, even by critics of Chevron, con-
ceding that there is a "long tradition of deference to agency interpretations."s
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial
Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519, 538 & n.71 (2012) (describing Chevron as an "excep-
tion" to the proposition that "deferential review ... does not extend to decisions on pure is-
sues of law").
3. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2074-75
(1990).
4. 467 U.S. at 844 & n.14.
s. Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and
Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 791 (2010) (citing Edward's Les-
see v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827)); see also Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and
Fall of Textualism, 1o6 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18 n.69 (20o6) (claiming that "there are ample
nineteenth-century examples of such [judicial] deference to executive officials within their
areas of administration and expertise"); Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of Law,
and Presidential Influence in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679, 687 (2014)
("The consistency of the judicial function with some institutional deference in legal inter-
pretation is a very old idea.").
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. A separate doctrinal justification for judicial deference is set forth in Justice
Scalia's dissent in United States v. Mead Corp.,' and, almost a half century earli-
er, in Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line,
Inc.' Judicial deference, on this view, can be understood as "in accord with the
origins of federal-court judicial review."' That is because, to borrow Justice
Scalia's words, "[j]udicial control of federal executive officers was principally
exercised through the prerogative writ of mandamus" before the enactment of
general federal-question jurisdiction in 1875, and mandamus "generally would
not issue unless the executive officer was acting plainly beyond the scope of his
authority."' Based on this history, statutory ambiguities should be "left to rea-
sonable resolution by the Executive," as they ordinarily would have been when
an Article III tribunal reviewed a writ of mandamus directed against an execu-
tive official. o As Justice Douglas put the point, the "principle at stake" in judi-
cial deference cases "is no different than if mandamus were sought -a remedy
long restricted, in the main, to situations where ministerial duties of a nondis-
cretionary nature are involved."'
In contrast to these two justifications seeking to situate judicial deference in
nineteenth-century historical practice, a diametrically opposed perspective is
offered by those who, like Cass Sunstein, believe that Chevron is best "under-
stood as a natural outgrowth of the twentieth-century shift from judicial to
agency lawmaking."12 On this view, as Mark Tushnet explains, early twentieth-
century "administrative law unquestioningly accepted" that "courts would have
6. 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct.
1199, 1212 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (repeating the point that Chevron
"was in conformity with the long history of judicial review of executive action" by manda-
mus); cf. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (referring
to this aspect of the Mead dissent and noting that " [p]erhaps there is some unique historical
justification for deferring to federal agencies").
7. 356 U.S. 309 (1958).
8. Mead, 533 U.S. at 241-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
g. Id. at 242.
io. Id. at 243. Remarkably, this analogy between the Chevron and mandamus standards has es-
caped serious attention in the years following Mead, notwithstanding the fact that it repre-
sents an intriguing attempt (not to mention one of the few attempts by anyone) "to recon-
cile Chevron with the text of the [Administrative Procedure Act]" John F. Manning, Chevron
and the Reasonable Legislator, 128 HARv. L. REv. 457, 465 & n.68 (2014).
ii. Panama Canal Co., 356 U.S. at 318 (citations omitted); see also id. ("[W]here the duty to act
turns on matters of doubtful or highly debatable inference from large or loose statutory
terms, the very construction of the statute is a distinct and profound exercise of discre-
tion.").
12. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 205-06 (20o6).
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full power to review agencies' decisions interpreting the law those agencies
were administering."' That perspective accords with the view, expressed by
Ann Woolhandler, that "[t]he de novo model in its various manifestations,
which left the final say to the judiciary rather than the executive, was the pre-
dominant form of judicial review of executive action in the early Republic."4
Chevron (or at least, its twentieth-century precursors), on this perspective, is
not an outgrowth of, but rather a break from, what came before it.
There is an element of truth to each of these competing perspectives about
the development of the doctrine of judicial deference to executive interpreta-
tion. But there is an element of imprecision in each as well. If judicial deference
to executive interpretation is rooted in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ap-
proaches to interpretive theory, what explains the perspective that de novo, ra-
ther than deferential, review was the traditional model of interpretation? By
contrast, if judicial deference is a phenomenon of the mid-twentieth century,
what explains the holdings of the nineteenth-century cases on which Chevron
relied? And where does judicial review's origins in the writ of mandamus fit
within the historical picture? The fact that a wide spectrum of historical inter-
pretation is possible - even at this late date, more than thirty years after the
Court's decision in Chevron -suggests that the roots of the doctrine announced
in that opinion remain poorly understood.
Layered on top of these varying interpretations of the case law are varying
interpretations of the text of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which
represented (in part) Congress's attempt in 1946 to codify and clarify the scope
of judicial review of agency legal interpretations. The relevant text of the APA
seems simple enough: it provides that a "reviewing court shall decide all rele-
vant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and de-
termine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.""s Yet,
here too, disagreement over meaning reigns. Some argue that the text of the
APA is too simple-deceptively simple. It was intended, in the words of the in-
fluential Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, to "re-
13. Mark Tushnet, Administrative Law in the 193os: The Supreme Court's Accommodation of Pro-
gressive Legal Theory, 6o DuKE L.J. 1565, 1584 (2011).
14. Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action -A Revisionist History, 43 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 197, 206 (1991).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); see also id. § 706(2)(A), (C) (authorizing the reviewing court to "set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... not in accordance with law"
or "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or'short of statutory right");
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2080 (describing section 706 as "legislative endorsement" of
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stat[e] the [then-]present law as to the scope of judicial review"" and as a
"general restatement of the principles of judicial review embodied in many
statutes and judicial decisions."" The APA, on this view, incorporated the ap-
proach of pre-1946 cases expressing principles of judicial deference and, there-
by, incorporated a doctrine akin to Chevron.
Courts and commentators tend to agree on at least one issue: prior to Chev-
ron, there was widespread confusion over the proper scope of review.' That
confusion could be seen in the various approaches that courts took in the years
immediately preceding Chevron, and it dated back to the very earliest days of
the nation.'9 The confusion is well expressed in a 1976 opinion by Judge
Friendly that announced it was "time to recognize . .. two lines of Supreme
Court decisions on th[e] subject" of judicial deference "which are analytically
in conflict, with the result that a court of appeals must choose the one it deems
more appropriate for the case at hand."20 In his opinion, Judge Friendly con-
trasted a series of Supreme Court cases "supporting the view that great defer-
ence must be given to the decisions of an administrative agency applying a
statute to the facts and that such decisions can be reversed only if without ra-
tional basis" with a separate and "impressive body of law sanctioning free sub-
stitution of judicial for administrative judgment when the question involves the
meaning of a statutory term."2 Indeed, on one view, Chevron - if it had no oth-
16. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT io8 (1947).
17. Id. at 93.
18. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 972
(1992) ("Prior to 1984, the Supreme Court had no unifying theory for determining when to
defer to agency interpretations of statutes."); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2082 ("Before 1984,
the law . .. reflected a puzzling and relatively ad hoc set of doctrines about when courts
should defer to administrative interpretations of law.").
19. That perspective on the nineteenth century's approach to judicial deference echoes the
broader view that, in general, administrative law was undeveloped until the twentieth centu-
ry. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and "The Democracy": Administrative Law from Jackson
to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1688 (2oo8) (asserting that "[n]ot much adminis-
trative law that reflects our contemporary understandings was to be found in the courts" be-
tween the Jackson and Lincoln presidencies); cf Woolhandler, supra note 14, at 198-99 (de-
scribing the nineteenth century as "something of a dark age" for administrative law, noting
that the "work that has been done suggests that administrative law was incoherent," but
seeking to "show[] that early administrative law was at once more coherent and less deferen-
tial than is commonly realized").
20. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Ne.
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
21. Id.
915
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
er beneficial aspects -at the very least cleared up the intellectual and jurispru-
dential disarray that had existed for over a century prior to 1984.22
Or did it? In this Article, I argue that commentators have misunderstood
the pre-Chevron state of affairs. Although Chevron can claim an analog of sorts
in early nineteenth-century cases about interpretive methodology, those cases
addressed the "respect" that was due to executive interpretation because of the
interpretation's nature -specifically, its articulation contemporaneous with the
enactment of the controlling legal text or its ability to demonstrate a customary
practice under that text. In this respect, four critical and hitherto neglected
points are necessary to understand the intellectual and jurisprudential devel-
opment of judicial deference to executive interpretation.
First, the charge of longstanding and uniform analytical disarray is mistak-
en. Far from being under-theorized, proper interpretive methodology in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries received ample intellectual and judicial
attention. Eighteenth-century England and America were no intellectual waste-
lands when it came to political theory. It should be unsurprising that they were
not wastelands when it came to considering the proper relationship between
the judiciary and executive in construing legal texts.
Second, the prevailing interpretive methodology of nineteenth-century
American courts was not a form of judicial deference, as it has come to be un-
derstood in the post-Chevron era. Under the traditional interpretive approach,
American courts "respected" longstanding and contemporaneous executive in-
terpretations of law as part of a practice of deferring to longstanding and con-
temporaneous interpretation generally. It was the pedigree and contemporanei-
ty of the interpretation, in other words, that prompted "respect"; the fact that
the interpretation had been articulated by an actor within the executive branch
was relevant, but incidental.
Nor was nineteenth-century mandamus practice based on any interpretive
methodology that required judicial deference to the executive qua executive.
While the modern reader may hear echoes of Chevron in mandamus -because
the mandamus standard precluded judicial intervention when an executive offi-
cial engaged in an "executive duty" (including statutory interpretation) that re-
quired the exercise of judgment and discretion2 3 -the analogy is mistaken. As
the Court put it in the foundational case of Decatur v. Paulding, if an issue of
statutory construction were to arise outside of the mandamus context - where
the standards for obtaining the writ did not apply -"the Court certainly would
22. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE
L.J. 511, 517 (arguing that "Chevron is unquestionably better than what preceded it").
23. See, e.g., Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 508 (1840).
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not be bound to adopt the construction given by the head of a department.""
Courts, in other words, applied the mandamus standard only because they were
confronting a writ of mandamus (or another extraordinary writ). Where there
was no writ of mandamus, there would be no comparable interpretive defer-
ence.
A window into nineteenth-century interpretive methodology can be found
in a neglected passage from Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution. In
the course of discussing how best to interpret legal texts, Justice Story explains
that "the most unexceptionable source of collateral interpretation is from the
practical exposition of the government itself in its various departments upon
particular questions discussed and settled upon their own single merits."25 The
modern reader, reviewing this language and finding it familiar, might believe
that he has stumbled upon an old and venerable friend -namely, the canon de-
scribed in Chevron. That gloss on Justice Story's Commentaries, however, would
be mistaken. Justice Story made these remarks in the context of an extended
discussion on the proper role of "practical exposition" in construing the federal
Constitution. Understanding the import of this passage, its intellectual anteced-
ents, and the reason why Justice Story would have borrowed techniques of
statutory construction to construe the Constitution will allow us to understand
the respective roles of the executive and the judiciary in nineteenth-century in-
terpretive methodology.
Third, when the modern trend toward generalized judicial deference to ex-
ecutive interpretation began during the fifth decade of the twentieth century,
the Court did not rely primarily on the principle that courts "respected" con-
temporaneous and customary executive constructions, nor on the principle that
the mandamus standard required deference to executive action. Instead, the
Court invoked longstanding precedents addressing judicial deference to agency
factual determinations and analogized questions of law requiring agency exper-
tise to questions of fact. In doing so, the Court drew on preexisting scholarship
suggesting that a formal distinction between "law" and "fact" in administrative
review was illusory.26 By embracing this legal-realist perspective on the law-
fact distinction, and thereby blurring the line between factual determinations
24. Id. at 515.
25. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTAIUES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 408, at 392
(Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1833).
26. JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 50-55, 312 (1927). Dickinson, as explained below, later became a critic of the Court's
decisions expanding the scope of judicial deference to executive interpretation. See infra
notes 367-370. and accompanying text.
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and legal questions, the Court incrementally expanded the domain of agency
discretion in a manner that ultimately led to the Chevron doctrine.2 7
Fourth, Congress enacted the APA in 1946 in part to stop this deviation
from the traditional interpretive rules and to recapture the interpretive meth-
odology that prevailed before the Court's experimentation with the law-fact
distinction during the 1940s. The APA's text, drafting history, and early schol-
arly interpretations all point in this direction: they suggest that Congress
sought to cabin the discretion that the Court had recently granted administra-
tive agencies.2 ' But the APA's text and drafting history were quickly forgotten.
In the time between the APA's adoption and Chevron, courts relied interchange-
ably on cases applying the mandamus standard, cases applying the traditional
contemporary and customary canons, and cases applying the 1940s approach
breaking down the distinction between judicial review of questions of law and
questions of fact. The result was, as Judge Friendly observed in Pittston Steve-
doring Corp. v. Dellaventura, a bewildering and often contradictory set of rules
to govern judicial review of agency statutory interpretation.2 9 Chevron cleared
up this confusion by departing from, rather than seeking out, the meaning of
the APA's text and the traditional interpretive methodology.
The lacuna in the scholarship on the roots and historical development of
judicial deference is no academic issue -for the validation of a legal rule, such
as the interpretive rule announced in Chevron, is rightly viewed to be its pedi-
gree.30 Judicial deference's pedigree, moreover, is doubly relevant because Con-
gress specified the proper scope of judicial review of executive legal interpreta-
tions when it provided in section 706 of the APA that a "reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law" and "interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions."" The canon of construction that Chevron announced can be justi-
27. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402
(1941); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Rethinking Judicial Review of Administrative Action: A Nine-
teenth Century Perspective, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 2241, 2243 (2011) ("The Chevron opinion's ex-
plicit merger of issues of policy with statutory interpretation is of a piece with the Hearst
Court's fictional treatment of legal conclusions as questions of fact.").
28. See infra Section III.B.
29. See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cit. 1976), af'd sub nom. Ne.
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); infra Section III.C (discussing Judge
Friendly's view).
30. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990) (plurality opinion); see also
Woolhandler, supra note 14, at 199 ("[T]he background assumption that the first hundred
years were an age of judicial deference to agencies implicitly uftdergirds current claims that
the executive agencies can more legitimately exercise delegated lawmaking power than the
courts.").
31. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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fied only if it is an appropriate gloss on Congress's articulation of the proper
standard of review in section 706 of the APA.
Finally, judicial deference's pedigree is particularly salient today, in the
wake of recent opinions addressing the doctrine's scope. In a recent case, Chief
Justice Roberts remarked that "[t]he rise of the modern administrative state
has not changed" Marbury's directive that courts "say what the law is,"3 nor has
it altered the Court's "duty to police the boundary between the Legislature and
the Executive," which is "firmly rooted in our constitutional structure" and is
"as critical as [the] duty to respect that [boundary] between the Judiciary and
the Executive."" And Justice Scalia, in another recent case, called for a rejection
of another branch of the doctrine of judicial deference because the "purpose of
interpretation is to determine the fair meaning of the rule - to 'say what the law
is.""' A consideration of precisely what history tells us about the proper rela-
tionship between courts and the executive on matters of statutory interpreta-
tion is therefore necessary and timely.
This Article traces the intellectual and jurisprudential origins and develop-
ment of judicial deference to executive interpretation. Part I addresses recent
opinions that have called into question the doctrine of judicial deference from a
historical perspective. Part II describes the theory and practice of interpretation
that prevailed in American courts throughout the nineteenth century. It also
describes two associated octrines that later proved relevant to the evolution of
the doctrine of judicial deference - the standard for extraordinary writs, such as
mandamus, and Article III review of agency factual determinations. Part III ex-
plains how the interpretive framework unraveled over the course of the twenti-
eth century; how Congress sought in the APA to codify the prevailing interpre-
tative approach; and how the attempted codification was unsuccessful, leading
ultimately to the Court's decision in Chevron.
I. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AT THE COURT AND THROUGH THE LENS
OF HISTORY
Over the past three terms, a series of Supreme Court opinions have sought
to address the relevance of historical practice to the legality of judicial deference
to executive interpretation from a variety of perspectives, some invoking Mar-
32. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
33. Id. at 1886.
34. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1340 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177).
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bury, other eighteenth-century sources, and the text of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. But the opinions have yet to grapple with relevant doctrine and the
cases cited in Chevron itself. In Section I.A, I address the role that precedent
played in the Chevron opinion. Section I.B then demonstrates that the Justices
have since failed to engage seriously with that precedent on which Chevron re-
lies, and Section I.C seeks to bring attention to the corresponding gap in the
scholarly treatment of Chevron's origins.
A. The Role of Precedent in the Chevron Opinion
A close review of Chevron shows the central role that preexisting law played
in the Court's holding. Chevron, it may be remembered, announced a now-
canonical interpretive methodology for judicial review of an "agency's construc-
tion of the statute which it administers."s First, "employing traditional tools of
statutory construction," the reviewing court must determine whether "Con-
gress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.""6 If it has, "that is the
end of the matter" and the court "must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress."' Second, if "Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue" because "the statute is silent or ambiguous," a re-
viewing court's task is to determine "whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute."" As a result, the "court need not con-
3s. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
36. Id. at 842, 843 n.9. This language could be read to require courts to apply all tools of statuto-
ry construction, as "in an ordinary statutory interpretation case, with no agency involved,"
where "the court would proceed by applying whatever tools it thought appropriate to arrive
at the best understanding of the statute-an understanding that the court would then as-
cribe to Congress." JOHN F. MANNING & MATrHEw C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGU-
LATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 776-77 (2d ed. 2013). Because, however, that interpretation
"would render Chevron practically meaningless," the common approach is to understand
Chevron instead to "mean that a reviewing court should defer to the agency if the application
of the traditional tools of statutory construction fails to supply a sufficiently clear answer to
the interpretive question." Id. at 777.
37. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
38. Id. at 843. The Chevron opinion is somewhat inconsistent on the precise rule that it is an-
nouncing. In language reminiscent of Marbury, the Court remarked that "[t]he judiciary is
the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative con-
structions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." Id. at n.9. In language suggest-
ing that the Court's holding turned on a balancing of factors, the Court observed that, in the
case before it, "the regulatory scheme [was] technical and complex, the agency considered
the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involve[d] reconciling con-
flicting policies." Id. at 865 (footnotes omitted). Finally, some of the language in the Court's
opinion suggests that the Court believed the statute was ambiguous, not in the sense that
920
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clude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have
adopted to uphold the construction.""
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on two rationales. The first
was sound policy in the allocation of responsibilities among the branches of
government. Article III judges, the Court noted, "have no constituency" and
"are not experts in the field" or "part of either political branch.""o Second, Chev-
ron sought to ground the rule that it announced in precedent.4 The Court as-
serted that it had "long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded
to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted
to administer."42 To support that proposition, the Court cited, though it did not
analyze, several dozen cases43 dating back to the Court's 1827 opinion in Ed-
ward's Lessee v. Darby.'
Under the rule announced by these precedents, the Court reasoned, it
would be a "basic legal error. . . to adopt a static judicial definition" of a statu-
tory term when "Congress itself had not commanded that definition."4 5 Even if
the agency's interpretation "represent[ed] a sharp break with prior interpreta-
the agency selected an imperfect (but permissible) construction over a better (but not re-
quired) one, but rather in the sense that there was no superior reading of the statute that the
Court could have adopted. See id. at 866 ("When a challenge to an agency construction of a
statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's poli-
cy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the chal-
lenge must fail."); see also id. (arguing that judges "have a duty to respect legitimate policy
choices made by those who do [have a constituency]," because "[t]he responsibilities for as-
sessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing
views of the public interest are not judicial ones"). In the text, I have tried to set forth the
standard interpretation of the opinion, though there remains confusion on the precise test
that Chevron establishes. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002) (clarifying that
reenactment of language subject to longstanding agency interpretation reinforces interpreta-
tion); Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 168 (2001) (giving priority
to original interpretation); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 146,
151, 156-57 (2000) (crediting, but not relying on, an agency's longstanding interpretation of
a statute to bolster the Court's conclusion that Congress had spoken on a given issue).
39. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11.
40. Id. at 865-66 (stating that judges are not competent to "resolv[e] the competing interests
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved
by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities").
41. See id. at 843-44, 843 nn.9 & 11, 844 nn.12-14, 865-66, 865 nn.39-41.
42. Id. at 844.
43. See id. at 844-45 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382, 383 (1961)); id. at 844
n.14 (listing the cases).
44. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 2o6 (1827).
4s. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
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tions of the Act'" that break did not necessarily mean "that no deference should
be accorded the agency's interpretation of the statute."4 6 "An initial agency in-
terpretation," according to the Court, "is not instantly carved in stone." To the
contrary, the Court embraced the claim that the "fact that the agency has
adopted different definitions in different contexts adds force to the argument
that the definition itself is flexible."48 The key point, according to the Court,
was that, in a "technical and complex arena," the agency had "consistently in-
terpreted [the Act] flexibly" rather than "in a sterile textual vacuum" and had
properly considered "varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a
continuing basis.""
B. The Current Debate overJudicial Deference
In a number of recent concurrences and dissents, Justices on the Court have
highlighted their interest in confronting judicial deference from a historical or
separation-of-powers perspective, relying on an array of different sources from
Marbury to James Madison to Montesquieu. But none of these opinions has
addressed the cases that Chevron itself relied on to justify judicial deference as a
matter of precedent.
The first avenue through which Justices have raised these issues is in a cri-
tique of Chevron itself. The Chief Justice's dissent (joined by Justices Kennedy
and Alito) in City of Arlington v. FCC,s0 for example, attempted to re-evaluate
Chevron in light of separation-of-powers first principles. While nominally ac-
cepting the Chevron framework," the City of Arlington dissent stressed that its
46. Id. at 862; see also id. at 862-63 (canvassing a series of rules in which the agency had adopted
"varying interpretations" of the statutory term).
47. Id. at 863. Although some passages from Chevron suggest that it was somehow relevant that
the inconsistency in the agency's position was not directly attributable to the agency itself
(but rather to earlier unfavorable court of appeals decisions), see id. at 864, later cases have
stressed that "[a] gency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency's in-
terpretation under the Chevron framework," Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X In-
ternet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005); cf Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199,
1223 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the Court has "granted Seminole Rock def-
erence to agency interpretations that are inconsistent with interpretations adopted closer in
time to the promulgation of the regulations").
48. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864.
49. Id. at 863-64.
SO. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
51. See id. at 1886 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (conceding that Chevron "guards against the Judi-
ciary arrogating to itself policymaking properly left, under the separation of powers, to the
Executive"); id. at 188o (accepting that courts act consistently with the separation of powers
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"disagreement" with the majority is "fundamental"5 2 and premised on the no-
tion that the "duty to police the boundary between the Legislature and the Ex-
ecutive" is "firmly rooted in our constitutional structure" and is "as critical as
[the] duty to respect that [boundary] between the Judiciary and the Execu-
tive."s" Fixing "the boundaries of delegated authority," according to the dissent,
"is not a task" that courts can "delegate to the agency" because "[w]e do not
leave it to the agency to decide when it is in charge."
54 Deference under Chevron
is appropriate only if the court decides "whether Congress ... has in fact dele-
gated to the agency lawmaking power over the ambiguity at issue.""' Accord-
ingly, a congressional delegation of interpretive authority can support Chevron
deference only when the delegation "extend[s] to the specific statutory ambi-
guity at issue," because the question Chevron requires a court to ask "is whether
the delegation covers the 'specific provision' and 'particular question' before the
court."56 More recently, the Chief Justice revisited the proper application and
"when [they] afford an agency's statutory interpretation Chevron deference ... because Con-
gress has delegated to the agency the authority to interpret those ambiguities").
52. Id. at 1877.
S3. Id. at 1886.
54. Id.
ss. Id. at 188o; see id. at 1886 (stating that the judicial branch may "reconcile [its] competing
responsibilities" under Chevron only after determining "that Congress has given interpretive
authority to the agency"); id. at 1877 ("Courts defer to an agency's interpretation of law
when and because Congress has conferred on the agency interpretive authority over the
question at issue."); see also id. at 1875-76 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (agreeing that "[t]he question whether Congress has delegated to an agency
the authority to provide an interpretation that carries the force of law is for the judge to an-
swer independently"; arguing that "context-specific[] factors will on occasion prove rele-
vant" to whether an agency receives deference; and listing, among the factors, "the intersti-
tial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the
question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the
careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time" (quoting
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002))).
s6. Id. at 1883 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)); see also id. ("A congressional grant of authority over some
portion of a statute does not necessarily mean that Congress granted the agency interpretive
authority over all its provisions."). For its part, the majority opinion claimed that the Chief
Justice's dissent would work a "massive revision of our Chevron jurisprudence," id. at 1874
(majority opinion) with the "ultimate target [being] Chevron itself," id. at 1873. Echoing the
City of Arlington dissent (which he did not join), Justice Thomas recently argued that "Chev-
ron deference raises serious separation-of-powers questions" by "preclud[ing] judges from
exercising [independent] judgment" and "forcing them to abandon what they believe is the
best reading of an ambiguous statute in favor of an agency's construction." Michigan v. EPA,
135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quotation marks omitted); see also
Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2528-30
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scope of judicial deference in his majority opinion in King v. Burwell, which
casually dismissed the government's argument that the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice should receive deference for its construction of the Affordable Care Act's
tax-credit provisions. As the majority put it, the Court "often" applies Chevron
in assessing statutory issues of this nature, but not in "extraordinary cases" of
"deep 'economic and political significance' . . . central to th[e] statutory
scheme."" Accordingly, it was the Court's-not the agency's-"task to deter-
mine the [statute's] correct reading.""
The second avenue through which the Justices have questioned judicial
deference to the executive is through a critique of Chevron's sister doctrine-
commonly attributed to the Supreme Court's opinions in Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co. " and Auer v. Robbins60 - under which courts "defer to an agen-
cy's interpretation of its own regulations."61 In his partial dissent in Decker v.
Northwest Environmental Defense Center, Justice Scalia relied on separation-of-
powers first principles to argue that this doctrine should be abandoned and re-
placed with the rule that courts must give regulations their most "natural" and
"fairest" construction, "using the familiar tools of textual interpretation'" not-
withstanding the agency's advocacy of a plausible but "unnatural reading."62
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). For a recent court of appeals opinion that expresses similar
concerns, see Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (ioth Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (explaining that "Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swal-
low huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a
way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers' de-
sign").
57. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).
58. Id. at 2489; cf Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1989 (2015) ("Because it makes scant sense,
the [Board of Immigration Appeals]'s interpretation, we hold, is owed no deference under
the doctrine described in Chevron. . . .
59. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
6o. 518 U.S. 452 (1997).
61. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("In practice, Auer deference is Chevron deference applied to regula-
tions rather than statutes.").
62. 133 S. Ct. at 1339, 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Perez v.
Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1225 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("By my best
lights, the entire line of precedent beginning with Seminole Rock raises serious constitutional
questions and should be reconsidered in an appropriate case."); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338-39
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (expressing an interest in revisiting Auer and Seminole Rock in a
later case in which the issue has been more fully briefed and argued).
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More recently, in a separate concurrence in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n,
Justice Scalia observed that the APA "contemplates that courts, not agencies,
will authoritatively resolve ambiguities in statutes and regulations" and that the
Court's "elaborate law of deference to agencies' interpretations of statutes and
regulations" was "[h]eedless of the original design of" section 706.63 Despite
this observation, however, Justice Scalia did not call for Chevron's abandon-
ment because interpretive deference on statutory questions "was in conformity
with the long history of judicial review of executive action" under a writ of
mandamus.64 Seminole Rock and Auer should be rejected, he argued, because
there was no "such history justifying deference to agency interpretations of its
own regulations."65 Justice Thomas likewise questioned the "legitimacy" of
Seminole Rock, which (according to him) "effect[ed] a transfer of the judicial
power to an executive agency" and "raise[d] constitutional concerns" by "un-
dermin[ing]" the Court's "obligation to provide a judicial check on the other
branches."66 That was so because, according to Justice Thomas, "the judicial
power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent
judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws. "6 7 In language that
could apply just as easily to Chevron as to Seminole Rock, he claimed that
63. 135 S. Ct. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 1211-12 (arguing that
the Court had "supplement[ed] the APA with judge-made doctrines of deference," thereby
"revolutioniz[ing]" the APA's provision on interpretive rules, and claiming that this "prob-
lem is ... perhaps insoluble if Chevron is not to be uprooted, with respect to interpretive
rules setting forth agency interpretation of statutes").
64. Id. at 1212 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 243 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing)). That position is in some tension with the Court's statement in an opinion (also au-
thored by Justice Scalia) holding that the Supremacy Clause does not create a cause of ac-
tion. The Court said that it had "long held" that federal courts may grant injunctive relief
"with respect o violations of federal law by federal officials" -consistent with the traditional
relief "given in a court of equity," which "reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal
executive action, tracing back to England'" Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015) (citing Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 110
(1902)); see also Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 152-96
(1965)); infra Section II.C (addressing this issue). The Court gave no explanation to square
this tradition of (seemingly de novo) equitable relief against government officers with the
opposing tradition of deferential mandamus review.
65. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 1210 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (claiming that separate opinions "offer substantial reasons why the Seminole
Rock doctrine may be incorrect").
66. Id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
67. Id. at 1217.
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"[w]hen courts refuse to decide what the best interpretation is under the law,
they abandon the judicial check.""
What is notable about these recent opinions, taken together, is not merely
the anti-deference position that they advocate, but also their failure to engage
with the nineteenth-century cases on which Chevron relied. To be sure, the Jus-
tices have cited Chief Justice Marshall's directive in Marbury that courts must
"say what the law is"; 69 the text of the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and III;70
James Madison's and Alexander Hamilton's statements on the importance of
the separation of powers in The Federalist;` similar general statements by
Montesquieu, William Blackstone, and other pre-Founding authors;72 and the
68. Id. at 1221.
69. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.
Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury while contending that ju-
dicial deference "wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretive authority to 'say what the law
is,' and hands it over to the Executive" (citation omitted)); Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1222 (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Marbury for the proposition that "[ljudges are at
least as well suited as administrative agencies to engage in [the interpretive] task"); Decker
v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1340 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (contending that the "purpose of interpretation is to determine the fair
meaning of the rule- to 'say what the law is," and "to determine what policy has been made
and promulgated by the agency, to which the public owes obedience" (quoting Marbury, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177)).
70. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712-13 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing U.S. CONsT. art. I, § i; id.
art. III, § i).
71. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); City ofArlington, 133 S.
Ct. at 1877-78 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (contending that, contrary to Madison's claim that
the "accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands ...
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny," the modern administrative state
has allowed agencies to "exercise legislative power, by promulgating regulations with the
force of law; executive power, by policing compliance with those regulations; and judicial
power, by adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions on those found to have
violated their rules" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at
324 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961))); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (contending that deference under Auer contradicts Hamil-
ton's explanation for the Constitution's decision not to mimic British practice by using a
House of Lords as a court of last resort, "due in part to the fear that he who has 'agency in
passing bad laws' might operate in the 'same spirit' in their interpretation" (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 81, at 543-44 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961))).
72. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1220 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that
" [j]udges have long recognized their responsibility to apply the law" and appealing to Chief
Justice Coke); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that allowing agencies to both "prescribe" and "interpret" regulations violates the
principle that "the power to write a law and the power to interpret it cannot rest in the same
hands"; by appealing to Montesquieu's caution against uniting "the legislative and executive
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text of section 706 of the APA." But Chevron's reliance on early nineteenth-
century cases raises the possibility that each of these sources can, at the end of
the day, be reconciled with the broad principle of judicial deference that the
Court believed that it was rearticulating.
Cases like Edward's Lessee, on which Chevron itself relied, are completely
missing from the recent opinions questioning judicial deference. In other
words, though Chevron was premised on a jurisprudential tradition, that tradi-
tion plays no part in the current debate. That omission is a serious one, because
(assuming Chevron properly understood the cases) their age suggests that sepa-
ration of powers poses no barrier to judicial deference to executive interpreta-
tion. The import of those cases is thus key to assessing the recent judicial cri-
tiques of the Chevron opinion.
7
1
C. The Scholarly Treatment of the Precedents Cited in Chevron
Scholars have previously addressed the cases on which Chevron relied, but
here too the debate remains incomplete. In an article almost contemporaneous
with the Court's opinion in Chevron, Henry Monaghan relied on the same basic
set of precedents to conclude that " [h] istory, if not logic, is . . . squarely against
the wide assertion . . . that article III courts can never yield to administrative
powers . . . in the same person" for fear that "the same monarch or senate should enact ty-
rannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner"; and by appealing to Blackstone's
condemnation of the ancient practice of resolving doubts about "the construction of the
Roman laws" by "stat[ing] the case to the emperor in writing, and tak[ing] his opinion up-
on it" (quoting MONTESQUIEU, SPHUT OF THE LAws bk. XI, at 151-52 (0. Piest ed., T. Nugent
trans., 1949) (1748); and 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *58)).
73. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1211-12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); City of Arlington, 133
S. Ct. at 188o (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
74. The debate within the courts has been supplemented recently by legislative debate on the
wisdom of judicial deference. Two Senate committees have held hearings with
testimony questioning the continued role of judicial deference to agencies' statutory
interpretations. See Examining Agency Use of Deference, Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Regulatory Affairs and Fed. Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental
Affairs, 114 th Cong. (2016), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/examining-agency-use
-of-deference-part-ii [http://perma.cc/934T-2QLF]; Examining the Federal Regulatory System
To Improve Accountability, Transparency and Integrity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, ii 4 th Cong. (2015), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/examining-the
-federal-regulatory-system-to-improve-accountability-transparency-and-integrity [http://
perma.cc/AZV6-5KVJI]. And the House of Representatives recently passed legislation, enti-
tled the "Separation of Powers Restoration Act,0f 2016,' that would add to section 706 an
explicit requirement that courts review "de novo" all questions of law. See H.R. 4768, 114 th
Cong. (2016).
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constructions of law."" He contended that "the Marshall court itself gave early
sanction to deference principles," with "judicial expressions of deference in-
creas [ing]" over the course of the nineteenth century and Marbury proving "no
barrier to the development."
Adopting a slightly different perspective, Thomas Merrill identified a tradi-
tion of deference that was "pragmatic and contextual" and based on "an eclectic
cluster of considerations," such as the relative expertise of the agency, the con-
sistency or contemporaneity of the agency's interpretation, and the depth of the
agency's analysis." In a similar vein, Peter Strauss observed that a court inter-
preting a statute referred to "the meanings attributed to it by prior (adminis-
trative) interpreters, their stability, and the possibly superior body of infor-
mation and more embracive responsibilities that underlay them."" Like Strauss
and Merrill, the most prominent administrative law scholars in the decades fol-
lowing the APA's passage, Kenneth Culp Davis and Louis Jaffe, both described
the doctrine of judicial deference as turning on a host of factors." According to
Merrill, however, this pre-Chevron tradition "had no unifying theory for de-
75. Henry Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 17 (1983).
Notwithstanding the thirty-year passage of time, both the dissent and majority in City ofAr-
lington cited Monaghan's article. Chief Justice Roberts quoted the article for the proposition
that a "court is not abdicating its constitutional duty to 'say what the law is' by deferring to
agency interpretations of law: it is simply applying the law as 'made' by the authorized law-
making entity." 133 S. Ct. at 188o (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Monaghan, supra, at
27-28). Justice Scalia's majority opinion cited it for the proposition that "[a]dministrative
application of law is administrative formulation of law whenever it involves elaboration of
the statutory norm." Id. at 1870 (majority opinion) (quoting Monaghan, supra, at 29).
76. Monaghan, supra note 75, at 14-15.
77. Merrill, supra note 18, at 972-73. In a subsequent article, Merrill and his coauthor Kathryn
Watts have suggested that Congress signals that judicial deference is appropriate when it
grants an agency rulemaking authority with the "force of law" and that, conversely, agencies
that lack such rulemaking authority ought not be given Chevron deference. Thomas W. Mer-
rill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116
HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002). Although their article uncovers significant evidence that the APA
intended to tether its notice-and-comment requirements to the phrasing of rulemaking
grants, I am not persuaded that the language of the grants was intended to trigger applica-
tion (or non-application) of judicial deference.
78. Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skid-
more Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1143, 1156 (2012); see also Peter L. Strauss, In Search of
Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REv. 789, 789 (2014) ("Ever since 1827, the U.S. Supreme Court
has repeatedly observed that when a court is interpreting a statute that falls within the au-
thority of an administrative agency, the court in reaching its own judgment about the stat-
ute's meaning should give substantial weight to the agency's view.").
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termining when to defer"; had "no explicit rationale linking the various factors
together'" which "tended to be invoked unevenly"; and "did not comprise, ei-
ther individually or collectively, what could be described as a coherent doc-
trine."so "No attempt, as he puts it, "was made to connect the various factors
together or to explain their relevance in terms of a model of executive-judicial
relationship. ""
With respect to the argument that Chevron may be justified as consistent
with "the origins of federal-court judicial review" in the writ of mandamus,
scholars have had little to say.82 Since Chevron, there has been no in-depth
scholarly or jurisprudential attention to this issue, despite acknowledgement
that it is one of the few attempts "to reconcile Chevron with the text of the
APA."83
The failure to engage with Chevron's precedential origins and the nature of
mandamus review has left an important gap in the administrative law litera-
ture. In the remainder of this Article, my goal is not only to fill this gap, but al-
so to provide a richer and deeper understanding of the doctrinal underpinnings
of judicial deference and an explanation of how the Chevron Court misinter-
preted the precedents on which it relied.
80. Merrill, supra note 18, at 972, 974.
81. Id. at 974; see also Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 549, 562 (1985) (describing various "divergent strains in the Court's administrative
review jurisprudence"); Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and
Force of Law, 66 OHIo ST. L.J. 1013, 1025-26 (2005) ("[T]he judicial deference doctrine of the
pre-Chevron era did not constitute a coherent body of law, and one must treat generaliza-
tions about it with care."); Woolhandler, supra note 14, at 234 ("The Court's deference to
long-standing constructions of statutes by the executive seems to have been similarly influ-
enced by the need for reliability in land patents to avoid obstructions on the sale and use of
land.").
82. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
refers to, and derives his view from, Jaffe's observation that the standard for mandamus can
"be taken to mean that if the applicable rule of law is disputable (in the opinion of the
judge), then the court will not make an independent determination of the law upon which
to base a command to the officer," which Jaffe analogizes to a deferential "theory of judicial
review generally." JAFFE, supra note 64, at 183.
83. Manning, supra note io, at 465 & n.68. Two recent (albeit fleeting) treatments of manda-
mus' relevance to judicial deference can be found in PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw UNLAWFUL? 293-94, 308-09 (2014), and JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw 212-13, 302 (2012).
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II. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERPRETATION FROM THE
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC TO THE END OF THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY
Interpretive theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries routinely
applied two interpretive canons to eliminate the problem of ambiguity: a reli-
ance on the contemporaneous understanding of a text (what was called the
"contemporanea expositio") and a reliance on the customary understanding of
that text (the "interpres consuetudo"). The nineteenth-century cases on which
Chevron relied apply these two canons of construction, which form the critical
theoretical underpinnings for the case law and the interpretive methodology of
the era. In this Part, I explore the interpretive methodology used by nine-
teenth-century courts and commentators, beginning in Section II.A with a re-
view of the intellectual foundations of the interpretive approach, before turning
in Section II.B to an examination of how American courts applied the interpre-
tive methodology in practice. I then turn in Section II.C to two related issues:
the articulation of the standard for obtaining a writ of mandamus, and the
proper scope for reviewing factual issues previously adjudicated by executive
branch officers. These issues illuminate how nineteenth-century courts viewed
the proper relationship between the judicial and executive branches. They were
also instrumental in the development of doctrines of deference during the
twentieth century. Finally, in Section II.D, I offer a "view from 1900" through
the lens of nineteenth-century treatises.
A. The Theory of Interpretation: The Contemporanea Expositio and Interpres
Consuetudo Canons of Construction
In a recent opinion respecting the denial of certiorari, Justice Scalia re-
marked that King James I, England's monarch at the turn of the seventeenth
century, "did not have the benefit of Chevron deference."84 James I governed a
nation with an administrative apparatus far different in kind and scope from
the American administrative state. But the smaller size and dissimilar ambi-
tions of the seventeenth-century English state did not eliminate the need for
English judges to interpret ambiguous legal text. Rather than adopting a Chev-
ron-like framework, however, judges adhered to customary canons of construc-
tion in the face of statutory ambiguity. Two of those canons- the contemporanea
84. Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari). James I was the primary royal antagonist of Sir Edward Colce, whose views
shaped English law and the legal perspective of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Ameri-
can lawyers. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
930
126:908 2017
THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO EXECUTIVE INTERPRETATION
expositio and interpres consuetudo -were central to the development of judicial
deference.
1. The Problem ofAmbiguity
It takes no genius to recognize that legal text can, for a variety of reasons,
be difficult to interpret. Not surprisingly, seventeenth- and eighteenth- century
legal theorists (some of whom could fairly be described as geniuses) identified
the problems that ambiguity, in its various guises, posed for an ordered legal
system.8
Writ large, the goal of interpretation was straightforward: understanding
the meaning and intention of the text's "speaker." In the words of John Selden,
a well-known seventeenth-century scholar and parliamentarian, "a mans wryt-
ing has" the "sense" that "the Author meant when he write it."" Or as John
Locke put the same point, a man speaks so "that he may be understood" and to
"make known his ideas to the hearer."" The "signification" of the speaker's
words, therefore, "is limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing
else" -lest they end up "hav[ing] no signification at all.""
That commonsense approach, however, could break down in significant
cases. One difficulty was the inherent ambiguity of human language and the
constant concern that an author had expressed himself imprecisely -a problem
only exacerbated by the fact that legal documents were often created for appli-
cation to future circumstances not fully anticipated." The amount of time be-
tween the text's creation and the text's application often meant, as Blackstone
pointed out, that the precise issue to be adjudicated "probably ... did not occur
85. Cf Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("Those who ratified the Constitution knew that legal texts would often contain
ambiguities.").
86. THE TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 12-13 (Frederick Pollock ed., 1927).
87. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE HuMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. III, ch. II, § 2, at 204
(Raymond Wilburn ed., 1947) (1689).
88. Id.; id. § 8, at 206.
89. See 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND § 21, at
24 b (photo. reprt. 2008) (Francis Hargrave & Charles Butler eds., 1809) (observing that
"the law-makers could not possibly set downe all cases in expresse terms"); THOMAS WOOD,
AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND 8 (3d ed. 1724) (observing that "[I] aw-makers can-
not comprehend all Cases"); cf Edrich's Case (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 238 (CP) 239 (holding
that the words of a statute are followed "when the meaning of the makers doth not appear to
the contrary, and when no inconvenience will thereupon follow").
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to the legislators when they framed the ... Act.""o A second difficulty was the
change in the conventional usages of language over time -otherwise known as
semantic drift. Even where a legal text's meaning was unambiguously known
and established at the time of its adoption, the passage of years could change
and obscure the sense of the words used. "Laws operate at a distance of time,"
wrote the English cleric and academic Thomas Rutherforth in an influential
treatise -a distance that could hinder the search for "true meaning" by inter-
preters "who live many years, after the laws were made.""
And a third difficulty arose in the case of legal texts created by more than
one party.9' In such cases, the various "authors" may not have intended to ex-
press the same idea in creating the text, and asking them for their meaning
after the fact could be problematic because their perspectives could become un-
reliable. At the time when judicial interpretation was generally necessary- after
a dispute between parties could not be resolved outside of the courts -a fair-
minded interpreter could not simply ask the parties what they meant to say, be-
cause each party's interpretation of the text was likely colored by present inter-
ests.93 For that reason, Blackstone argued that " [t] o interrogate the legislature
go. Gerard's Case (1777) 96 Eng. Rep. 663 (CP) 665 (opinion of Blackstone, J.).
91. 2 THOMAS RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 336 (1756); see also 3 EMMERICH DE
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 202 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. 1916) (1758)
("Languages are constantly varying in form; the force and meaning of terms change in the
course of time.").
92. A DISCOURSE UPON THE ExPOSICION & UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTES WITH SIR THOMAS
EGERTON'S ADDITIONS 151 (Samuel E. Thorne ed., 1942) [hereinafter EXPOSICION & UNDER-
STANDINGE OF STATUTES] (describing the problem as involving the existence of "so manie
heades as there were, so many wittes; so manie statute makers, so many myndes").
93. See 3 DE VATTEL, supra note 91, at 200 ("[I]f I am allowed to explain my promises after my
own pleasure I shall have it in my power to render them meaningless and of no effect by giv-
ing them a meaning quite different from that they had for you when you accepted them.");
see also I JEAN DOMAT, THE CIviL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER TOGETHER WITH THE PUBLICK
LAw xlix (William Strahan trans., 2d ed. 1737) (1722) (advising that, in the formation of
contracts, "the Intention of the one Party, ought to answer to that of the other, and it is nec-
essary that they understand each other, and that they agree together," lest one party "hath
made use of an ambiguous Expression"); HUGO GROTIUs, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE
352 (Jean Barbeyrac ed., Innys et al. 1738) (1625) (reasoning that "there would be no Obliga-
tion at all by Promises, if every Man were left to his Liberty, to put what Construction he
pleased upon them"); 1 JOHN JOSEPH POWELL, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND
AGREEMENTS 372-73 (Garland 1978) (1790) ("[W]hatever difference there may be between a
man's internal sentiments and external expression, he must, in his ordinary transactions
with mankind, be concluded to use signs according to their common acceptation ....
Therefore he, in whose favor an obligation is incurred, has a right to compel him, from
whom it is due, to perform it in that sense, which the ordinary interpretation of the signs
made use of import."); SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS: OR, A
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to decide particular disputes, is not only endless, but affords great room for
partiality and oppression."" Like parties to a contract, legislators could give bi-
ased testimony, perhaps as a result of influence by persons interested in and ca-
pable of corrupting the bargain struck in the statute's text.95
2. Solutions to the Problem ofAmbiguity
The goal of interpretation was to mitigate these difficulties through the ap-
plication of neutral rules-the canons of construction - that approximated, in
Blackstone's words, the legislature's "intentions at the time when the law was
made, by signs the most natural and probable."96 Many of these canons were
nothing more than rules of thumb for good English. Others were of a more le-
gal bent and remain familiar to us today, such as the canon that an interpreter
should "construe one part of the statute by another part of the same statute, for
that best expresseth the meaning of the makers.""
Two of those canons are central to the development of judicial deference.
The first canon was distilled in the Latin maxim contemporanea expositio est op-
tima et fortissima in lege- or "a contemporaneous exposition is the best and
most powerful in law." The rule had deep-rooted origins. As early as the
GENERAL SYSTEM OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY, JURISPRUDENCE, AND
POLITICs 534 (Bonwicke et al. eds., Basil Kennet trans., 5th ed. 1749) (1672) ("[T]here
would be no such Thing as Obligation, if any one might free himself, by affixing what Sense
he pleased to his Signs, and by pretending that he meant different from their true Significa-
tion.").
94. 1 WIILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *58.
9s. Cf 2 RUTHERFORTH, supra note 91, at 3o8 (reasoning that it would be unfair to require a
person "to comply with [a legislator's] will" when he did "not know what [that] will is," but
could see only an "outward sign or mark [namely, the enacted law], by which this will is ex-
pressed or declared").
96. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *59 (emphasis omitted); see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that
during the ratification debate, Federalists expected courts to apply "principles of interpreta-
tion that had been set out by jurists for centuries"); Simon v. Metivier or Motivos (1766) 96
Eng. Rep. 347 (KB) 347 (opinion of Mansfield, C.J.) ("[W]hat the Legislature meant, is the
rule both at law and equity; for, in this case, both are the same. The key to the construction
of the Act is the intent of the Legislature . . . ."). In discussing the interpretive approach of
this era, I do not mean to suggest that all theorists shared a common vision on all legal mat-
ters. Far from it. See, e.g., Emily Kadens,Justice Blackstone's Common Law Orthodoxy, 103 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1553, 1598-1604 (2009) (describing Blackstone as the anti-Mansfield because of
the former's advocacy of common-law orthodoxy and the latter's advocacy of change). My
summary of the interpretive methodology is intended to canvass the shared legal ground
upon which the various authors conducted their legal debates.
97. 2 COKE, supra note 89, § 728, at 381 a.
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fifteenth century, Chief Justice Frowyck claimed that, in the absence of legisla-
tors' "declaracion of theire myndes" in statutory text, the "authoritye" of those
who "were mooste neerest the statute" would "persuade us.""
For the generation of the Constitution's Framers, the canon's most famous
proponent was the eminent Elizabethan-era jurist Edward Coke. "Great re-
gard," he is believed to have explained,
[O]ught, in construing a statute, to be paid to the construction which
the sages of the law, who lived about the time, or soon after it was
made, put upon it; because they were best able to judge of the intention
of the makers at the time when the law was made.99
Early expositors of legal text were often "best able to judge of the intention" of
the text's drafters, thereby allowing a later interpreter to approximate the draft-
ers' meaning. For that reason, Coke explained in the Magdalen College Case that
"Acts of Parliament ... are to be construed according to the intent and meaning
of the makers of them, the original intent and meaning is to be observed." 0 In
particular, "ancient acts and graunts," like the Magna Carta, "must be construed
and taken as the law was holden at that time when they were made."'01 Other
legal scholars advocated the same general approach.'02 Rutherforth, for exam-
98. EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTES, supra note 92, at 152; see also THEODORE F.T.
PLUCKNETT, STATUTES & THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH
CENTURY 49-50 (1st ed. 1922) (describing an early case in which the judge, who also served
as a member of the legislature, proclaimed, "[d]o not gloss the statute for we know better
than you; we made it").
99. 2 FORTUNATUS DwARRis, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES 562 (2d ed. 1848) (ascribing
this language to Coke).
loo. The Case of the Master and Fellows of Magdalen Coll. in Cambridge (1615) 77 Eng. Rep.
1235, 1245; 11 Co. Rep. 66 b, 73 b.
101. 1 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND i (photo.
reprt. 2008) (1797); see also Rex v. Bishop of London (1694) 89 Eng. Rep. 714, 715; 1 Show.
K.B. 493, 495 ("[I]n any construction of Acts of Parliament, the original intent and meaning
of the makers of the law is to be observed . . . .").
102. See, e.g., S.B. CHRIMES, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 293
(1936) (stating that the "rule of reference to the intention of the legislators ... was certainly
established by the second half of the fifteenth century"). The point was made repeatedly by
the authors of legal treatises. See GROTIUS, supra note 93, at 353 ("The best Rule of Interpre-
tation is to guess at the Will by the most probable Signs ... ."); SIR CHRISTOPHER HATTON,
A TREATISE CONCERNING STATUTES, OR ACTS OF PARLIAMENT: AND THE EXPOSITION THERE-
OF 14 (1677) (asserting that "when the intent is proved, that must be followed"); VON PUF-
ENDORF, supra note 93, at 535 ("The true End and Design of Interpretation is, to gather the
Intent of the Man from most probable Signs."); 2 RUTHERFORTH, supra note 91, at 309
("The end, which interpretation aims at, is to find out what was the intention of the writer;
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ple, advocated that, to "remov[e] any doubts about the sense" of a law "owing
only to our remoteness from its original establishment," an interpreter should
"look[] back into the contemporary practice .. . which the law produced in the
first instance" to "see in what sense it was then understood."os
Jurists applied the contemporanea expositio rule of thumb in a wide variety of
cases. In 1591, for example, the King's Bench observed that "when [an] ancient
grant is general, obscure, or ambiguous, it shall not be now interpreted as a
charter made at this day, but it shall be construed as the law was taken at the
time when such ancient charter was made, and according to the ancient allow-
ance on record."104
And the canon was not directed at statutes alone: it was viewed as a generalized
method of proper interpretation, applicable to all manner of legal instruments.
Vattel, for example, argued that, in seeking the meaning of a treaty's words at
the time it "was entered into and its terms drawn up" the interpreter should
consult "deeds of the same period and ... contemporary writers, by a careful
process of comparison."os
Precisely how to implement the canon was the subject of debate. On the
one hand, in what may be one of the early uses in the common-law tradition of
some sort of "legislative history" to arrive at the contemporanea expositio, Chief
Justice Frowycke wrote in the fifteenth century that "those that were the pen-
ners & devisors of statutes [have] bene the grettest lighte for exposicion of
statutes."'o6 That suggested that the interpretation expressed by the authors of
to clear up the meaning of his words. . .); 3 DE VATTEL, supra note 91, at 201 (asserting
that the rules for interpreting treaties and contracts should be "adapted to determining the
meaning of the contract as it was naturally understood by the parties when drawn up and
accepted" (emphasis omitted)). For examples of sources using the Latin formulation of the
canon, see 4 MATTHEW BACON, A NEw ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAw 648 (5 th ed. 1786); HER-
BERT BROOM, A SELECtION OF LEGAL MAXIMs 683 (8th ed. 1882); 2 DWARRIS, supra note 99,
at 562; and WOOD, supra note 89, at 8.
103. 2 RUTHERFORTH, supra note 91, at 336-37.
104. The Case of the Abbot of Strata Mercella (1591) 77 Eng. Rep. 765, 772; 9 Co. Rep. 24 a, 28 a
(footnotes omitted).
105. 3 DE VATTEL, supra note 91, at 202.
io6. EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTES, supra note 92, at 151-52. It may be that Chief
Justice Frowycke's perspective on the appropriateness of referring to the personal knowledge
and intent of a law's draftsman predated (and was hence superseded by) the separation of
judicial and governmental functions in the King's Council. See S.E. Thorne, The Equity of a
Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 ILL. L. REV. 202, 203 (1936) ("It is only after the middle of the
fourteenth century, when judges find themselves no longer able to draw either upon the ac-
tual intention of the legislator or upon the royal dispensing power, that they are forced to
construct a body of rules of statutory interpretation. . . ."); see also John 0. McGinnis & Mi-
chael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case
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the statute-albeit intentions not expressed in the statute itself-would be
somehow privileged above the interpretation of others. A number of cases,
such as Chief Justice Mansfield's opinion in Atcheson v. Everitt, "looked into the
debates of th[e] days" during which a law was enacted.10 7 On the other hand,
the English majority view appeared to preclude the use of legislative debates to
aid statutory construction. As Christopher Hatton, Lord Chancellor under
Elizabeth I, observed, parliamentarians had no special authority over the inter-
pretation of legal text because "their Authority is returned to the Electors so
clearly" even "if they were altogether assembled again for interpretation by a
voluntary meeting."os More to the point, other judges asserted that "[t]he
sense and meaning of an Act of Parliament must be collected from what it says
when passed into a law; and not from the history of changes it underwent in
the house where it took its rise."10 As a result, "[p]arliamentary doubts, de-
bates, or conferences, ought to have no weight in directing judicial determina-
tions." 10
But whether the interpreter was permitted to use sources akin to what we
now call legislative history-or only other sources indicating the author's in-
tent, such as contemporaneous dictionaries or scholarly works - the ultimate
Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 751, 790, 791 n.135 (2009) (reasoning that, in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, an "increasing emphasis on statutory text was due in
part to the emergence of a stricter separation of legislative and judicial powers" and in part
to the appearance of "more careful drafting" by legislators).
107. Atcheson v. Everitt (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1142, 1147; 1 Cowp. 382, 390; see also Earl of Leicester
v. Heydon (1571) 75 Eng. Rep. 582, 602; 1 Plowden 384, 398 (citing legislative history that
was "well known, the affair happening but of late time" and that may "discover to us the in-
tent of the makers of the Act"); Partridge v. Strange (1553) 75 Eng. Rep. 123, 130; 1 Plowden
77, 82 (reasoning that, because "words" are "no other than the verberation of the air," they
are only "the image" of the statute; that "the life of the statute rests in the minds of the ex-
positors of the words"; and that if those expositors "are dispersed, so that their minds can-
not be known, then those who may approach nearest to their minds shall construe the
words"); CHRIMES, supra note 102, at 293-95 (discussing judicial reference to legislative in-
tent in the fifteenth century).
io8. HArrON, supra note 102, at 29-30.
iog. Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 217; 4 Burr. 2303, 2332 (Willes, J., concurring)
(reasoning that the legislative "history is not known to the other house, or to the Sover-
eign"); cf. id. at 256 (opinion of Mansfield, C.J.) (relying on legislative history by observing
that "[a]n alteration was made in the committee"); id. at 248 (Yates, J., dissenting) (relying
on legislative history). During the course of the nineteenth century, the British courts' aver-
sion to relying on legislative history hardened. See Regina v. Hertford Coll., [1878] 3 QB 693
at 707 (Eng.) ("The statute is clear, and the parliamentary history of a statute is wisely in-
admissible to explain it .
11o. Evans v. Harrison (1762) 97 Eng. Rep. 51, 62; Wilm. 130, 159.
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point was the same: the faithful interpreter of an ambiguous statute resorted to
contemporaneous ources to determine the contemporanea expositio.1"'
The second rule of thumb was also distilled into a Latin phrase -optimus
interpres legum consuetudo, or "usage is the best interpreter of laws."1 2 The in-
terpres consuetudo canon, as I will call it, had equally deep-rooted origins. The
Roman jurist Julius Paulus Prudentissimus - the praetorian prefect to the Em-
peror Alexander Severus and the most excerpted authority in Justinian's Di-
gest- had expressed the point as early as the third century.113 Like the contempo-
ranea expositio canon, the interpres consuetudo canon was routinely applied by
courts." Coke applied it in Lord Cromwel's Case."s John Vaughan, the Chief
Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and a friend of John Selden's, remarked
in Sheppard v. Gosnold that "[w] here the penning of a statute is dubious, long
usage is a just medium to expound it by"-because "the meaning of things
spoken or written must be, as it hath constantly been receiv'd to be by common
acceptation."1 16
ill. In short, the timeworn question of whether "legislative history," or the expressed subjective
"intention" of the authors of a legal text, may properly be used as a tool to interpret statutes
is outside the scope of this Article. For recent treatments of the historical practice, see PHILIP
HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 54 (20o8) (arguing that common lawyers started
with "an initial presumption that the intent could be discerned from the words," but "recog-
ni[zed] that when the words remained unclear it was necessary to inquire more broadly
about the act's intent"); and Robert G. Natelson, The Founders' Hermeneutic: The Real Origi-
nal Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239, 1259-73 (2007) (concluding that
the English rule precluding reliance on legislative history did not appear until the nineteenth
century).
n2. See 1 COKE, supra note loi, at 18, 282 (setting forth the canon); see also id. at 25 (contending
that "the best expositors of this and all other statutes are our bookes and use or experi-
ence"); EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 75
(5th ed., Streater et al. 1671) (1644); 2 JOHN LILLY, THE PRACTICAL REGISTER: OR A GEN-
ERAL ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAw 649 (2d ed. 1745) (stating that "long Usage is a just Medium
to expound [an Act of Parliament] by").
113. THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 1.3.37 (Paulus, Quaestiones i) ("[O]ptima enim est legum inter-
pres consuetudo."); see also DIG. 1.3.23 (Paulus, Ad Plautium 4) ("Minime sunt mutanda,
quae interpretationem certain semper habuerunt."); DIG. 1.3.26 (Paulus, Quaestiones 4)
("Non est novum, ut priores leges ad posteriores trahantur.").
114. The maxim appeared in a variety of formulations. See, e.g., Stevens v. Duclkworth (1664) 145
Eng. Rep. 486, 487; Hardres 338, 340 ("[U]sus optimus magister & interpres." ("Use is an
excellent teacher and interpreter.")); Molyn's Case (1590) 77 Eng. Rep. 261, 261; 6 Co. Rep.
5 b, 6 a ("[C]onsuetudo est optima interpres legum.").
115. Lord Cromwel v. Andrews (1601) 76 Eng. Rep. 574, 597; 2 Co. Rep. 69 b, 81 a.
116. Sheppard v. Gosnold (1672) 124 Eng. Rep. lo18, 1023; Vaugh. 159, 169; see also 4 BACON, SU-
pra note 102, at 653 (repeating Chief Justice Vaughan's language). Custom did not trump
plain legal text. As Vaughan explained, usage that was "against the obvious meaning of an
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Nobody harbored the illusion that reference to contemporary or customary
practices allowed the interpreter to capture perfectly the meaning of the speak-
er. But as the British judge and politician James Mansfield observed, "It is of
greater consequence that the law should be as uniform as possible, than that
the equitable claims of an individual should be attended to."'17 There was, in
other words, utility in not disturbing the expectations of parties who had come
to rely on the customary interpretation. If the "uniformity" produced by the
customary interpretation did not reflect the legislature's wishes -perhaps be-
cause "the subtle and nice Wits of learned Lawyers" had obscured parliamen-
tary intent-the legislators, "who best knew their own Sense and Meaning,"
could enact explanatory statutes "to direct and guide the Judges.""'
3. American Perspectives
American lawyers at the time of the Constitution's adoption were familiar
with these theoretical debates and the resulting interpretive framework."' For
example, in the widely circulated The Federalist, James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton analyzed how these interpretive principles would be applied to con-
strue a newly adopted Federal Constitution and concluded that constitutional
Act of Parliament" and was practiced solely "by the vulgar and common acceptation of the
words" was "an oppression," rather than an "exposition of the Act." Sheppard, 124 Eng. Rep.
at 1023; Vaugh. at 170; see also Molyn's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 262 ("Quod licet consuetudo est
magnae authoritatis nunquam tamen praejudicat veritati." ("While custom is of great au-
thority, it never . .. prejudices the truth.")); 4 BACON, supra 102, at 653 ("But if the Usage
have been, to construe the Words of a Statute contrary to their obvious Meaning, such Us-
age is not to be regarded. . . .").
117. Hammond v. Anderson (1804) 1 Bos. & Pul. 69, reprinted in 2 LEADING CASES IN THE COM-
MERCIAL LAW OF ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND 148, 150 (George Ross ed., 1855).
118. WILLIAM PEYT, JUS PARLIAMENTARIUM 55 (2d ed. 1741).
11g. See, e.g., Julius Goebel, Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 555,
563 (1938) ("It is the tradition of Coke's time that passes over to the American colonies, for it
is upon the methods and constitutional views of Coke that the colonial lawyers were nur-
tured."). Thomas Jefferson, to take just one example, told Madison that "a sounder whig"
than Coke "never wrote, nor of profounder learning in the orthodox doctrines of the British
constitution, or in what were called English liberties." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (Feb. 17, 1826), in 12 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 455, 456 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., 1905). It should be noted, however, that as a nineteen-year-old law clerk,
Jefferson rendered a somewhat less favorable verdict of Coke's scholarship. See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to John Page (Dec. 25, 1762), in 3 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
1760-1776, 3, 5 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) ("Well, Page, I do wish the Devil had old Cooke,
for I am sure I never was so tired of an old dull scoundrel in my life.").
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interpretation should mimic ordinary statutory interpretation.
120 Thus, Hamil-
ton equated the task that Article III judges would have in interpreting the Con-
stitution with their ordinary role in applying tools of statutory construction to
congressional enactments. Without suggesting a bright demarcation between
deferential statutory review and de novo constitutional review, he observed
that the judiciary would "ascertain [the Constitution's] meaning, as well as the
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body."121
Second, in articulating that generalized interpretive approach, Madison
acknowledged the pervasive problem of legal ambiguity, and the specific criti-
cisms of the anti-Federalists that the language of the Constitution was ambigu-
ous,'22 in terms that would have been familiar to legal theorists of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. Madison observed that "no language is so
copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as
not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas."1
2 3 Due to inherent
deficiencies in language, "new laws, though penned with the greatest technical
skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as
more or less obscure and equivocal."1
2 4
120. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885,
948 (1985) ("Early interpreters usually applied standard techniques of statutory construc-
tion to the Constitution."); see also Donaldson v. Harvey, 3 H. & McH. 12, 19 (Md. 1790)
("In expounding the [F]ederal [C]onstitution, the same rules will be observed which are at-
tended to in the exposition of a statute.").
121. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
122. See Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution' Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 239, 307 n.254 (1989) (citing examples of anti-Federalist complaints about the Consti-
tution's vagueness). But see id. at 308 nn.260-61 (citing examples of Federalist contention
that "the Constitution was clear or at least as clear as possible in light of both linguistic and
political difficulties").
123. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
124. Id. Madison's private correspondence further reveals that he was generally aware of then-
current European debates on proper interpretive methodology and specifically aware of the
special problems posed by semantic drift. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Con-
ventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 519, 521, 525 (2003) (observing that "James Madison and other
prominent founders did not consider the Constitution's meaning to be fully settled at the
moment it was written," but rather "recognized that it contained ambiguities"); see also id. at
551 n.137 (touching briefly on the connection between early interpretive methodology and
Chevron by making the "limited" analogy that the "canon of statutory construction reflected
in [Chevron] illustrates how legal texts that do not explicitly delegate interpretive authority
to anyone might nonetheless be understood to include an implicit delegation as part of ...
their 'meaning," but stressing that Chevron and founding-era interpretive principles are not
"identical" given that "the terms of the delegation inferred by Chevron give administrative
agencies substantially more freedom to depart from settled understandings than the Madi-
sonian concept of 'liquidation"').
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Third, Hamilton considered, but rejected, the possibility that the political
branches would fill in the ambiguities in the Constitution's text. He addressed
the likelihood that the "[1]egislative body [would] themselves [be] the consti-
tutional judges of their own powers," making the "construction they put upon
them ... conclusive upon the other departments." 1.25 He rejected that view as
not being "the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any
particular provisions in the Constitution."1 26 In light of the Constitution's sepa-
ration of powers, Hamilton noted, it would be "far more rational to suppose
that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the
limits assigned to their authority," with "[t]he interpretation of the laws [as]
the proper and peculiar province of the courts."1 27
Fourth, both Madison and Hamilton adopted the proposed solutions to the
problem of legal ambiguity advocated by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
legal theorists. They stressed, in other words, the role of custom and contem-
poraneity in construing those parts of the Constitution's text that may other-
wise be susceptible to a range of permissible interpretations. In the words of
Hamilton, customary practice that developed over time would "liquidate the
meaning" of the Federal Constitution.1 28 Or as Madison put it, the meaning of
constitutional provisions would be "liquidated and ascertained by a series of
particular discussions and adjudications."1 29
Commentators of the era echoed Madison's and Hamilton's views in polem-
ics, scholarly works, and legislative debates. Law professor and jurist Theophi-
lus Parsons, for example, declared that the people would have "no permanent
security of ... person and property" if "the executive and judicial powers be
united'" because "[t]he executive power would interpret the laws and bend
them to his will; and, as he is the judge, he may leap over them by artful con-
structions, and gratify, with impunity, the most rapacious passions."13o In a
more sober vein, James Wilson declared that "[t]he first and governing maxim
in the interpretation of a statute is, to discover the meaning of those, who made
it.""' Similarly, writing under the pseudonym Brutus, the well-known anti-
125. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 121, at 467.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 491 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
129. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 123, at 229.
13o. THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS 374 (1859).
131. James Wilson, Of the Study of the Law in the United States (1804), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS
OF JAMES WILSON 69, 75 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
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Federalist Robert Yates assumed that the Supreme Court would "fix[], by a
course of decisions" the "meaning and construction of the constitution"3 2
During the First Congress, various congressmen repeatedly referenced the con-
temporaneous and customary interpretation given to constitutional provisions
in advancing their positions in debates over the Bill of Rights, the removal of
federal officers, and the First National Bank.' As Madison put it during the
consideration of the First National Bank, the participants of these debates
shared the assumption that "[c]ontemporary and concurrent expositions" of
the Constitution were "reasonable evidence of the meaning of the parties."134
B. The Interpretive Theory in Practice
Looking from the vantage point of the Framers and early theorists, one can
better understand the nineteenth-century cases on which Chevron relied. In
particular, these sources highlight that courts' repeated assertions that certain
executive interpretations of legal text should receive "respect" were in fact ap-
plications of the theory that an ambiguous legal text should be given its con-
temporaneous and customary meaning. The courts' assertions were, in both
constitutional and statutory cases alike, applications of the contemporanea expo-
sitio and interpres consuetudo canons, not of judicial deference to the executive as
such. A look into early American practice demonstrates courts' use of the can-
132. Brutus XII, N.Y.J., Feb. 7, 1788, reprinted in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFI-
CATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 72, 73 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1986). This notion was
repeated throughout the early Republic. See, e.g., NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, PRINCIPLES OF Gov-
ERNMENT: A TREATISE ON FREE INSTITUTIONS INCLUDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES 254 (1833) (observing that the "meaning of words or terms" may change over
time, but the "meaning of the constitution is not therefore changed"); GULIAN C. VER-
PLANCK, SPEECH WHEN IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, IN THE SENATE OF NEW-YORK, ON
THE SEvERAL BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS FOR THE AMENDMENT OF THE LAW AND THE REFORM
OF THE JUDICIARY SYSTEM 28 (1839) (noting that the meaning of legal text is unclear "until
usage and precedent have fixed it").
133. See Natelson, supra note iii, at 1298-1305.
134. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1946 (1791). Once again, the precise contemporaneous sources that
could be consulted, and the circumstances under which consultation would be appropriate,
was the subject of debate. See, e.g., Ex'rs of Rippon v. Ex'rs of Townsend, i S.C.L. (1 Bay)
445, 449 (1795) (observing that "it would be wrong for us to give [a] different, meaning than
the law affixes to a legal technical term .. .. merely from an idea that the legislature meant to
do so, which perhaps they did not, though some particular member might have had such an
intention"); see also ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality
of an Act To Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97,
iii (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965) ("[W]hatever may have been the intention of the framers of
a constitution, or of a law, that intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself . . . .").
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ons in both constitutional and statutory interpretation, and their willingness to
invalidate executive action on the basis of the canons.
1. The Generality of the Canons in American Practice
Early courts routinely invoked the two canons to construe the Constitu-
tion's text. In the leading case, Stuart v. Laird (decided the same year as Mar-
bury),13s the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the practice of
Supreme Court Justices "riding circuit" without distinct commissions as circuit
judges. The Court explained that, because the "objection" to circuit riding was
of "recent date," it was "sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence
under [the Constitution] for a period of several years, commencing with the
organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has in-
deed fixed the construction."136 "This practical exposition" was, the Court rea-
soned, "a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature" that was
"too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled.""'
A number of seminal cases followed this mode of analysis by giving weight
to early and longstanding constructions of ambiguous constitutional provi-
sions. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that "[a] n ex-
position of the constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts, on the
faith of which an immense property has been advanced, ought not to be lightly
disregarded."3 8 In Cohens v. Virginia, Marshall observed that "[g]reat weight
has always been attached, and very rightly attached, to contemporaneous expo-
sition." 39 And in Field v. Clark, the Court reasoned that "the practical construc-
tion of the Constitution, as given by so many acts of Congress, and embracing
almost the entire period of our national existence, should not be overruled, un-
less upon a conviction that such legislation was clearly incompatible with the
supreme law of the land.""o
Opinions in somewhat more obscure cases tied the formulations of the
canons to the justifications given for them by Madison and other interpretive
theorists. In The Passenger Cases, Chief Justice Taney's dissent (echoing Madi-
135- 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
136. Id. at 309.
137. Id.; see also The Laura, 114 U.S. 411, 416 (1885) (quoting Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 309).
138. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
139. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821); see also id. at 420 (reasoning that the act at issue in the
case was constitutional in part because "in the Congress which passed that act were many
eminent members of the Convention which framed the constitution").
140. 143 U.S. 649, 691 (1892).
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son) noted that " [i]f in this court we are at liberty to give old words new mean-
ings when we find them in the Constitution, there is no power which may not,
by this mode of construction, be conferred on the general government and de-
nied to the States.""' In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the Court said
that "[t]he construction placed upon the Constitution by the first act of 1790,
and the act of 1802, by the men who were contemporary with its formation,
many of whom were members of the convention which framed it, is of itself
entitled to very great weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus
established have not been disputed during a period of nearly a century, it is al-
most conclusive."1 4 2 And in Boyd v. United States, the Court expressly tied its in-
terpretive approach to the Latin formulations of the interpretive canons, ob-
serving that "long usage, acquiesced in by the courts, goes a long way to prove
that there is some plausible ground or reason for [an interpretation] in the
law," because "[i] t is a maxim that, consuetudo est optimus interpres legum; and
another maxim that, contemporanea expositio est optima etfortissima in lege."143
Cases interpreting statutes applied precisely the same canons of construc-
tion as constitutional cases. Judges "deferred" to or "respected" executive statu-
tory constructions because they were contemporaneous to enactment or cus-
tomary, not because they were executive as such. The leading case for many
years was Edwards' Lessee v. Darby,144 which Chevron cited as the earliest exam-
ple of a case holding that "considerable weight should be accorded to an execu-
tive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to adminis-
ter."14s Edwards' Lessee addressed a statute enacted by the North Carolina
legislature to settle disputes over certain land boundaries. The Court held that
it would not disturb the construction of the statute previously given by ap-
pointed land commissioners because "[i]n the construction of a doubtful and
ambiguous law, the cotemporaneous construction of those who were called up-
on to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is
entitled to very great respect."l"6 The Court observed that the North Carolina
statute "was not only thus construed by the commissioners, but that construc-
141. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 478 (1849).
142. Ill U.S. 53, 57 (1884); see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827) (John-
son, J., concurring) (invoking the contemporaneity canon and justifying reference to Fram-
ing-era materials on the theory that the contemporaries of the Constitution "had the best
opportunities of informing themselves of the understanding of the framers ... and of the
sense put upon it by the people when it was adopted by them").
143. 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886).
144. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 (1827).
145. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 & n.14 (1984).
146. Edwards' Lessee, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 210.
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tion seems to have received, very shortly after, the sanction of the legislature" in
a later enactment hat "must be construed as recognising the validity of, and as
ratifying the surveys which had been made by the commissioners."147
2. The Use of the Canons To Invalidate Executive Action
The clearest sign that Edwards' Lessee announced a doctrine of deference to
contemporaneous and customary interpretations, not a doctrine of deference to
executive interpretations, is that the principle in the case was repeatedly invoked
to reject the executive branch's changed construction of a statute and to require
that statutory interpretation be consistent and uniform-and, hence, custom-
ary or contemporaneous with enactment. In Merritt v. Cameron, for example,
the Court reasoned that "a construction of a statute by a department charged
with its execution [is not] held conclusive and binding upon the courts of the
country, unless such construction has been continuously in force for a long
time."148 The Court's precedents "go to that extent and no further."4 9 Along the
147. Id. at 210-11. There is voluminous jurisprudence applying this principle to uphold a contin-
uous and longstanding practice. See, e.g., United States v. Philbrick, 120 U.S. 52, 59 (1887)
(upholding the Secretary of the Navy's longstanding construction of a naval benefits statute
because the Secretary's interpretation was not clearly erroneous and had been relied upon for
decades); Brown v. United States, 113 U.S. 568, 571 (1884) ("This contemporaneous and
uniform interpretation is entitled to weight in the construction of the law, and in a case of
doubt ought to turn the scale."); Hahn v. United States, 107 U.S. 402, 4o6 (1883) (noting
that "congress had not interfered with [a preexisting] construction"); United States v. Bur-
lington & Mo. River R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 334, 341 (1878) ("This uniform action is as potential,
and as conclusive of the soundness of the construction, as if it had been declared by judicial
decision. It cannot at this day be called in question."); Garfielde v. United States, 93 U.S.
242, 246 (1876) (agreeing with an agency interpretation because it was "in conformity to the
usages . . . for many years past"); Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272,
306 & n.6o (1873) (citing Edward' Lessee and finding it "significan[t]" that a particular legal
proposition "does not seem to have occurred to any one" in a series of prior cases, and de-
claring that this silence was "hardly less effectual than an express authoritative negation up-
on the subject"); Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43, 68 (1871) ("Long and uninterrupted
practice under a statute, especially by the officers whose duty it was to execute it, is good ev-
idence of its construction, and such practical construction will be adhered to, even though,
were it res integra, it might be difficult to maintain it.").
148. 137 U.S. 542, 552 (1890).
149. Id. The Court noted that because the Treasury Department's construction of the statute at
issue had "not been uniform," "[t] here is no such long and uninterrupted acquiescence in a
regulation of a department, or departmental construction of a statute, as will bring the case
within the rule . .. that in case of a doubtful and ambiguous law the contemporaneous con-
struction of those who have been called upon to carry it into effect is entitled to great re-
spect." Id. Courts have applied this doctrine in numerous other cases. See, e.g., Robertson v.
Downing, 127 U.S. 607, 61i, 613 (1888); United States v. Johnston, 124 U.S. 236, 253 (1888);
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same line, in United States v. Healey, writing for the Court, Justice Harlan rea-
soned that, as a result of the lack of "uniform[ity]" in the "practice of the De-
partment," the Court was obligated "to determine the true interpretation of the
act of 1877, without reference to the practice in the Department.""so Justice Har-
lan observed that the outcome may have been otherwise if "the Interior De-
partment had uniformly interpreted the act," in which case the Court would
have "accept[ed] that interpretation as the true one, if, upon examining the
statute, we found its meaning to be at all doubtful or obscure."1 And in United
States v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co., a unanimous Court relied on the
''contemporaneous construction thus given by the executive department of the
government, and continued for nine years through six different administra-
tions of that department" in rejecting a "sudden change" in favor of the execu-
tive branch's litigating interpretation.152 The Court previously reasoned in
Iowa v. McFarland, 110 U.S. 471, 489 (1884) (Miller, J., dissenting) (disputing that "previ-
ous construction of the government" was sufficiently longstanding); United States v. Pugh,
99 U.S. 265, 269 (1878); Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 227, 237
(1873); Peabody v. Stark, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 240, 242-44 (1872); United States v. Dean Lin-
seed-Oil Co., 87 F. 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1898) ("The importance of adherence to a long-
continued and reasonable construction of a statute by the officers of the department whose
duty it has been to execute it, when the statute is of an ambiguous character, has been fre-
quently commented upon by the supreme court ever since the case of Edwards v. Darby.");
United States v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 37 F. 551, 555 (C.C.D. Colo. 1889) (Brewer, J., riding cir-
cuit) (reasoning that "[i] nnocent parties have bought on the faith of the title" and that "at
this late day something more than a mere doubt must exist to justify the divesting of titles
thus sanctioned, and sanctioned for so long a time"). For internal executive branch docu-
ments applying the same principle, see War-Revenue Act-Export Bills of Lading, 23 Op.
Att'y Gen. 3, 8 (1900), which notes that "[w]hen there is added to this departmental con-
struction the subsequent readoption of the same language by Congress in another act, it is
conclusive that Congress, in the absence of language to the contrary, intended the same con-
struction and effect to be given to the words in the latter as in the former instance"; Arrears
of Pension- Statutory Construction, 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 408 (1896), which reasons that
"[d]epartmental practice under an act of Congress has an effect similar in this respect to
Congressional practice under an ambiguous statutory provision"; and Compensation of
United States Attorney at New York, 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 354, 357 (1889), which states that "I
do not see how, in the face of these circulars, and of such uniform practice for so many years,
any other interpretation can now be given the statutes, whatever might be said if the ques-
tion were an original one.'
iso. 16o U.S. 136, 145 (1895).
151. Id.
152. 142 U.S. 615, 621 (1892). The Court also noted that "[i]t is especially objectionable that a
construction of a statute favorable to the individual citizen should be changed in such man-
ner as to become retroactive, and to require from him the repayment of moneys to which he
had supposed himself entitled, and upon the expectation of which he had made his contracts
with the government." Id.
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United States v. Hill that the interpretive principle of contemporaneous con-
struction "has been applied, as a wholesome one, for the establishment and en-
forcement of justice, in many cases in this court, not only between man and
man, but between the government and those who deal with it, and put faith in
the action of its constituted authorities, judicial, executive, and administra-
tive." 5 3
The cases, moreover, cited constitutional, statutory, and even contractual
precedents applying the canons interchangeably, while nowhere suggesting
that the rule varied depending on the legal instrument at issue in the case. For
example, in Schell' Executors v. Fauchi, the Court held that a past "practice" that
had "grown up throughout the country" made it "too late for us to be called
upon to overrule it ... notwithstanding [a] treasury regulation," relying on
both Stuart v. Laird (which addressed deference to legislative practice under the
Constitution) and Edwards' Lessee (which addressed deference to administrative
practice under a statute)."4 "In all cases of ambiguity," the Court claimed, "the
contemporaneous construction, not only of the courts but of the departments,
and even of the officials whose duty it is to carry the law into effect, is univer-
sally held to be controlling.""s
Over a century after the American Revolution, the traditional canons of
construction continued to have relevance in the interpretation of ambiguous
legal text. As the Court explained in The "City of Panama," when an act is am-
biguous, "the contemporaneous construction of such a statute is entitled to
great respect, especially where it appears that the construction has prevailed for
153. 12o U.S. 169, 182 (1887).
154. 138 U.S. 562, 572 (1891).
155. Id. State court cases took the same approach. See Commonwealth v. Lockwood, 1o9 Mass.
323, 339 (1872) (citing Edward's Lessee for the proposition that the interpretation of an am-
biguous constitutional provision is "settled by the contemporaneous construction and the
long course of practice in accordance therewith" and holding that government's current in-
terpretation conflicted with the Constitution's contemporaneous construction); Barney v.
Leeds, 51 N.H. 253, 265-66 (1871) (citing Edward's Lessee, in stating that "contemporaneous
construction . . . is entitled to great respect," and applying principle to "the construction giv-
en to this form of expression, or its equivalent terms, in analogous statutes, by the courts in
other jurisdictions"); Attorney Gen. v. Bank of Cape Fear, 40 N.C. (5 Ired. Eq.) 71, 72 (1847)
(observing that a "cotemporary exposition practiced and acquiesced in for a period of years
fixes the construction" unless it "is contrary to the obvious meaning of the words of the
Act" -and that "[t]his is also a rule in the construction of contracts"); Boyden v. Town of
Brookline, 8 Vt. 284, 286 (1836) (stating that "long established construction of [a] statute
should now have the force of a judicial determination" because "[s]uch has always been the
deference paid by courts to such an exposition of statute or constitutional law").
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a long period, and that a different interpretation would impair vested rights -
contemporanea expositio estfortissima in lege." 's"
C. Two Related Issues: The Mandamus Standard and Questions of Fact
Before turning from the legal framework of the nineteenth century to that
of the twentieth, it is necessary to address two additional aspects of early Amer-
ican public law, both of which played a large role in the development of doc-
trines of deference. The first- the nature and scope of judicial review in cases
brought using a writ of mandamus or other extraordinary writ - has been cited
by Justices of the Supreme Court as a precursor to modern doctrines of defer-
ence and a possible doctrinal basis for Chevron.'5 7 As explained below, however,
the nineteenth-century cases addressing the scope of the mandamus writ sup-
port the contrary proposition. Those cases distinguished between, on the one
hand, the standard for obtaining the writ and, on the other, the appropriate in-
terpretive methodology that would be applied in cases not brought using the
writ. The second -the nature and scope of judicial review of factual determina-
tions by executive branch officials -would prove to be critical in the early intel-
lectual justifications for, and the subsequent development of, the doctrine of
judicial deference in the mid-twentieth century.
1. Mandamus Review
The immediately preceding discussion of the nineteenth-century Court's
use of a de novo standard of review for statutory questions (accompanied by
application of the contemporanea expositio and interpres consuetudo canons) may
suggest that judges were routinely involved in directly reviewing the interpre-
tive decisions of executive branch officials. But judicial review of executive ac-
tion was for a portion of the nineteenth century often accomplished using a
writ of mandamus (or other extraordinary writ), which carried with it a defer-
ential standard of review. That standard of review witnessed a significant shift
from the Marshall Court to the Taney Court, then began to lose its salience
with the advent of federal-question jurisdiction in 1875. More importantly, the
is6. 101 U.S. 453, 461 (1879) (citing THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH
GOvERN THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 213 (2d ed. 1874)).
157. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 242 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
"U]udicial control of federal executive officers was principally exercised through the prerog-
ative writ of mandamus"); Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 318 (1958)
(noting that "[t]he principle at stake is no different than if mandamus were sought").
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standard was a function of the writ used - and the remedy sought - rather than
the interpretive theory that the Court was applying.
Because federal courts lacked general federal-question jurisdiction until
1875, parties arguing that an executive official violated federal law had to find
another source of jurisdiction to challenge the executive branch's interpretation
and application of law. In the absence of general federal-question jurisdiction-
and where a claim did not "arise under" one of the specific grants of federal-
question jurisdiction that Congress enacted during this period'-parties
normally had two options: (1) common-law actions in which the interpretation
of a statute was an ancillary step in the analysis; and (2) extraordinary writs,
such as the writ of mandamus, against the executive branch official charged
with enforcing the action."' The interpretive method applied in cases involv-
ing either of these two bases for jurisdiction tells us much about the proper role
that courts and executive officers played in construing statutes.16 0
Some statutory issues were reviewable in the context of tort or contract ac-
tions against the responsible executive officer or another party.161 In such cases,
as demonstrated above, the Court's interpretive role was essentially de novo.162
Not all statutory issues, however, could readily be adjudicated in the context of
a common-law action. Where a common-law action was unavailable, plain-
tiffs sometimes resorted to seeking a writ of mandamus directed at the respon-
158. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Justice Holmes,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2151, 2157-68 (2009) (describing early pockets of "arising under"
jurisdiction).
159. Cf JAFFE, supra note 64, at 155 (noting that nineteenth-century courts generally controlled
administrative action "by the prerogative writs -certiorari, mandamus, etc. -or by permit-
ting common-law actions against officers alleged to have exceeded their authority"); Thom-
as W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of
Administrative Law, III COLUM. L. REV. 939, 947 (2011) (" [T]he key to understanding nine-
teenth-century judicial review starts with the observation that administrative action could be
reviewed only through certain forms of action."); Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and
Nonstatutoty Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands
Cases, 68 MICH. L. REv. 867, 885-86 (1970) (observing that nineteenth-century judges had
"greater reverence for the integrity of the pleadings," such that "[i]f the sovereign was not
named, the sovereign was not sued").
160. Cf Merrill, supra note 159, at 947 ("The form of action dictated the nature of the 'review."').
161. See id. (noting that "[c]ustoms, revenue, and prize cases tended to be reviewed by tort ac-
tions against the officer responsible for the taking").
162. See supra Section II.B.
163. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARv. L. REV. 1285,
1299 (2014) ("[T]he erroneous deprivation of a government benefit- a military pension, for
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sible executive officer.164 But the writ imposed its own standard for obtaining
relief. As Chief Justice Marshall explained in Marbury, mandamus would issue
only if the claimant could show that he had a vested right and that the execu-
tive official had violated a nondiscretionary, ministerial legal duty.165 Other
comparable writs were subject to similar limitations.166
The application of that abstract standard to concrete cases ebbed and
flowed significantly over the course of the early nineteenth century beginning
with Marbury and the interventionist impulses of the Marshall Court. While
Marbury recognized that "there may be such cases" in "which[] the injured in-
dividual has no remedy" (because the statutory duty called for the exercise of
discretion),167 the opinion tended to disregard the mandamus standard in or-
der to elevate the right-remedy connection. As Chief Justice Marshall put it,
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every indi-
164. The only court authorized to issue the writ to federal officers (and only to those within the
District of Columbia) was the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia. See Kendall v.
United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 615-26 (1838). The Marshall Court had
previously held that state courts did not have authority to issue mandamus to federal offi-
cials, see McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 604-05 (1821), and that "the power of
the Circuit Courts to issue the writ of mandamus, [was] confined exclusively to those cases
in which it may be necessary to the exercise of their jurisdiction," McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 504, 506 (1813).
165. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 170-71 (1803). For an exploration of the relation-
ship between this aspect of Marbury and Chevron, see Aditya Bamzai, Marbury v. Madison
and the Concept of Judicial Deference, 84 Mo. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). See also JAFFE, supra
note 64, at 332 (noting that a "series of [English] cases in the years 1700-1740 developed the
principle that mandamus would not lie when the respondent's function was 'judicial' but
only when it was 'ministerial"' and characterizing this distinction as meaning that there was
"an area of 'discretion' free from control by the King's Bench").
166. See Litchfield v. Register, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 575, 577 (1869) (declining to issue a writ of in-
junction because the officer's action was discretionary); Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 347, 352-53 (1868) (holding that prohibition on review of discretionary acts "is as ap-
plicable to the writ of injunction as it is to the writ of mandamus" and that an injunction
would not issue where the Secretary's discretion rested on "a question which requires the
careful consideration and construction of more than one act of Congress"); Mississippi v.
Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1866) (holding that the Court "has no jurisdiction of a
bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties"). For an explanation of
the difference between the "writ of injunction" and the equitable remedy of an injunction,
see James E. Pfander & Nassim Nazemi, Morris v. Allen and the Lost History of the Anti-
Injunction Act of 1793, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 187, 229-34 (2014). For a contrary view, see DICK-
INSON, supra note 26, at 65 n.82, which surmises that Gaines and Litchfield are in part "a lega-
cy from cases like Decatur v. Paulding . . . embodying the Jeffersonian doctrine that the prin-
ciple of separation of powers forbids judicial interference with the duties of the other
departments by means of mandamus."
167. Marbuty, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 164.
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vidual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."'
Statutory remedies, in other words, were to be implied when there were statu-
tory wrongs, consistent with the Blackstonian notion that "where there is a le-
gal right, there is also a legal remedy" - language quoted with approval in Mar-
bury itself.'6 9 Elaborating on a similar theme some thirty years later, the Chief
Justice claimed that "[i]t would excite some surprise if, in a government of
laws and of principle," a person would be left with "no remedy, no appeal to the
laws of his country, if he should believe the claim to be unjust."70 "[T]his
anomaly does not exist," Chief Justice Marshall claimed, because "this imputa-
tion cannot be cast on the legislature of the United States."'1
Chief Justice Marshall's conception of rights and remedies had a sound in-
tellectual pedigree-as his citation of Blackstone suggests. What it lacked,
however, was a sound basis in positive law. In the wake of the Jeffersonian vic-
tory in 1800, Congress repealed the general grant of federal-question jurisdic-
tion, leaving mandamus review as one of the limited avenues by which private
parties could compel executive officials to comply with statutory duties.7 2 That
repeal necessarily meant that not every executive violation of a statute would
have a remedy. Contrary to the Chief Justice's assertion, the "anomaly" (as he
saw it) did exist -unless, that is, the mandamus standard was interpreted to be
the functional equivalent of de novo review.
The high-water mark for Chief Justice Marshall's robust vision of manda-
mus review occurred in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,' a case argued
168. Id. at 163.
169. Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23).
170. United States v. Nourse, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 8, 28-29 (1835). Years later, the Court cited Nourse
in support of the presumption of reviewability of statutory questions. See Bowen v. Mich.
Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986); Bagley, supra note 163, at 1291-92 (ar-
guing that Bowen confirmed the "presumption of reviewability"); cf. Abbott Labs. v. Gard-
ner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (applying the principle that an aggrieved individual is entitled
to judicial review of an agency's actions).
171. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 29.
172. See An Act to Repeal Certain Acts Respecting the Organization of the Courts of the United
States; and for Other Purposes, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132 (1802); see also David E. Engdahl, Federal
Question Jurisdiction Under the 1789Judiciary Act, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 521, 532-38 (1989)
(documenting the history of changing federal jurisdiction and explaining the motivations
behind the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801); Alison L. LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and
Federal jurisdiction, 30 LAw & HIST. REv. 205, 2o8 (2012) (observing that the post-election
repeal had "utterly stymied" "the Federalists' drive to expand the scope of federal cases over
which the inferior federal courts could exercise original jurisdiction").
173. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
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and decided three years after his death.174 Kendall reaffirmed the ministeri-
al/executive distinction drawn in Marbury. Granting mandamus where the ex-
ecutive officer acted in a ministerial capacity, the Court concluded in Kendall,
would not "interfere[] . . . with the rights or duties of the executive" or "in-
volve[] any conflict of powers between the executive and judicial departments
of the government."17s That was because the mandamus did not "direct or con-
trol the [executive officer] in the discharge of any official duty, partaking in any
respect of an executive character," but rather "enforce[d] the performance of a
mere ministerial act."176
After Kendall, however, the interventionist tide receded. Only two years lat-
er, in Decatur v. Paulding,177 Chief Justice Taney (who was, of course, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's replacement) authored an opinion for the Court's majority
denying a writ of mandamus. In Decatur, the Court considered the cumulative
effect of two pension provisions enacted on the same day in 1837: a general
statute conferring on the widow of a naval officer killed in service a pension at
half the pay to which the officer would have been entitled, and a specific resolu-
tion granting a pension to the widow of Stephen Decatur, a naval hero. The
question was whether Decatur's widow could recover two pensions. The Secre-
tary of Navy, on the Attorney General's advice, said she could not recover twice,
and Decatur sought mandamus relief.17s
Chief Justice Taney concluded that mandamus was inappropriate because
the Secretary's interpretation of the two statutory provisions was an "executive
duty" requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, not a mere "ministeri-
al act."17' That particular holding- applying the mandamus standard to the
facts of the case-may have been unexceptional, but Chief Justice Taney's rea-
soning was broad. He observed that executive officials are "continually required
174. Cf. JAFFE, supra note 64, at 178-79 (observing that the "Taney Court was much more guard-
ed" on this issue than the Marshall Court); Woolhandler, supra note 14, at 216 ("[T]he judi-
cially activist de novo method of review was at its height during the Marshall years, whereas
the deferential res judicata model of review was at its height during the Taney years.").
175. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 61o.
176. Id.
177. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840). The story of the famous naval hero Stephen Decatur's exploits
and death, and his widow Susan's attempts to obtain a federal spousal benefit are told more
fully in JAMES TERTIUS DE KAY, A RAGE FOR GLORY: THE LIFE OF COMMODORE STEPHEN DE-
CATUR, USN 209-10 (2004), and Kristin A. Collins, "Petition Without Number": Widows'Pe-
titions and the Early Nineteenth-Century Origins of Public Marriage-Based Entitlements, 31 LAW
& HIST. REV. 1, 15-20 (2013).
178. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 513-14.
179. Id. at 515-
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to exercise judgment and discretion" including "in expounding the laws and
resolutions of Congress."1so Such interpretive decisions, according to the Chief
Justice, were "[i]n general ... not mere ministerial duties." Interpretation,
from this perspective, generally involved discretion not subject to mandamus.
Chief Justice Taney's opinion made clear, however, that the standard for
mandamus applied in Decatur was distinct from the appropriate methodology
for interpreting statutes in non-mandamus cases: "If a suit should come before
this Court, which involved the construction of any of these laws'" the Chief
Justice reasoned, "the Court certainly would not be bound to adopt the con-
struction given by the head of a department."s2 To the contrary, in such cases,
the Justices would be bound to determine whether the executive official's "deci-
sion" was "wrong" and "of course, so pronounce their judgment."8 That ex-
plained why, in common-law cases, the Court gave de novo review to legal
questions: a judgment "upon the construction of a law" in a common-law suit
would occur "in a case in which [the Court] ha[d] jurisdiction, and in which it
is their duty to interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights of
the parties in the cause before them.""' Article III judges could not "by manda-
mus, act directly upon the officer, and guide and control his judgment or discre-
tion in the matters committed to his care, in the ordinary discharge of his offi-
cial duties ""'
Decatur's underlying reasoning, in other words, rested on the standard for
mandamus actions: the case did not purport to turn on appropriate interpretive
methodology. The Court's holding in the case made that point crystal clear.
The Court held it lacked "jurisdiction over the acts of the Secretary," while at
18o. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. Dickinson, Jaffe, and Monaghan allude to this aspect of Decatur, but each in passing. See
DICKINsoN, supra note 26, at 42 n.13 (observing that the Court applied deference because
"these were cases of application for mandamus" and "[t] he fact that the courts will not issue
a writ of mandamus in a given situation hardly means that they would not review the execu-
tive action taken if the question could be got before them in some other way"); JAFFE, supra
note 64, at 179 ("The Secretary's construction of the law, argued Taney, would not bind the
Court in a case in which it had jurisdiction. . . ."); Monaghan, supra note 75, at 17 n.97
("Note, however, that even if direct review were not permissible, it appears that the legal is-
sue could have been litigated in a private action where the [C]ourt would not have been
bound by prior administrative decisions on law.").
183. Decatur, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 515.
184. Id.; see also id. (characterizing a mandamus action as akin to "an appeal from the decision of
one of the Secretaries" or a revision of "his judgment in any case where the law authorized
him to exercise discretion, or judgment").
185. Id. (emphasis added).
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the same time "forbear[ing] to express any opinion upon the construction of
the resolution in question."186
Chief Justice Taney's reasoning in Decatur effectively closed any avenue for
mandamus relief against executive officials for four decades. The Court repeat-
edly denied mandamus relief against executive branch officials on the ground
that the officials were performing discretionary, rather than ministerial, du-
ties.'87 The next time that the Court approved the issuance of a writ of man-
damus to a federal executive officer was in 188o.18 8
186. Id. at 517. Parts of Decatur suggest a broader sweep based on Chief Justice Taney's notions of
sound policy. The Chief Justice reasoned, for example, that "[t]he interference of the Courts
with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the govern-
ment, would be productive of nothing but mischief; and we are quite satisfied that such a
power was never intended to be given to them." Id. at 516. Later cases repeated this senti-
ment, either in the context of extraordinary writs, such as, for example, Gaines v. Thompson,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347, 352-53 (1868); and Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866);
or where a statute or constitutional provision was best read as conferring discretion upon an
executive officer, such as, for example, Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 292-93, 296
(1900), which quotes language from Decatur and reasons, with respect to removal of offic-
ers, that "[t]hese are matters peculiarly within the province of those who are in charge of
and superintending the departments, and until Congress by some special and direct legisla-
tion makes provision to the contrary, we are clear that they must be settled by those admin-
istrative officers"; Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1853); and JAFFE, supra note 64, at 178,
which states that "[i] n some of the mandamus cases in the middle of the [nineteenth] cen-
tury, particularly the federal, one senses a question whether mandamus is consistent with
the American doctrine of separation of powers." As Decatur demonstrates, however, even the
Taney Court, which "was clearly committed to protecting executive action from judicial in-
terference,' sought to protect executive discretion by relaxing the standard for issuing the
writs of mandamus and injunction, rather than by altering proper interpretive methodology.
Mashaw, supra note 19, at 1683.
187. See 4 WILLIAM WAIT, A TREATISE UPON SOME OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 365-
66 (1878) (summarizing case law as providing that, where a federal executive official pos-
sesses discretion concerning the action sought to be enforced by mandamus, the remedy will
be denied); see also Bagley, supra note 163, at 1298 & nn.78-79 (observing that "[a]fter Deca-
tur, it took another forty years for the Court to find a federal officer who had failed to dis-
charge a ministerial duty," and that, "[i] n the meantime, the Court repeatedly found admin-
istrative action-even action that appeared to thwart straightforward legal commands-to
be discretionary in nature and outside the purview of mandamus"). For examples of Su-
preme Court decisions discussing mandamus, see United States ex rel. International Contract-
ing Co. v. Lamont, 155 U.S. 303, 308 (1894); United States ex rel. Carrick v. Lamar, 116 U.S.
423, 426 (1886); United States v. Commissioner of General Land Office, 72 U.S. 563 (1866);
United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284 (1854); and Wilkes v. Dinsman,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 129 (1849).
188. See United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 395, 399 (1880) (relying on Marbury in issuing a
writ of mandamus); see also Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 171-77
(1893) (citing Marbuty, Kendall, and Schurz to support the issuance of a writ of injunction
restraining the Secretary of Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office from
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But even while denying the writ, the Court's cases distinguished between
the jurisdictional standard for mandamus and the proper method for interpret-
ing statutes. The Court's 1888 decision in United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black,"'
to take one example, echoed Chief Justice Taney's distinction in Decatur. While
noting that courts could "not interfere by mandamus with the executive officers
of the government in the exercise of their ordinary official duties, even where
those duties require an interpretation of the law," the Court simultaneously
made clear that "[w]hether, if the law were properly before us for considera-
tion, we should be of the same opinion [as the executive officer], or of a differ-
ent opinion, is of no consequence in the decision of this case."1`0 The Court's
earlier decision in the non-mandamus case of Johnson v. Towsley made the same
point.'91 There, the Court explained that, while it had "frequently and firmly
refused to interfere with [executive officers] in the discharge of their duties, ei-
ther by mandamus or injunction," it had "constantly asserted the right of the
proper courts to inquire" into legal questions concerning private land disputes
"according to the established rules of equity and the acts of Congress concern-
ing the public lands," even where executive branch officials had previously ex-
revoking a railroad's right of way); Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 64-
68 (1884) (holding that mandamus will issue if an executive officer refuses to perform a
ministerial duty); cf Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 541 (1875) (issuing an ex-
traordinary writ against a state officer).
189. 128 U.S. 40 (1888).
190. Id. at 48 (emphasis added); see also United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190
U.S. 316, 324-25 (1903) (denying mandamus and reasoning that "[m]andamus has never
been regarded as the proper writ to control the judgment and discretion of an officer," and
observing that "[w]hether [the executive branch officer] decided right or wrong, is not the
question"); id. at 325 ("The writ [of mandamus] never can be used as a substitute for a writ
of error. Nor does the fact that no writ of error will lie in such a case as this . . . furnish any
foundation for the claim that mandamus may therefore be awarded."); United States v.
Lynch, 137 U.S. 280, 286 (1890) (describing Decatur as holding that, "while the court would
not be bound to adopt the construction given, when departmental decisions are under re-
view in a proper case, the court would not by mandamus control the exposition of statutes
by direct action upon executive officers"); cf Comm'r of Patents v. Whiteley, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 522, 534-35 (1866) ("The main question passed upon by the commissioner, and which
was supposed to underlie this case, is not before us for consideration. If it were, as at present
advised, we are not prepared to say that the decision of the commissioner was not correct.").
191. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72 (1871). Johnson arose in the context of a common-law land dispute and
is discussed below. See infra notes 222-227 and accompanying text. For a subsequent case
with essentially the same reasoning, see United States ex rel. Ness v. Fisher, 223 U.S. 683, 691-
92 (1912) ("[W]e are confronted with the question, not whether the decision of the Secre-
tary was right or wrong, but whether a decision of that officer, made in the discharge of a
duty imposed by law, and involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, may be re-
viewed by mandamus . . .
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pressed a contrary view of the legal question.19 2 "[T]he relations thus estab-
lished between the courts and the land department," the Court explained, "are
not only founded on a just view of the duties and powers of each, but are essen-
tial to the ends of justice and to a sound administration of the law."19
3
By the time many of these cases were decided, however, the relevance of the
scope of the mandamus standard had begun to fade for reasons that Chief Jus-
tice Taney could not have foreseen when he wrote Decatur in 1840. In 1875,
Congress enacted a statute containing a general federal-question jurisdiction
provision. In relevant part, the provision conferred on circuit courts (subject to
an amount-in-controversy requirement) jurisdiction over "all suits of a civil na-
ture at common law or in equity.. . arising under the ... laws of the United
States."194 During the years that followed, the Court inferred the authority to
enjoin unlawful executive-branch action from the general grant of "equity" ju-
risdiction, a process that eliminated (in those cases) the need for plaintiffs to
pigeonhole their federal claims into a common-law- action or to pursue an ex-
traordinary writ.195
The modern observer reviewing the 1875 Act might wonder why the en-
actment of federal-question jurisdiction by itself would have been interpreted
to create causes of action for statutory violations.'9 6 In John Duffy's words,
"[g]iven the structure of the law then, the 1875 grant of jurisdiction is best in-
terpreted as an authorization for federal equity courts to .. . continue applying
the preexisting federal equity law (developed prior to 1875 under other federal
192. Johnson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 87.
193. Id.; see also JAFFE, supra note 64, at 338 (noting that in cases like Johnson "there are strong
echoes of the reasoning in Decatur v. Paulding that the judiciary may not direct or control ex-
ecutive actions, but in a private litigation properly cognizable by the judiciary a court is not
bound by prior executive decisions on the law").
194. An Act To Determine the Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of the United States, and To Regu-
late the Removal of Causes from State Courts, and for Other Purposes, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat.
470, 470 (1875) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012)).
195. See Scalia, supra note 159, at 890 (noting that, by the turn of the twentieth century, "there
had been hundreds of cases in the federal courts seeking mandamus or injunction against
land-office officials" and that "federal jurisdiction had been easily provided in most such cas-
es arising after 1875 by the existence of a federal question"); Woolhandler, supra note 14, at
239 ("The common-law tradition of de novo actions against officers received new support in
the Reconstruction era with the passage of the general federal question statute in 1875, and
with the passage of the 1871 Civil Rights Act." (citation omitted)).
196. See, e.g., Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981) ("The vest-
ing of jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority to for-
mulate federal common law.'); see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial
Review, 77 TEx. L. REv. 113, 121-22 (1998) (observing that it "may seem incorrect today" to
infer "authority to create common law" in equity from "a grant of federal jurisdiction").
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jurisdictions)." 7 Earlier specific "arising-under" statutes had been interpreted
to create equitable causes of action, most notably in the areas of patent and
copyright law, but also for claims relating to the revenue and postal acts.1 9 8 In
addition, drawing on preexisting notions of equity and chancery, some courts
had articulated a background norm in which remedies followed the violation of
statutory rights.'99 As a result, the 1875 grant of jurisdiction ultimately put an
end to the necessity of relying on mandamus jurisdiction, and made "equity"
and "chancery" the touchstones for review of executive branch action,2 00 alt-
hough pockets of mandamus review would continue to exist well into the
twentieth century.2
The canonical precedent of this era is the 1902 case of American School of
Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty.202 Pursuant to a statute allowing him to block
"fraudulent" schemes executed through the U.S. mails, the Postmaster General
197. Duffy, supra note 196, at 122. Whether the Court's inference from the 1875 Act was correct or
undisputed is a separate question. See id. at 125 (stating that, in the late-nineteenth and ear-
ly-twentieth centuries, there were many "critic[s] of the federal equity jurisprudence" be-
cause "federal equity courts were aggressively enjoining labor strikes").
198. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 158, at 2158-62.
199. See Duffy, supra note 196, at 124-25.
200. See id. at 118-19 (noting that "statutes conferring equity jurisdiction" were interpreted to
"vest the federal courts with a power to fashion and administer a judge-made law of equity"
and that, consequently, "[j]udicial review in the early administrative era grew up in the fed-
eral equity jurisdiction"); Merrill, supra note 159, at 949 ("After Congress created federal
question jurisdiction in 1875, federal courts began entertaining bills of equity that sought to
enjoin allegedly unlawful administrative action. They did so on the theory that federal
courts needed only a grant of jurisdiction, not a statutory cause of action, in order to exercise
the powers of a court of equity in ruling on a request to enjoin agency action."); see also
3 KENNETH CuLP DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 5 23.04, at 307 (1st ed. 1958) (de-
scribing action in equity as "the mainstay for review of federal administrative action");
JAFFE, supra note 64, at 193 (referring to action for injunction in equity as a "catchall"). See
generally GEO. TUCKER BISPHAM & JOSEPH D. McCoy, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: A TREA-
TISE ON THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF CHANCERY § 1, at 1 (loth ed.
1922) (noting that equity is "that system of justice which was administered by the High
Court of Chancery in England").
201. See Scalia, supra note 159, at 870 & nn.11-13.
202. 187 U.S. 94 (1902); see Scalia, supra note 159, at 913-14 & n.215 (observing that "[njot until
the early years of the present century does there begin the well-known line of Supreme
Court cases ... against post-office officials" seeking "to overcome their allegedly incorrect
interpretation of the mail-carriage statutes" and citing McAnnulty as having "given the first
clear expression to the 'presumption of reviewability' of administrative action"); G. Joseph
Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L.
REV. 1443, 1465 (1971) ("At least since the decision in [McAnnulty], a petition to a district
court for an injunction has been viewed as the creation of a 'case' in which an agency posi-
tion could be reviewed." (footnote omitted)).
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determined that the American School of Magnetic Healing's creed that the "the
mind of the human race is largely responsible for its ills" (including physical
illnesses) was "fraudulent" and prohibited the School from using the mails.20
Although no statute specifically created a cause of action allowing the School to
enjoin the erroneous withholding of "fraudulent" mail, the Court held that the
School could sue a local postmaster to stop him from implementing the Post-
master General's order.204 Justice Peckham's opinion for the Court reasoned
that "in case an official violates the law to the injury of an individual the courts
generally have jurisdiction to grant relief."2 0s Congress had not entrusted "the
administration of these statutes wholly to the discretion of" the executive
branch such that the Postmaster General's "determination is conclusive upon all
questions arising under those statutes."206 To the contrary: courts "must have
power in a proper proceeding to grant relief," lest "the individual [be] left to
the absolutely uncontrolled and arbitrary action of a public and administrative
officer, whose action is unauthorized by any law and is in violation of the rights
of the individual."2 07 As in the days of Chief Justice Marshall, remedies were
generally assumed to accompany rights.
More to the point, in language that is often ignored, Justice Peckham anal-
ogized the case to land disputes adjudicated in common-law actions and rea-
soned that, although the Land Department is "administrative in its character,"
the Court had repeatedly "held that the decisions of the officers of the depart-
ment upon questions of law do not conclude the courts, and they have power
to grant relief to an individual aggrieved by an erroneous decision of a legal
question by department officers."20s The same logic applied here: the Postmas-
ter General's "right to exclude letters, or to refuse to permit their delivery to
persons addressed, must depend upon some law of Congress, and if no such
law exists, then he cannot exclude or refuse to deliver them."209 Assuming that
"the evidence before the Postmaster General, in any view of the facts, failed to
show a violation of any Federal law, the determination of that official that such
violation existed [was] . . . a pure mistake of law on his part."21 0 And the Post-
master General's determination, "being a legal error[,] does not bind the
203. 187 U.S. at 103.
204. Id. at 101-02, io8.
205. Id. at io8 (emphasis added).
2o6. Id.
207. Id. at 110.
208. Id. at lo8.
209. Id. at 109.
210. Id.
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courts."2 11 The ministerial-discretionary boundary went unmentioned. In im-
portant ways and crucial cases, the 1875 creation of federal-question jurisdiction
had (seemingly) rendered the mandamus standard a relic of the past.2 12
The critical point of the foregoing analysis is that because federal courts
lacked general federal-question jurisdiction before 1875, many statutory ques-
tions could be resolved only in the context of a mandamus action brought
against an executive official. In mandamus proceedings, courts applied the
mandamus standard. Following Decatur, the mandamus standard afforded
great leeway to executive discretion in interpreting legal text - akin, in some re-
spects, to the zone of interpretive discretion under the modern Chevron doc-
trine. But application of the mandamus standard was a consequence solely of
the form of relief requested, not the consequence of the interpretive theory
used. Therefore, a change in positive law on the cause of action would necessi-
tate the abandonment of the mandamus standard. The Court's use of de novo
review in non-mandamus cases made that clear, as did Chief Justice Taney's
opinion in Decatur itself. As the Chief Justice explained, "[T] he Court certainly
would not be bound to adopt the construction given by the head of a depart-
ment" in non-mandamus cases over which the federal courts had jurisdiction,
but rather would have the "duty to interpret the act of Congress, in order to as-
certain the rights of the parties in the cause before them."' Thus, when the
general federal-question-jurisdiction statute in 1875 gradually eliminated the
need to rely on mandamus jurisdiction to challenge executive action, the man-
damus standard and Decatur line of cases became less relevant. As then-Judge
(and later President and Chief Justice) Taft put the point in 1898:
In Decatur v. Paulding, it was expressly stated by the court that while, as
between the United States and the pensioner, the secretary of navy was
the final tribunal for the construction of the statute, yet, if the question
were to arise between two.litigants in such a way that the court would
have jurisdiction over the controversy, the court would not feel bound
to follow the construction of the secretary.2 1 4
211. Id. at ill.
212. Seemingly, but not entirely. See infra Section II.A.
213. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840).
214. D.M. Ferry & Co. v. United States, 85 F. 550, 557 (6th Cir. 1898) (citation omitted); see also
United States v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 202 U.S. 184, 192 (1906) (citing D.M. Ferry but
avoiding the issue). The Court in D.M. Ferry nevertheless denied relief (and applied the
mandamus standard) because no appellate power was given to review the decision of the ex-
ecutive official, thereby leaving mandamus as the sole available remedy. See Stone & Downer
Co. v. United States, 11 Ct. Cust. 484, 487 (Ct. Cust. App. 1923) (giving D.M. Ferry this
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2. The Distinction Between Law and Fact
Whereas mandamus required a deferential standard of review as a matter of
jurisdictional boundaries and executive discretion, a second doctrine incorpo-
rated a form of deference as a matter of interpretive theory. Specifically, courts
distinguished between questions of "law," which were subject to generally de
novo review, and questions of "fact,' which were reviewed deferentially. The
doctrine originated from the notion, expressed in the famous case of Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., that "there are matters, involving
public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is
capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination,
but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts
of the United States, as it may deem proper."2 15 Using the authority granted by
gloss); see also Mills & Gibb v. United States, 8 Ct. Cust. 31, 52-53 (Ct. Cust. App. 1917) (De
Vries, J., dissenting) (describing Decatur as a case "applicable solely in cases where no review
is provided by law of the power granted the [executive official];' thereby leaving mandamus
the sole remedy, and relying on then-Judge Taft's opinion in D.M. Ferry). Coincidentally,
Taft's opinion in D.M. Ferry was joined by another future Justice of the Supreme Court,
Horace Harmon Lurton, who was also then a judge on the Sixth Circuit. Later, as Chief Jus-
tice, Taft would summarize the law of mandamus as follows:
Mandamus issues to compel an officer to perform a purely ministerial duty.
It cannot be used to compel or control a duty in the discharge of which by
law he is given discretion. The duty may be discretionary within limits. He
cannot transgress those limits, and if he does so, he may be controlled by in-
junction or mandamus to keep within them. The power of the court to inter-
vene, if at all, thus depends upon what statutory discretion he has. Under
some statutes, the discretion extends to a final construction by the officer of
the statute he is executing. No court in such a case can control by mandamus
his interpretation, even if it may think it erroneous. The cases range, there-
fore, from such wide discretion as that just described to cases where the duty
is purely ministerial, where the officer can do only one thing which on re-
fusal he may be compelled to do.
Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1925).
215. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855). I do not mean to suggest that Murray's Lessee originated
the idea that executive bodies receive deference from courts on factual determinations. See
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 31-32 (1827) ("Whenever a statute gives a discretion-
ary power to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a
sound rule of construction, that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of
the existence of those facts."); see also West v. Cochran, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 403, 415-16 (1854)
(upholding, prior to Murray's Lessee, commission determinations on claims derived from
former governments in Louisiana Territory); Woolhandler, supra note 14, at 214 n.86 (not-
ing that "cases giving deferential review to executive actions did not frequently rely explicitly
on Murray's Lessee"). That issue, as well as the proper metes and bounds of when Congress
may have a non-Article III body determine a factual issue, are outside the scope of this Arti-
cle. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011). For present purposes, it is sufficient to
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this doctrine, Congress created administrative bodies that "adjudicated" various
factual issues in a manner that bound other parties. A notable example of such
an agency was the Land Department, which disbursed various public lands to
claimants. These disbursements often triggered common-law property dis-
putes between rival claimants, particularly when the issued land patents were
unclear or premised on erroneous understandings of the law or facts. When the
Court heard these cases, it did not defer to the Land Department's interpreta-
tions of law, but instead reviewed those questions de novo, applying the con-
temporary and customary canons of construction. As for factual issues previ-
ously resolved by the Department, the Court sometimes treated certain of them
as "conclusive" absent an indication that the proceeding was tainted by
fraud.2 16 Over time, the Court refined this standard to include review to ensure
that the agency's decision was supported by "substantial evidence" in the rec-
ord.2 17
The standard of judicial review, therefore, turned on whether a particular
issue was characterized as one of "law" or one of "fact." As one might expect,
the distinction between law and fact in this context mirrored the law-fact line
traditionally drawn in the law of evidence. And as one might expect, just as in
the context of the law of evidence, the distinction between "law" and "fact"
could pose line-drawing problems. In an influential treatise on the law of evi-
establish that the nineteenth-century Court understood that executive branch actors could
find facts, with the result that certain of those factual determinations would receive defer-
ence when a case or controversy before an Article III court later presented the same issue.
216. See Gardner v. Bonestell, 18o U.S. 362, 369-70 (1901) ("[T]he determination of the Land
Department in a case within its jurisdiction of questions of fact depending upon conflicting
testimony is conclusive, and cannot be challenged by subsequent proceedings in the
courts."); Johnson v. Drew, 171 U.S. 93, 99 (1898) (stating that "the decision of the land de-
partment upon mere questions of fact is, in the absence of fraud or deceit, conclusive, and
such questions cannot thereafter be relitigated in the courts"); cf Gardner, 18o U.S. at 370
("Both of these findings were matters of fact and based upon the testimony. No proposition
of law controlled such findings, and no error of law is apparent.").
217. See Burfenning v. Chi., St. Paul, Minn. & Omaha Ry. Co., 163 U.S. 321, 323 (1896) (invali-
dating patent because "the action of the Land Department cannot override the expressed will
of Congress, or convey away public lands in disregard or defiance thereof," while observing
that the Court would not review whether "a certain tract is swamp land or not, saline land or
not, mineral land or not,' because those issues "present[] a question of fact"); see also Inter-
state Commerce Comm'n v. Union Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1912) (noting "mixed
questions of law and fact" would not be "examine[d] ... further than to determine whether
there was substantial evidence to sustain the order"); E. Blythe Stason, "Substantial Evi-
dence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1026, 1040-41 (1941) (identifying Union Pa-
cific as one of the leading pre-APA cases to use the term "substantial evidence" in the admin-
istrative-law context). These cases crystallized into the "substantial evidence" standard
ultimately codified in the APA.
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dence, James Bradley Thayer observed that the application of a legal rule to
facts had been incorrectly characterized by others as a "mixed question of law
and fact'" whereas the jury "always ... must reason, and must 'judge the
facts."218 According to Thayer, there was no bright-line rule separating "law"
from "fact" because the difference between cases involving the application of a
legal term - such as "reasonableness" - to unique facts "is simply one of more
or less."21 "The reasons for leaving questions as to the meaning and construc-
tion of [contract] writing to the judges," Thayer reasoned, is not "that these are
questions of law, for, mainly, they are not," but rather "ground[s] of policy."220
The same problem could arise in administrative law. In Marquez v. Frisbie, for
example, the Court reasoned that "where there is a mixed question of law and
fact, and the court cannot so separate it as to see clearly where the mistake of
law is, the decision of the tribunal to which the law has confided the matter is
conclusive."2 21
The prevailing approach in Land Department cases by the turn of the twen-
tieth century was encapsulated in the Court's opinion in Johnson v. Towsley.222
In that case, the Court interpreted a statute providing that the decision of the
Commissioner "shall be final, unless appeal therefrom be taken to the Secretary
218. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 249-50
(1898).
219. Id. at 251; cf id. at 202 ("The judges have always answered a multitude of questions of ulti-
mate fact, of fact which forms part of the issue. It is true that this is often disguised by call-
ing them questions of law.").
220. James Bradley Thayer, "Law and Fact" in Jury Trials, 4 HARY. L. REV. 147, 16o-61 (1890); see
also id. at 161 (noting that "[s]uch things, so important, so long enduring, should have a
fixed meaning; should not be subject to varying interpretations; should be interpreted by
whatever tribunal is most permanent, best instructed, most likely to adhere to precedents");
cf. Nathan Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1922) ("[W]hether a
particular question is to be treated as a question of law or a question of fact is not in itself a
question of fact, but a highly artificial question of law."). For a modern treatment of the
same issue, see Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97
Nw. U. L. REV. 1769, i8o6 (2003), which argues that the "doctrinal distinction between
'law' and 'fact' . . . must be decided functionally rather than by reference to purported onto-
logical, epistemological, or analytical differences between the concepts."
221. 101 U.S. 473, 476 (1879); see also id. ("But if it can be made entirely plain to a court of equity
that on facts about which there is no dispute, or no reasonable doubt, those officers have, by
a mistake of the law, deprived a man of his right, it will give relief."). While the import of
the Court's use of this language was unclear-the Court ultimately held that the contention
at stake was "a very forced inference from facts not found in the record,' id. at 477-Marquez
would subsequently be relied on by one of the foundational twentieth-century cases on judi-
cial deference, see infra notes 239-249 and accompanying text.
222. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72 (1871).
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of the Interior"22 3 as establishing only that a decision would be final within the
Executive Branch.2 4 Congress, in the Court's view, had no "intention to give to
the final decision of the Department of the Interior .. . any more conclusive
effect than what belonged to it without its aid."2 25 The Court "fully conceded
that when [executive] officers decide controverted questions of fact, in the ab-
sence of fraud, or impositions, or mistake, their decision on those questions is
final, except as they may be reversed on appeal in that department," but
claimed that when, "in the application of the facts as found by them they, by
misconstruction of the law," affected the property rights of private parties, the
courts had "power to give ... relief." 226 In language reminiscent of Marbury,
the Court claimed that "it is of the very essence of judicial authority to inquire
whether this has been done in violation of law, and, if it has, to give appropri-
ate remedy."227
D. The View from 19oo
At the turn of the twentieth century, a reader of the available treatises
would have concluded executive interpretations of statutes were relevant to ju-
dicial determinations only insofar as they embodied understandings made
roughly contemporaneously with the statute's enactment and stably maintained
and practiced since that time.
With respect to constitutional interpretation, the rule was expressed by Jus-
tice Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution: "The most unexceptionable
source of collateral interpretation is from the practical exposition of the gov-
ernment itself in its various departments upon particular questions discussed,
223. Id. at 82 (citing Act of June 12, 1858, ch. 154, § io, ii Stat. 319, 327).
224. Id. at 83.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 86.
227. Id. at 85; see also id. at 87-88 (observing that "but for [the executive officer's] construction of
the statute,' the legal issue would have turned out differently and that the Court "must
therefore inquire whether the statute, rightly construed, defeated Towsley's otherwise per-
fect right to the patent"); cf. Wis. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Forsythe, 159 U.S. 46, 61 (1895) (stating
that it was "doubtless true" that a "question of title has been determined in the land depart-
ment adversely to the claim of the plaintiff," but finding that prior determination irrelevant
because it was "not upon any question of fact, but upon a construction of the law; and such
matter, as we have repeatedly held, is not concluded by the decision of the land depart-
ment"); Minnesota v. Bachelder, 68 U.S. 109, 115 (1863) ("A court of equity will look into
the proceedings before the register and receiver, and even into those of the land office or
other offices, where the right of property of the party is involved, and correct errors of law or
of fact to his prejudice."); JAFFE, supra note 64, at 337-38 nn.68-69.
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and settled upon their own single merits."228 Thus, in the words of a more con-
temporary (from the vantage point of 1900) treatise writer, G.A. Endlich,
" [t]he greatest deference is shown by the courts to the interpretation put upon
the constitution by the Legislature in the enactment of laws and other practical
application of constitutional provisions to the legislative business, when that
interpretation has had the silent acquiescence of the people, including the legal
profession and the judiciary, and especially when injurious result would follow
the disturbing of it."229
Justice Story also found a role for contemporary construction of the Consti-
tution, which "is properly resorted to, to illustrate and confirm the text, to ex-
plain a doubtful phrase, or to expound an obscure clause."230 Thomas Cooley
expressed the same point: "Great deference has been paid in all cases to the ac-
tion of the executive department, where its officers have been called upon, un-
der the responsibilities of their official oaths, to inaugurate a new system, and
where it is to be presumed they have carefully and conscientiously weighed all
considerations, and endeavored to keep within the letter and the spirit of the
constitution.23 1
228. 1 STORY, supra note 25, 5 4o8, at 392.
229. G.A. ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES: FOUNDED ON THE
TREATISE OF SIR PETER BENSON MAXWELL §5 527-28 (1888); see also THOMAS COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER
OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 67 (1868) ("Where there has been a practical con-
struction, which has been acquiesced in for a considerable period, considerations in favor of
adhering to this construction sometimes present themselves to the courts with a plausibility
and force which it is not easy to resist .... [A] strong presumption exists that the construc-
tion rightly interprets the intention. Especially where this has been given by officers in the
discharge of their duty, and rights have accrued in reliance upon it, which would be divested
by a decision that the construction was erroneous, the argument ab inconvenienti s some-
times allowed to have great weight."); id. at 66-71 (providing examples of judicial deference
to contemporaneous and customary constructions of the Constitution).
230. 1 STORY, supra note 25, 5 407, at 390-92; see also id. 5 405, at 387-88 ("Much... may be
gathered from contemporary history, and contemporary interpretation, to aid us in just con-
clusions"); Cf 2 STORY, supra note 25, 5 1089, at 536 (relying on "contemporaneous exposi-
tion, and the uniform and progressive operations of the government itself" to interpret the
Commerce Clause).
231. COOLEY, supra note 229, at 69 (observing that, "[i]f the question involved is really one of
doubt, the force of their judgment, especially in view of the injurious consequences that may
result from disregarding it, is fairly entitled to turn the scale of the judicial mind"); see J.G.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 5 307 (1891) ("A construction of a
constitution, if nearly contemporaneous with its adoption, and followed and acquiesced in
for a long period of years afterwards, is never to be lightly disregarded, and is often conclu-
sive.").
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With respect to statutory interpretation, Theodore Sedgwick observed that
"[i]n seeking aid to construe an obscure or doubtful statute, considerable
weight is attached to the opinions in regard to it entertained, by persons
learned in the law, at the time of its passage."23 2 "Of a similar value," Sedgwick
stated, "in regard to the construction of statutes is usage, or the construction
which custom or practice has put on them."233 Likewise, Endlich emphasized
that "usage," including "acts done under" a statute, "may determine the mean-
ing of the language, at all events when the meaning is not free from ambigui-
y"234
These passages addressing constitutional and statutory interpretation
sound similar, and use the same terminology, for a simple reason: they express
the same interpretive methodology, which was used in constitutional and statu-
tory cases alike. There was no stark distinction drawn between de novo consti-
tutional and deferential statutory interpretation. An ambiguous constitutional
provision would be given the meaning that early Congresses had given it in
practice.235 And courts "respected" agency interpretations for the same reasons
James Madison had believed that a series of "adjudications" in the political
branches would "liquidate[]" the meaning of constitutional provisions.2 36 As
J.G. Sutherland explained, "[t]he uniform legislative interpretation of doubtful
232. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOvERN THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 250-51 (1857).
233. Id. at 255.
234. ENDLICH, supra note 229, § 34; see also id. §§ 49, 357, 360 (discussing usage as it relates to the
repealed portions of acts, contemporaneous exposition, and government implementation).
235. For modern examples, see Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
175 (1926), which explains that "a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitu-
tion when the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively
participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction
to be given its provisions." See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997)
("[E]arly congressional enactments provide contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the
Constitution's meaning ... ." (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); Bowsher
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986) ("This Decision of 1789 provides contemporaneous
and weighty evidence of the Constitution's meaning since many of the Members of the First
Congress had taken part in framing that instrument." (internal citation omitted)); Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1942) (reasoning that the 1776 act allowing spies to be tried by
court-martial "must be regarded as a contemporary construction" of the Constitution
"which has been followed since the founding of our Government" and, hence, "is entitled to
the greatest respect"); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329
(1936) ("The uniform, long-continued and undisputed legislative practice just disclosed
rests upon an admissible view of the Constitution which, even if the practice found far less
support in principle than we think it does, we should not feel at liberty at this late day to
disturb.").
236. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 123, at 229.
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constitutional provisions, running through many years, and a similar construc-
tion of statutes, has great weight,.2 37 The treatises thus echoed what the cases
held-the executive branch's construction of an ambiguous statute would be
"respected" where that construction reflected an interpretation that was de-
scribed as either contemporary with the statute's enactment, or longstanding or
customary, or both.
From the vantage point of the legal community in 1900, there was thus no
general rule of statutory construction requiring "deference" to executive inter-
pretation qua executive interpretation. But the landscape would change funda-
mentally during the course of the twentieth century, when the interpretive
methodology for statutes and other legal texts began to diverge dramatically.
And, as the passage of time obscured the intellectual roots of the Court's nine-
teenth-century precedents privileging the executive's customary and contempo-
rary interpretations of statutory text, those cases would be reimagined and re-
cycled as precedents privileging the interpretation advanced by executive
actors.
III. THE STEPS TO CHEVRON
The narrative now turns to the intellectual and jurisprudential steps during
the twentieth century that led to the forgetting, and ultimately the unravelling,
of the traditional interpretive framework. In Section III.A, I canvass the devel-
opments from approximately 1900 through the New Deal Court, when judicial
cracks in the glass began to emerge and, more importantly, scholarly critiques
of the prevailing interpretive methodology began to take hold. In Section III.B,
I address the new jurisprudence of deference that emerged in the early 1940 s in
the wake of the appointment of new Justices sympathetic to the critiques of ju-
dicial review of questions of law. I also explain that, after a backlash against the
New Deal, Congress enacted the APA in 1946 to codify the traditional interpre-
tive approach and repudiate the increased deference courts gave to agencies in
the 1940s. In Section III.C, I discuss the proliferation of interpretive tests in the
years after the APA's enactment and the bewildering state of the law prior to
the Court's opinion in Chevron. Finally, in Section III.D, I return to and reassess
the Court's opinion in Chevron in light of the Article's historical analysis.
237. SUTHERLAND, supra note 231, § 311 (emphasis added).
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A. The Traditional Canons of Construction from 19oo Through the New Deal
Court
In this Section, I discuss challenges to the prevailing interpretive method-
ology-most academic, though some judicial -that emerged in the early twen-
tieth century. I explain, however, that courts during this era, by and large, ad-
hered to traditional interpretive techniques - a fact that critics of those
techniques acknowledged. Those who advocated for greater judicial deference
to executive interpretation during this era understood that they were seeking a
departure from prevailing doctrine.
1. A Crack in the Glass
Each of the doctrines that has been discussed thus far played a role in the
now-obscure, but once-important 1904 case of Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne. * In
Bates, the Court considered whether the Postmaster General improperly re-
fused to recognize a monthly musical publication, Masters in Music, as a period-
ical and hence entitle it to second-class mail rates.2 39 The Postmaster General
had determined that because each issue of the periodical was "complete in it-
self" (each treated the works of a single master musician) and "had no connec-
tion with other numbers save in the circumstance that they all treated of mas-
ters in music,' the mailings "were in fact sheet music disguised as a periodical,
and should be classified as third[-]class mail matter."24 0 The government con-
ceded that its position in the case conflicted "with the construction placed upon
the statute by the Department for more than sixteen years continuously prior
to the present ruling of the Department."24 1
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brown acknowledged that the statuto-
ry question at issue "may be one of doubt" and that it was "largely one of
law."242 He nevertheless concluded that "there is some discretion left in the
Postmaster General . .. and that the exercise of such discretion ought not to be
interfered with unless the court be clearly of opinion that it was wrong."243
Thus, "even upon mixed questions of law and fact, or of law alone, [an agen-
238. 194 U.S. io6 (1904).
239. Id. at 106-07.
240. Id. at 107.
241. Id. at iii (Harlan, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 107 (majority opinion); see also id. at 11o (stating that the "question involved one of
law rather than of fact").
243. Id. at 107-08.
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cy's] action will carry with it a strong presumption of its correctness, and the
courts will not ordinarily review it, although they may have the power, and will
occasionally exercise the right of so doing."244 That was particularly so because
"the Postmaster General may have been, to a certain extent, guided by extrane-
ous information obtained by him, so that the question involved would not be
found merely a question of law, but a mixed question of law and fact."2"5
The Court analogized this curiously speculative holding to two lines of
precedents: (1) those "treat[ing] the findings of the Land Department upon
questions of fact as conclusive" (notwithstanding the Court's description of the
case as "largely one of law") and (2) those, like Decatur, in which the Court had
held, in applying the mandamus standard, that the executive official's action
"will not be reviewed by the courts, unless he has exceeded his authority or this
court should be of opinion that his action was clearly wrong" (notwithstanding
the fact that the case did not involve an extraordinary writ).246 The Court dis-
tinguished McAnnulty by claiming that the Court's opinion in that case "inti-
mated that something must be left to the discretion of the Postmaster Gen-
eral."2" 7 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan (joined by Chief Justice Fuller)
noted that the government's then-current position conflicted with its
longstanding one. He contended that the Court's opinion had "overthrown"
the "settled" principle that "the established practice of an Executive Depart-
ment charged with the execution of a statute will be respected and followed-
especially if it has been long continued-unless uch practice rests upon a con-
struction of the statute which is clearly and obviously wrong."248
Precisely what motivated the Court to retreat to a deferential standard in
Bates after reviewing the Postmaster General's decision de novo in McAnnulty is
hard to untangle.24 9 One reasonable speculation is that the Court was still ad-
justing to the shift in its authority prompted by the creation of general federal-
question jurisdiction. Having applied the mandamus standard for so many
years, it may have been natural for the Justices to view narrow legal questions
through a deferential lens. Justice Brown's articulation of a "floodgates" issue
were the Court to review the agency de novo reveals a hint of this concern:
"The consequence of a different rule," according to the Court, "would be that
244. Id. at 109-10 (relying in part on Marquez v. Frisbie).
245. Id. at iio (emphasis added).
246. Id. at 109.
247. Id. at io8.
248. Id. at iii (Harlan, J., dissenting).
249. See DAVIS, supra note 79, § 237, at 827 (contrasting McAnnulty and Bates and claiming that
" [t]he results in both cases flowed from practical considerations, not from interpretation").
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the court might be flooded by appeals of this ind to review the decision of the
Postmaster General in every individual instance."250 Another reasonable specu-
lation is that the Court found the line between "law" and "fact" in this area to
be difficult to draw-hence, Justice Brown's imprecise descriptions of the issue
before the Court as "largely one of law" and a "mixed question of law and
fact."2 51
Whatever the Court's reasons for the rule announced in Bates, two addi-
tional points are notable. First, Justice Harlan argued in dissent that the Court's
opinion violated the contemporary and customary canons of construction.252
But the Court did not respond to Justice Harlan's argument. It did not dispute
Justice Harlan's characterization of the precedents, nor did it rely on those cases
to justify the rule of judicial deference that it adopted. Second, at least immedi-
ately, the rule that Bates announced swung in a relatively narrow arc. As the
Court said in Silberschein v. United States, Bates allowed judicial review when the
agency's decision was "wholly dependent upon a question of law."253
25o. Bates, 194 U.S. at 108; see also id. at no (stating that past judicial review of the Postmaster
General's classification "is not intended to intimate that in every case hereafter arising the
question whether a certain publication shall be considered a book or a periodical shall be re-
viewed by this court").
251. Id. at 107, 110.
252. See id. at 111-12 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
253. 266 U.S. 221, 225 (1924); see Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 139-40 (1922) (citing Bates for the
proposition that the Court would not second-guess "a question of fact which the stat-
utes ... committed to the decision of the Postmaster General"); Houston v. St. Louis Indep.
Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479, 484 (1919) (citing Bates and reasoning that " [w]hether or not the
term 'sausage,' when applied to [a] product . . . [containing] more than the permitted
amount of cereal and water ... is false and deceptive is a question of fact" that could not be
disturbed "where it is fairly arrived at with substantial evidence to support it"); Cent. Tr.
Co. v. Cent. Tr. Co. of Ill., 216 U.S. 251, 261 (1910) (citing Bates to observe that "[w]e have
had occasion to consider the effect of findings of fact by officers in charge of the several de-
partments of government, and the accepted rule is that those findings are conclusive, unless
palpable error appears"); see also Brougham v. Blanton Mfg. Co., 249 U.S. 495, 499-500
(1919) (citing Bates for the proposition that "the power of determining whether a trade
name is 'false or deceptive' given by the law to the Secretary of Agriculture is, when exer-
cised, conclusive of the falsity or deception of the name"); Nat'l Life Ins. Co. of United
States v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 209 U.S. 317, 325 (1908) (refusing to review a determination
made by the post office because the petitioner was "appealing from the discretion of the de-
partment to the discretion of the court, and .. . has no clear legal right to obtain the order
sought"). Justices Brown and Holmes appear to have been the only Justices to have written
opinions realizing the implication of Bates on questions of law, but they circumscribed the
holding of the case to matters decided by the Postmaster General. See Smith v. Hitchcock,
226 U.S. 53, 58 (1912) (Holmes, J.) (characterizing Bates as "suggest[ing]" that, even on a
"question of law," the Court would "not interfere with the decision of the Postmaster-General
unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong" (emphasis added)); Pub. Clearing House v.
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Perhaps because of its lack of immediate impact, Bates has been neglected in
modern scholarship. But it was later an influential opinion among those who
sought to justify a reduced role for judges in reviewing legal questions. When
Jaffe wrote his magisterial summary of administrative law in 1965, for example,
he responded to the contention that the Supreme Court's deference jurispru-
dence in the 1940s was "an abdication of the customary power and responsibil-
ity of the judiciary" by claiming that the doctrine of judicial deference "is as
traditional as it is sound" -citing, as his supporting authority, Justice Brown's
opinion in Bates.254 "As long ago as 1904," Jaffe wrote, "Mr. Justice Brown with
complete frankness stated [in Bates] the function of a reviewing court in the
terms" of late-twentieth century judicial deference.2 55
2. Persistence of the Traditional Approach
Notwithstanding the expansion in the size, scope, and responsibility of the
federal government, courts in the first few decades of the twentieth century
generally hewed to the traditional interpretive formulations. The Court viewed
its role as requiring de novo review of questions of law and deferential review
of questions of fact,256 with mandamus a diminishing (but continuing) avenue
Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 509 (1904) (Brown, J.) (citing Bates for the proposition that determi-
nations made by the Postmaster General were presumed constitutional and the only ques-
tion was whether the Court should "accept the findings of the Postmaster General as to the
classification of the mail matter as final under the circumstances of the case").
254. JAFFE, supra note 64, at 575.
25s. Id. at 593. Bates was also a key precedent for John Dickinson, see infra notes 365-372 and ac-
companying text, and was cited by the Court in Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 n-7 (1941).
For other judicial deference cases relying on Bates, see Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390
U.S. 1, 9 (1968); United States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370, 376 (1962); and United States v. Shim-
er, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961). See also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 n.13 (1932) (citing
Bates as an example of the Court upholding an agency's action when it was issuing a deter-
mination of fact); DAvIs, supra note 79, § 236, at 817 & n.27 (citing Bates for the proposition
that "[e]ven when the scope of review is exceedingly broad, the Supreme Court may talk in
terms of non-reviewability").
256. See United States v. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940) ("It has long been held that where
Congress has authorized a public officer to take some specified legislative action when in his
judgment that action is necessary or appropriate to carry out the policy of Congress, the
judgment of the officer as to the existence of the facts calling for that action is not subject to
review."); Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 477 (1936) ("When the Secretary acts
within the authority conferred by the statute, his findings of fact are conclusive. But, in de-
termining whether in conducting an administrative proceeding of this sort the Secretary has
complied with the statutory prerequisites, the recitals of his procedure cannot be regarded as
conclusive." (citations omitted)); United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 15 (1926)
(reasoning that "the basis of fact on which [administrative orders] rest will not be reviewed
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for obtaining relief from agency action.257 The canonical statement of the de
novo standard in this era came from a concurring opinion-Justice Brandeis's
concurrence in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States.258 Brandeis argued that
" [t] he supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have some
court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and whether the
proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly."259 The
"inexorable safeguard" of the Due Process Clause, he contended, required that
there "be opportunity for a court to determine whether the applicable rules of
law ... were observed" and that an administrative order "may be set aside for
any error of law, substantive or procedural." 2 60
For a generation of scholars, Justice Brandeis's concurrence set forth the
"classic statement" on the scope of judicial review over questions of law. 261
There was, however, something ahistorical about Justice Brandeis's perspective
on the "supremacy of law." For law to be supreme, Justice Brandeis reasoned,
an Article III court must pass upon all questions of law and process. Yet he did
not acknowledge that, through much of the nineteenth century, the absence of
general federal-question jurisdiction necessitated, in many cases, resorting to
by the courts"); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912) (collecting cases and holding, in
immigration proceedings, that "the findings of fact reached by [executive branch] officials,
after a fair though summary hearing, may constitutionally be made conclusive, as they are
made by the provisions of the act in question").
257. See, e.g., Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174, 179-81 (1917) (approving of a writ of mandamus
when the Land Department changed its "view and practice" under statute).
258. 298 U.S. 38, 73 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon
Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920) ("In all such cases, if the owner claims confiscation of his
property will result, the State must provide a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a
judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and
facts; otherwise the order is void because in conflict with the due process clause, Fourteenth
Amendment.").
259. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 84 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
260. Id. at 73, 74.
261. JAFFE, supra note 64, at 343; see, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 79, § 8 at 33-34 (arguing that "[t]he
only significant recognition of the doctrine" of the "supremacy of law" in "a Supreme Court
opinion comes from a surprising quarter," namely, the "concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis"); JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 124 (1938) (interpreting
Brandeis as meaning that the "supremacy of law" requires the "right of a party to a judicial
determination as to the appropriate rule of law applicable to his particular case, and the right
to a judicial determination as to the regularity of the procedure employed by the administra-
tive"); John Dickinson, Administrative Procedure Act: Scope and Grounds of Broadened judicial
Review, 33 ABAJ- 434, 516 (1947) (arguing that "[a] very broad statement of th[e] principle"
that "questions of law are for the determination of the reviewing Court" is "contained in a
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an extraordinary writ like mandamus, under which an Article III court would
not resolve questions of law de novo. A better (or at least, more historically
grounded) description of the concept of "supremacy of law" in the American
tradition would have acknowledged that Congress has the authority to select
the cause of action -deferential mandamus or de novo federal-question re-
view -by which Article III courts would review questions of law. Where Con-
gress provided solely for mandamus jurisdiction, deferential review was con-
sistent with the "supremacy of law." Where Congress created federal-question
jurisdiction, however, the application of independent judgment was consistent
with traditional rules of interpretation and, hence, appropriate.
An example of the continued vitality of the canons of construction can be
found in a 1932 opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, Burnet v. Chicago Portrait
Co. 262 In Burnet, Chief Justice Hughes alluded to the "familiar principle .. . that
great weight is attached to the construction consistently given to a statute by
the executive department charged with its administration."
2 63 But he rejected
application of judicial deference based on a "qualification of that principle"
that, he argued, was "as well established as the principle itself": "The Court is
not bound by an administrative construction, and if that construction is not
uniform and consistent, it will be taken into account only to the extent that it is
supported by valid reasons."264 Deference was due, in other words, because of
an interpretation's consistency and uniformity, which would in most instances
render the agency construction customary or contemporaneous with a statuto-
ry enactment. Non-uniform interpretations, by contrast, would be persuasive
"only to the extent" they are "supported by valid reasons."265
Burnet is an obscure decision today, and it has been all but ignored by mod-
ern cases and commentators, with one important exception: in Chevron itself,
the Court cited Burnet, but neglected to explain or to engage in any way with
the "qualification" identified in Chief Justice Hughes' opinion.
2 66
3. Intellectual Challenges to the Traditional Interpretive Method
In the 1927 book Administrative justice and the Supremacy of Law in the Unit-
ed States, John Dickinson, at the time a thirty-three-year-old lecturer at Har-
vard, pointed out that, as a descriptive matter, the scope of judicial review over
262. 285 U.S. 1 (1932).
263. Id. at 16.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
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administrative decision making "focus[ed] ultimately upon the distinction
which the courts draw between 'questions of law' and 'questions of fact.'
267
Dickinson recognized that, under prevailing case law, courts "review[ed] for
error[s] of law, but not findings of fact, at least where, on the evidence, the
findings are within the bounds of reason."2 68 "The statutes and cases," he not-
ed, "are full of this distinction between 'law' and 'fact,' which is taken for grant-
ed, and has formed the basis of decision in so many instances that it becomes
important to see what there is in it."269
Dickinson's answer was that there was not much to it. Because "any factual
state or relation which the courts ... regard as sufficiently important to be
made decisive for all subsequent cases of similar character becomes thereby a
matter of law," it was impossible "to establish a clear line between so-called
'questions of law' and 'questions of fact.' 270 Standards inevitably "bridged [the
gap] between the special subsidiary facts . . . and the ultimate [legal] conclu-
sion."2 71 Any formal distinction between "law" and "fact" was illusory, because
the legal bridge was tantamount to fact finding. As Dickinson put it:
In truth, the distinction between "questions of law" and "questions of
fact" really gives little help in determining how far the courts will re-
view; and for the good reason that there is no fixed distinction. They
are not two mutually exclusive kinds of questions, based upon a differ-
ence of subject-matter. Matters of law grow downward into roots of
fact, and matters of fact reach upward, without a break, into matters of
law. The knife of policy alone effects an artificial cleavage at the point
where the court chooses to draw the line between public interest and
private right. It would seem that when the courts are unwilling to re-
view, they are tempted to explain by the easy device of calling the ques-
267. DICKINsON, supra note 26, at viii. For another take on Dickinson's book, see Merrill, supra
note 159, at 972-79, which emphasizes Dickinson's embrace of the appellate-review model
rather than the slipperiness of the law-fact distinction. See also Jeffrey A. Pojanowski,
Neoclassical Administrative Common Law, NEW RAMBLER REv. (Sept. 26, 2016), http://new
ramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/neoclassical-adninistrative-common-law [http://
perma.cc/EYC4-JX29] (reviewing Dickinson's book).
268. DICKINsoN, supra note 26, at 5o (footnote omitted).
269. Id. at 50-51 (footnote omitted).
270. Id. at 312.
271. Id. at 315. Dickinson expressly noted that this model of review differed from the "ultra vires"
model present in the mandamus line of cases and also that the model mirrored "review by a
court of error of the verdict of a jury." Id. at 312.
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tion one of "fact"; and when otherwise disposed, they say that it is a
question of "law."272
Dickinson's analytical move, in the context of the law of judicial review,
echoed Thayer's similar move in the law of evidence three decades earlier -an
intellectual debt that Dickinson acknowledged by repeatedly citing Thayer on
this point and describing Thayer's treatise as "contain[ing] the most profound
analysis that I know of the relation between 'matters of fact' and 'matters of
law.'2 7 1 It also echoed the Court's 1904 decision in Bates, which, Dickinson ob-
served, held that "on a 'mixed question of law and fact' the finding of an ad-
ministrative body ought not to be disturbed."27 4
Dicldnson's central thesis had the good fortune of being incredibly timely
and proved to be hugely influential.275 In the years following publication of the
272. Id. at 55; see also Merrill, supra note 159, at 975-76 (noting that Dickinson "reconceptualized"
the law-fact distinction to say that "[t]he more the principle for decision becomes one of
widespread generality, the more appropriate it is to call it a question of law" and " [t]he more
it tends toward factors unique to a particular controversy, the more appropriate it is to call it
a question of fact," and characterizing this paragraph as "perhaps the most frequently quoted
passage from the book" (footnotes omitted)).
273. DICKINSON, supra note 26, at 151 n.79; see also id. at-53, 55 n.55, 153 n.79, 207 n.16, 316 n.20,
319 n.27 (acknowledging Thayer's contributions on the relationship between matters of fact
and matters of law). The conceptual connection between the Chevron doctrine and Thayer's
The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129
(1893), which advocates a deferential standard of review for questions of constitutional law,
is well known. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 75, at 7-14. But the direct connection between
Thayer's views on evidence and the development of judicial deference, once similarly well
understood, has been long forgotten. See DAVIs, supra note 79, 5 250, at 902 (observing that
"[s]ome writers have suggested that courts should substitute judgment on general proposi-
tions but not on questions that are peculiar to a particular case"; that "[t]his idea seems to
have originated with Thayer"; and that " [i]n administrative law it largely stems from John
Dickinson's book"); cf. Posner, supra note 2, at 522 (stating that Thayer "seems not have been
concerned with judicial review of executive action" in part because "the executive branch was
of course much smaller and weaker when he wrote than it is today").
274. DICKINsoN, supra note 26, at 54 (footnote omitted).
275. Two Supreme Court opinions cited the book. First, Justice Brandeis cited it in his dissent in
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 85 n.55, 93 n.61 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), written five
years after the book's publication; and second, Justice Jackson cited it in his majority in
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37 n-3 (1950), written more than two decades after
the book's publication. See also DAVIs, supra note 79, § 250, at 902 (observing that Dickin-
son's view on the law-fact distinction "has been quoted with approval by a number of im-
portant writers and without doubt has substantially influenced thought on the subject");
JAFFE, supra note 64, at 546-47 & n-4 (noting that "[p]erhaps the most famous expression"
of the view that "it is difficult, perhaps indeed impossible, to make a clean distinction be-
tween fact and law" is found in Dickinson); George L. Haskins, John Dickinson: 1894-1952,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 6 n.6 (1952) ("Dickinson's ideas attracted particularly the attention of
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book in 1927, the expansion of the American administrative state during the
New Deal brought the executive branch and the Justices of the Supreme Court
increasingly into conflict on questions of both constitutional and statutory in-
terpretation. Some critics (and even supporters) of the administrative state
sought to articulate a manner in which agency discretion could be cabined.
Ernst Freund, a professor at the University of Chicago Law School, believed
that administrative action worked best when "procedural guaranties and other
inherent checks" were established that would "in course of time, if not immedi-
ately, substitute principle for mere discretion" and would "evolve principle out
of constantly recurrent action."2 76 More dramatically, Roscoe Pound, as the lead
author of a Special Committee on Administrative Law for the American Bar As-
sociation, criticized an emerging "administrative absolutism" that was repug-
nant to the idea of traditional law in the United States.2 7 7
But the dominant approach within the academy -and the Roosevelt execu-
tive branch-embraced administrative discretion.2 78  Dickinson criticized
Freund for viewing administrative discretion as "of necessity inherently bad,
and [assuming] that all questions can be justly decided by the yard-stick of
fixed rules."2 7 9 More administrative discretion, however, required less judicial
review. In the words of Walter Gellhorn, a law professor at Columbia, "the
burning question was whether and how much a court could review (and, in re-
viewing, revise) administrative judgments," given that judges "were sometimes
less than supermen and were therefore themselves capable of erring" and that
judges could not "reach more than a tiny segment of the administrative out-
put."
28 0
Mr. Justice Cardozo, who frequently referred to them in his printed works." (citing SELECT-
ED WRITINGS OF CARDOZO 13, 15, 288 (Hall ed., 1947))).
276. Ernst Freund, The Substitution of Rule for Discretion in Public Law, 9 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 666,
669, 671-72 (1915)-
277. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. ABA 331, 339-46 (1938).
278. See Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1590, 1637 (observing that New Deal Progressives sought to
"liberate agencies from judicial supervision so that technocracy guided loosely by politics
could replace law" and had a "vision for administrative law [that] had the courts withdraw-
ing almost completely from the supervision of administrative agencies").
279. John Dickinson, Book Reviews, 22 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 981, 985 (1928) (reviewing JOHN PRES-
TON COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES (1927);
and ERNST FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY: A COMPARA-
TIVE SURVEY (1928)); see also Daniel R. Ernst, Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter, and the Ameri-
can Rechtsstaat: A Transatlantic Shipwreck, 1894-1932, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 171, 184 (2009)
(discussing other students of Frankfurter who criticized Freund's distaste of administrative
discretion).
280. WALTER GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 42-43 (1941).
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In this intellectual climate, whatever Dickinson's precise intent in describ-
ing "law" and "fact" as "not two mutually exclusive kinds of questions,""' many
readers understood his point broadly. Drawing the line between "facts" and
"law" for purposes of judicial review, on this view, was not a matter of mere
formal categorization, but rather a policy call dependent on the generality of
the legal principle that the court or agency was articulating. That meant certain
questions traditionally deemed "legal" could be re-conceptualized as "factual"
where the principle being articulated was of insufficient abstraction to justify
the involvement of generalist courts in the functioning of expert agencies.
In the Storrs Lecture delivered in 1938 at Yale Law School and published as
The Administrative Process, James Landis set forth the standard account of New
Deal progressives on the topic of judicial review of administrative action.28 2
"[T]he administrative process," he claimed, "springs from the inadequacy of a
simple tripartite form of government to deal with modern problems," with the
changes wrought by the modern administrative state being "conducive to flexi-
bility -a prime quality of good administration. ". The quality of "expertness"
that administrative agencies possessed, Landis argued, could arise "only from
that continuity of interest, that ability and desire to devote fifty-two weeks a
year, year after year, to a particular problem."8
Landis accepted that, under the prevailing interpretive approach, "[t]he
scope of judicial review" over questions of fact and questions of law "is wholly
different."288 In this regard, he noted that he "use[d] the[] terms 'fact' and
'law' knowing how tenuous the distinction between them is" and described
Dickinson as an authority who "reject[ed] the distinction completely."286 With
respect to questions of "fact'" the issue was relatively straightforward: review
was minimal under the precedents, and should be minimal because "the ex-
281. DICKINsON, supra note 26, at 55.
282. LANDIS, supra note 261, at 136-40. Landis, then the Dean of Harvard Law School, had just
returned from service as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, see Tushnet,
supra note 13, at 1612, where he may well have played a role in the SEC's defense of its ex-
pansive early reading of its organic statute, see In re Application of Int'l Paper & Power Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 292, 1937 WL 32739 (May 5, 1937), powers under our fundamen-
tal Act with undue strictness at this stage in our growth would be to sacrifice upon the altar
of a by-gone legal formalism our ability to perform adequately our allotted task. It would,
indeed, be for us to make the mistake which Chief Justice Marshall happily avoided in his
exposition of a great organic act in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316.").
283. LANDIs, supra note 261, at 1, 69.
284. Id. at 23.
285. Id. at 145.
286. Id.
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pertness of the administrative, if guarded by adequate procedures, can be trust-
ed to determine these issues as capably as judges."28 7
But as to questions of law, Landis seemed to part ways with the prevailing
approach. In a revealing statement, Landis observed that "[t]he interesting
problem as to the future of judicial review over administrative action is the extent
to which judges will withdraw, not from reviewing findings of fact, but conclu-
sions upon law ... due to the belief that" legal issues (like factual ones) "are
best handled by experts."288 Landis contended that "the same considerations of
expertness" that prompted deference on factual issues "have validity in the field
of law."289 Indeed, the commonplace "desire to have courts determine questions
of law is related to a belief in their possession of expertness with regard to such
questions."290 Questions of law, however, should be "decided by those best
equipped for the task" due to their expertise, which would in certain specialized
circumstances be administrative agencies rather than courts.291 The message
from The Administrative Process was clear: judicial deference to executive inter-
pretation was not the law, circa 1938, but some form of the doctrine should be
in the future.
B. The Death (and Temporary Revival) of the Traditional Canons from 1940 to
the Administrative Procedure Act
Following the appointment of a set of new Justices, the Supreme Court in
the early 1940s steadily expanded the zone of interpretive discretion given to
administrative. agencies, effectively abandoning the traditional interpretive
287. Id. at 142; see also Robert M. Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion, 47 YALE
L.J. 577, 595 (1938) (criticizing those who supported "the doctrine of judicial infallibility"
and who were "presumably of the opinion that an independent ribunal endowed with the
antiquated or cumbersome methods of legal procedure, steeped in the traditions of the
common law and completely isolated from the previous steps in the administrative process,
is the most suitable agency to determine finally the existence of certain basic facts pertaining
to an administrative controversy").
288. LANDIS, supra note 261, at 144 (emphasis added).
289. Id. at 145.
290. Id. at 152 (emphasis omitted).
291. Id. at 153. In contrast to Landis's approach, Erwin Griswold's (later Landis' successor as
Dean of Harvard Law School) 1941 article summarized the existing case law as hinging on
two factors that "can be compressed into two long words: contemporaneousness, and long-
continuedness." Erwin N. Griswold, A Summaty of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARY. L. REV.
398, 404 (1941). Dean Griswold did not address the intellectual antecedents for these two
factors, nor the development of the mandamus standard or law-fact distinction, but his
analysis was, in the main, consistent with that of this Article.
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methodology.292 In charting this new course, the Court borrowed much from
Dickinson's (and Thayer's) legal realist approach to the law-fact distinction. As
Jaffe later explained, " [t] he device of characterizing a question as one of fact or
as 'mixed' permit[ted] a court to pretend that it must affirm the administrative
action if it is 'supported by evidence' or is 'reasonable.""' But then, in the
wake of a backlash against the New Deal and the perception of excesses by ad-
ministrative agencies, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act in
1946. Read against the history of the APA's adoption, section 706 is best inter-
preted as an attempt to revive the traditional methodology and to instruct
courts to review legal questions using independent judgment and the canons of
construction.
1. The New Jurisprudence
The opinion in Gray v. Powell heralded a new era and set forth an approach
to judicial review that illustrated the proclivities of the new members of the
Court. In Gray, the Court held that it would not question the Department of
Interior's construction of the word "producer" under the Bituminous Coal Act
292. See STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 22 ( 3d ed. 1992) ("In a relatively short time, the Supreme Court (and with it, much
of the lower federal judiciary) swung from almost undisguised hostility toward the new
programs of the administration to conspicuous deference. The availability of judicial review
of administrative action was curtailed, and particular agency decisions were frequently sus-
tained with judicial obeisance to the mysteries of administrative expertise. The defenders of
the administrative process appeared to have substantially succeeded in insulating agency de-
cisions from judicial check."); WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND
COMMENTS 379-80 (8th ed. 1987) (stating that, during this period, the "historical building
blocks" for deferential judicial review of agency legal interpretation were put in place); cf.
Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judici-
ary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 284, 300 (2013) (noting a
rise in the number of citations of legislative history from about the year 1940, attributing
that rise "in part [to] a rapid turnover in the personnel and therefore the ideology of the
Court" with "the appointment of new progressive-minded Justices by President Roosevelt,"
and contending that the use of such history was "at least in its origin, a statist tool of inter-
pretation"). Among the newly appointed members was Felix Frankfurter -one of two peo-
ple (the other, Roscoe Pound) to whom Dickinson had dedicated Administrative justice and
the Supremacy of Law. The other new Justices were Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, William
Douglas, Frank Murphy, James Byrnes (briefly), Robert Jackson, Wiley Rutledge, and Har-
old Burton. They replaced Willis Van Devanter, George Sutherland, Benjamin Cardozo,
Louis Brandeis, Pierce Butler, James McReynolds, Harlan Stone, Charles Evans Hughes,
and Owen Roberts.
293. JAFFE, supra note 64, at 547; see also DAvis, supra note 79, § 250, at 902-05 (expressly con-
necting Thayer and Dickinson's perspective on the law-fact distinction and the Court's def-
erence jurisprudence during the 1940s).
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of 1937.294 The Court reasoned that Congress had "delegate[d] th[e] function"
of interpreting the statutory term "to those whose experience in a particular
field gave promise of a better informed, more equitable" judgment, and that
"this delegation will be respected and the administrative conclusion left un-
touched."29 s The Court brushed aside the fact that there was "no dispute as to
the evidentiary facts" because "[i]t is not the province of a court to absorb the
administrative functions to such an extent that the executive or legislative
agencies become mere fact finding bodies deprived of the advantages of
prompt and definite action."2 96 "To determine upon which side of the median
line the particular instance falls," the Court reasoned, "calls for the expert, ex-
perienced judgment of those familiar with the industry." 297 In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Roberts argued that in the absence of a "single disputed fact,"
the agency's "error was a misconstruction of the Act . . . and that error, under
all relevant authorities, is subject to court review."298 He accused the majority of
"obviously fail[ing] in performing its duty," of "abdicat[ing] its function as a
court of review," and of "complete[ly] revers[ing] ... the normal and usual
method of construing a statute."2 99
A few years later, in 1944, the Court elaborated on this mixed-question-of-
law-and-fact approach. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., the Court conclud-
ed that "where the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory
term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must de-
294. 314 U.S. 402, 411-12 (1941).
295. Id. at 412 & n-7 (citing, among other cases, Bates).
296. Id. at 412.
297. Id. at 413 (reasoning that, unless the agency's action could be characterized as not "a sensible
exercise of judgment, it is the Court's duty to leave the Commission's judgment undis-
turbed"). Although Gray does not expressly speak of "mixed questions" of law and fact, Jus-
tice Reed's draft opinions for the Court - which I have recently uncovered - make abundant-
ly clear the connection between the preexisting debate and the Gray Court's reasoning and
ultimate holding. See Justice Stanley Reed, Draft Opinion in Gray v. Powell (on file with au-
thor) (reasoning that, in "dealing with" questions about the standard of review, "courts have
sought to subsume inferences from evidentiary facts under the categories of fact or law in an
effort by that classification to determine their power of judicial review" and that, "[e]ven
though th[e] Act [at issue in the case] forbids plenary review of facts and allows it for legal
issues, the need for accurate separation of the two is not often essential"); see also Aditya
Bamzai, The Law-Fact Distinction and Gray v. Powell (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
298. 314 U.S. at 418 (Roberts, J., dissenting); see also id. at 420 (arguing that, if an agency fails to
"observe ... guides in applying the statute . . . , it is the obligation of the courts to observe
them in performing their statutory duty to review [its] determination").
299. Id. at 420-21.
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termine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited." 0 ' The Court re-
jected the argument that it could "import wholesale the traditional common-
law conceptions" of the statutory term, lest the statute become "encumbered by
the same sort of technical legal refinement as has characterized" the judicial
definition.0o Instead, the Court held that the agency's "[e]veryday experience
in the administration of the statute gives it familiarity" with how best to define
the statutory term and meant that the agency construction "is to be accepted if
it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law."3 02
A third case, also from 1944, seemed to articulate a slightly different, more
forthrightly multifactor and contextual approach to judicial deference. In Skid-
more v. Swift & Co., Justice Jackson authored a unanimous opinion for the
Court asserting that a particular agency's legal interpretations, "while not con-
trolling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance."3 The "weight" given the agency's legal interpretation, on
Justice Jackson's reasoning, "depend[ed] upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lack-
ing power to control."304 While Justice Jackson's reasoning paralleled the meth-
odology of the interpretive canons to the extent that it instructed courts to look
at agency "consistency," Skidmore did not provide a theoretical basis for its mul-
tifactor approach or an explanation for why the approach was appropriate. Nor
did it explain how other factors with the "power to persuade" were related to
the statute's contemporaneous understanding and the agency's customary prac-
tice.
Almost immediately, the Court inconsistently applied the new principles
that it had articulated in Gray, Hearst, and Skidmore. The mixed-question anal-
ysis was embraced, in some cases, by the dissenting Justices in Gray,30 and re-
300. 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944); see id. at 135-36 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "Congress
did not delegate" the interpretive task to the agency and that such a task "is a question of the
meaning of the Act and, therefore, is a judicial and not an administrative question").
301. Id. at 125 (majority opinion).
302. Id. at 130-31.
303. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
304. Id.
305. See Barrett Line v. United States, 326 U.S. 179, 201-02 (1945) (Stone, C.J., and Roberts,
Frankfurter, and Jackson, JJ., dissenting) (reasoning that "it is our business to deal with the
case now here and not to be concerned with apparent inconsistences in administrative de-
terminations" and that "the construction of this provision involves considerations so bound
up with the technical subject matter that, even though the neutral language of the statute
979
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
jected, in others, by Justices in the Gray majority.306 The analysis was embraced
in some cases,30 7 and rejected in others on grounds that were hard to deci-
pher."o' Still other cases made it hard to determine whether the Court was truly
following7 a "mixed question" approach, as opposed to the broader principle
that agencies receive deference for all legal interpretations, which was later
adopted in Chevron.309
permits, as a matter of English, the construction which the Court now makes, the experience
of the Commission should prevail"); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 681
n.1 (1944) (Stone, C.J.) (arguing that "[i]t has now long been settled that" on questions of
law "the experienced judgment of the Board is entitled to great weight").
3o6. See Switchmen's Union of N. Am. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 321 (1943) (Reed, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that the agency "may be conceded discretion to make a reasonable
determination of the meaning" of a statute, but criticizing the Court for allowing the agency
"to determine not only questions judicially found to be committed to its discretion, as in
Gray v. Powell, . . . but the statutory limits of its own powers as well").
307. See Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 478 (1947) (holding that, for application
"of a broad statutory term or phrase to a specific set of facts" that may "be considered more
legal than factual in nature, the reviewing court's function is exhausted when it becomes ev-
ident that" the agency's "choice has substantial roots in the evidence and is not forbidden by
the law"); Unemployment Comp. Comm'n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1946)
("All that is needed to support the Commission's interpretation is that it has 'warrant in the
record' and a 'reasonable basis in law."'); Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 552-53 (1944)
(citing Gray for the proposition that "the interpretations of an Act of Congress by those
charged with its administration are entitled to persuasive weight"); Dobson v. Comm'r, 320
U.S. 489, 502 (1943) (reasoning that "when the Court cannot separate the elements of a de-
cision so as to identify a clear-cut mistake of law, the decision of the Tax Court must stand"
and that "[i]n deciding law questions courts may properly attach weight to the decision of
points of law by an administrative body having special competence to deal with the subject
matter").
308. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 290-91 (1946) (relying on
Skidmore and rejecting agency interpretation); Soc. Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369-
70 (1946) (observing that "[a]dministrative determinations must have a basis in law and
must be within the granted authority" because agencies "act as a delegate to the legislative
power," reasoning that it "is a judicial function" to "decide the limits of [agency] statutory
power," and holding that agency holding was "beyond the permissible limits of administra-
tive interpretation"); Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1946) (relying
on Skidmore); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 142-43 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) (citing Gray for the proposition that Congress may "lodge[]" matters "in the exclusive
discretion" of an agency); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Parker, 326 U.S. 6o, 65 (1945)
(citing Gray and reasoning that statutory language "gives administrative discretion" to the
agency "to draw its conclusion from the infinite variety of circumstances which may occur in
specific instances").
309. See, e.g., Fed. Sec. Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1943) (Stone, C.J.) (citing
Gray for the proposition that the Court had "repeatedly emphasized the scope that must be
allowed to the discretion and informed judgment of an expert administrative body," and
claiming that "[t] hese considerations are especially appropriate where the review is of regu-
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Leaving to one side the confusion in the case law in the year 1946, the
Court's cases, when set against the backdrop of the historical narrative, clarify a
point of wider jurisprudential significance. In the post-Chevron era, it has be-
come de rigueur to compare the bright-line approach seemingly articulated in
Chevron (and its predecessors, such as Hearst) with the multifactor and contex-
tual approach articulated by Justice Jackson in Skidmore. But it is possible that a
third explanation captures the jurisprudential phenomenon of the 1940s era:
both the Hearst and Skidmore standards were alternative twentieth-century at-
tempts by a Court struggling to define the bounds of judicial review of expert
decisions by generalist courts -and both are departures from the traditional in-
terpretive methodology and intellectual framework that privileged contempo-
rary and customary interpretations.
2. The Road to the Administrative Procedure Act
In his 1944 opinion in Skidmore, Justice Jackson remarked that there was
"no statutory provision as to what, if any, deference courts should pay to"
agency interpretations of statutes."'o Within two years, that would change as a
result of developments within the political branches that were occurring in par-
allel with this new jurisprudence. In 1939, Representative Francis Walter and
Senator Mills Logan introduced legislation to govern administrative procedure
and judicial review in the House and Senate.311 The debate over the bill attract-
ed intense national attention, with one congressman remarking that
"[p] ractically every leading newspaper in the country has commented editorial-
ly on the contents of this bill. It has been spectacularized in the news columns
lations of general application adopted by an administrative agency under its rule-making
power in carrying out the policy of a statute with whose enforcement it is charged").
310. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
311. H.R. 6324, 76th Cong. (1939); S. 915, 76th Cong. (1939). The bill was modeled on a pro-
posal by Roscoe Pound, the Chairman of the ABA's Special Committee on Administrative
Law, submitted to Congress in 1938. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 65
ANN. REP. ABA 215 (1940); Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 64 ANN.
REP. ABA 281 (1939); Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, supra note 277;
see also James M. Landis, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law, 53 HARv. L. REV. 1077, 1083
nn.11-12 (1940) (observing that House Resolution 6324 renumbered the sections of Pound's
bill, added definitions, and made minor substantive changes); George B. Shepherd, Fierce
Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1557 (1996) (relating the history of attempts to enact a statute addressing administra-
tive procedure and judicial review before the Walter-Logan bill).
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and on the radio." " The bill passed the House and Senate, but President Roo-
sevelt - on Attorney General Jackson's recommendation - vetoed it on Decem-
313ber 18, 1940. In doing so, he characterized the bill as "one of the repeated
efforts by a combination of lawyers who desire to have all processes of govern-
ment conducted through lawsuits and of interests which desire to escape regu-
lations."3 14 Roosevelt sought to deflect criticism of his veto, at least temporarily,
by asking Congress to wait for the recommendations of a Committee on Ad-
ministrative Procedure that he had asked Attorney General Jackson to establish
following the introduction of the Walter-Logan bill in Congress.1
Roosevelt's veto message prompted a heated reaction from Roscoe Pound,
who excoriated it in a 1941 speech before the New York State Bar Association
that was reprinted in the Journal of the American Bar Association.3 16 Pound dra-
matically claimed that the message was "much in the spirit of the absolute ideas
which have been making headway all over the world in the past two dec-
312. 86 CONG. REC. 13,814 (1940) (statement of Rep. Michener). From the vantage point of the
post-Chevron era, the bill gave scant attention to the standard of judicial review for questions
of law, requiring simply that a reviewing court would set aside a decision that "infringes ...
the statutes of the United States" or that "is otherwise contrary to law." That provision con-
trasted with the far more fulsome provisions on judicial review of factual issues, on which
the debate centered. 84 CONG. REC. 7075 (1939) (statement of Rep. Logan) (arguing that
the bill would eliminate the "scintilla" rule, under which a reviewing court would affirm an
agency decision supported by a "scintilla" of evidence, and replace it with the "substantial
evidence" rule, under which an agency decision would be affirmed only if it rested on sub-
stantial evidence). Whether the bill would actually change then-existing law was disputed;
other senators pointed out that courts had already embraced the substantial evidence rule.
See id.; see also, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (applying the
substantial evidence rule); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 685 (9 th Cit.
1943) (same); Appalachian Power Co. v. NLRB, 93 F.2d 985, 989 (4 th Cir. 1938) (same).
313. 86 CONG. REC. 13,942-43, 13,945.
314. Id. at 13,943.
315. See FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE, S. Doc. No. 77-8, app. A, at 251-52 (1941). Of the twelve members of the final com-
mittee, eight could be considered supporters of the New Deal, while four may have been op-
ponents. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2081 n.46 (noting that the Committee majority was
composed of "New Deal enthusiasts skeptical about judicial checks on administration" and
that it recommended no new legislation defining the scope of judicial review). The minority
was composed of Carl McFarland, E. Blythe Stason, Arthur T. Vanderbilt, and one "con-
servative" member, Lawrence Groner, who was later described as "off by himself, way off at
the right end, nobody joining him." Kenneth C. Davis & Walter Gellhorn, Present at the Crea-
tion: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 511, 513 (1986). The committee's staff
included two young law professors, Kenneth Davis and Walter Gellhorn, who would go on
to become two of the leading academic experts on administrative law in the second half of
the twentieth century. See Shepherd, supra note 311, at 1595.
316. Roscoe Pound, The Place of the judiciary in a Democratic Polity, 27 ABA J. 133 (1941).
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ades." 31 In doing so, he specifically criticized the "recent[]" trend of "giving the
interpretation of [statutes] to the executive, or to administrative officials.""'
He equated "tak[ing] away interpretation by the courts" and "leav[ing] inter-
pretation of the provisions and directions of the law to the executive" with "en-
ter[ing] upon the path leading to a lex regia" and "moving a long way from. . .
the genius of our institutions [which] was opposed to the deposit of unlimited
power anywhere."3 19
On January 22, 1941, a month after the House failed to override Roosevelt's
veto of the Walter-Logan bill, the Attorney General's Committee on Adminis-
trative Procedure submitted its report, accompanied by two draft bills from the
"majority" (more favorable to administrative discretion and flexibility) mem-
bers of the Committee and the "minority" (more favorable to codifying proce-
dural requirements) members. The majority reasoned that agencies were too
diverse to be governed by a single set of procedures and, hence, proposed con-
tinuous study and reporting of administrative procedures,320 along with a draft
bill that did not codify a standard for the scope of review of agency deci-
sions.321 The minority bill, by contrast, proposed a unified and comprehensive
code of administrative procedure, including provisions setting forth standards
for judicial review of administrative action for all relevant questions of
(1) constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity; (2) the statutory au-
thority or jurisdiction of the agency; (3) the lawfulness and adequacy of proce-
dure; (4) findings, inferences or conclusions of fact unsupported, upon the
whole record, by substantial evidence; and (5) administrative action otherwise
arbitrary or capricious.32 2 The minority draft also included a judicial-review
proviso stating that "upon such review due weight shall be accorded the expe-
317. Id. at 133.
318. Id. at 136.
319. Id. at 137.
320. Dean Acheson, Summary ofAttorney General's Committee Report, reprinted in 27 ABA J. 143, 145
(1941) ("The Committee believes that the judicial review which now exists is wise and
should be maintained.. . . [T]he Committee believes that [changes] may not wisely be
effected by general legislation.").
321. See H.R. 4782, 7 7 th Cong. (1941); S. 675, 7 7 th Cong. (1941); FINAL REPORT OF THE ArroR-
NEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 191-202
(1941).
322. H.R. 4782; S. 675; S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 203, 217-47; see also Additional Views and Recommen-
dations of Messrs. McFarland, Stason and Vanderbilt, reprinted in 27 ABA J. 146, 146-47 (1941)
(outlining the minority's proposal for a comprehensive code of administrative procedure).
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rience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and legislative policy of
the agency involved as well as the discretionary authority conferred upon it."323
With respect to questions of law, the majority of the Attorney General's
Committee reasoned that:
Even on questions of law [independent] judgment [by the court] seems
not to be compelled. The question of statutory interpretation might be
approached by the court de novo and given the answer which the court
thinks to be the "right interpretation." Or the court might approach it,
somewhat as a question of fact, to ascertain, not the "right interpreta-
tion," but only whether the administrative interpretation has substantial
support. Certain standards of interpretation guide in that direction.
Thus, where the statute is reasonably susceptible of more than one in-
terpretation, the court may accept that of the administrative body.
Again, the administrative interpretation is to be given weight-not
merely as the opinion of some men or even of a lower tribunal, but as
the opinion of the body especially familiar with the problems dealt with
by the statute and burdened with the duty of enforcing it. This may be
particularly significant when the legislation deals with complex matters
calling for expert knowledge and judgment.2
Two aspects of this passage stand out. First, the report's suggestion that
"questions of law" might be approached as "a question of fact, to ascertain ...
only whether the administrative interpretation has substantial support" mirrors
Dickinson's argument on the law-fact distinction-a debt that the report
acknowledged by quoting Dickinson's analysis.325 Second, the majority asserted
its recommendation tentatively, thereby indicating that the authors of the re-
port did not believe that-their position fully reflected the state of the case law,
but rather proposed a new and idealized rule of interpretation. Buttressing that
point, the report cited a single case to support the deferential standard of re-
view that it (tentatively) proposed-Judge Augustus Hand's Second Circuit
opinion in SEC v. Associated Gas & Electric Co.326 Simply put, when the report
was issued in January of 1941-before the Court issued Gray and Hearst-the
323. S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 246-47.
324. Id. at go-91 (footnote omitted).
325. Id. at 88 n.37 (citing DICKINSON, supra note 26).
326. 99 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1938). Judge Hand's opinion in the case could be understood as an ap-
plication of the traditional canons. See id. at 798 (noting "uniform[] treat[ment]" and "long
settled practice," as well as the "benefit of [the agency's] special knowledge acquired through
continuous experience in a difficult and complicated field").
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majority could find no better case to support a deferential standard of review
on questions of law.
3. Section 7o6 of the Administrative Procedure Act
For several years, issues of administrative reform were relegated to the
backburner as Congress focused on the nation's war effort.327 But when Con-
gress finally enacted the APA to govern internal agency procedure and judicial
review in 1946,328 one might have predicted that the Court's incipient deviation
from the traditional interpretive method would be swept away. After all, sec-
tion 706 of the APA provided that a "reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and deter-
mine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action."" On its
face, section 706's instruction that a court "decide all relevant questions of law"
appeared to contemplate some form of de novo review of agency legal interpre-
tation. Section 706, moreover, prescribed the same standard of review for stat-
utory provisions as for constitutional provisions by requiring that courts "in-
terpret constitutional and statutory provisions" alike. Since at least Marbury,
constitutional provisions had been subject to de novo review.330 And section
706 required, without suggesting that a deferential standard be applied, that
courts overturn agency actions "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right." 3 Finally, section 706 established def-
erential standards of review for issues other than "relevant questions of law,"332
thereby indicating that Congress knew how to write a deferential standard into
statute when it wanted to do so.
No less importantly, had the enactors of the APA wanted to require courts
to give additional weight to agency expertise -and thereby, to codify or to leave
327. See Shepherd, supra note 311, at 1641 (noting that during several of the war years "Congress
ignored administrative reform").
328. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 6o Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.); see also S. REP. No. 79-752, at 5-7 (1945) (explaining how the APA would meet the
goal of a bill that is "complete enough to cover the whole field").
329. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); see also id. § 706(2)(A), (C) (authorizing courts to "set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... not in accordance with law" or "in excess
of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right").
330. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922-23 (1995).
331. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).
332. See id. § 706(2)(A) (providing that agency actions, findings, and conclusions may be over-
turned "if arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law").
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in place the Supreme Court's post-1940s jurisprudence on the question of def-
erence -they had before them a template for doing so. Like the APA generally,
secttion 706 was modeled on the proposed bill of the minority of the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. 3  But there was a single,
glaring difference: the minority proposal had included a proviso requiring that
a reviewing court give "due weight" to agency "technical competence" and
"specialized knowledge."334 Section 706 omitted that language.3
Scholars have long debated what section 7o6's instruction means. On the
one hand, as Duffy explains, "commentators in administrative law have 'gener-
ally acknowledged' that section 706 seems to require de novo review on ques-
tions of law."336 Similarly, Merrill observes that section 706 "suggests that Con-
gress contemplated courts would always apply independent judgment on
questions of law" 3" and notes the "puzzling" fact that there has been no judi-
cial "'rediscovery' of the language of the APA." 3 3 And Jerry Mashaw states that
section 706 "seems to allocate firmly [questions of statutory interpretation] to
de novo judicial determination."3 39
333. See Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Some Comments on the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ILL. L.
REV. 368, 414 (1946) ("In general Section lo of the Act adopts the proposal of the minority
of the Attorney General's Committee."); Shepherd, supra note 311, at 1649-50 (observing
that bills introduced in 1943 "mirrored the Attorney General's Committee's minority bill"
and became the APA after "two years of negotiations and softening amendments"). Contra-
ry to Shepherd's characterization, however, not all of the "amendments" that the APA made
to the minority bill should be characterized as "softening." See infra text accompanying notes
334-335-
334. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S.
Doc. No. 77-8, at 246-47 (1941).
335. See Dickinson, supra note 261, at 517 n-40 (noting that, although the APA "adopts most of
the judicial review provisions of the minority bill,' the proviso "seems never to have been se-
riously considered by Congress or its committees").
336. Duffy, supra note 196, at 194-95. Duffy argues that "the tension between Chevron and Sec-
tion 706" cannot "be solved by considering Chevron to be a traditional canon of statutory
construction that formed part of the background understanding when Section 706 was en-
acted." Id. at 195. He ultimately concludes that a canon such as the one announced in Chev-
ron would have been "unknown in 1946." Id. at 197.
337. Merrill, supra note 18, at 995.
338. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1039,
io86 (1997). Merrill also reflects on the "embarrassing" point that the "APA appears to com-
pel th[e] conclusion" that "courts should decide all questions of law de novo." Id. at 1085.
339. Mashaw, supra note 27, at 2243; see also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 473 n.85 (1989) ("That
section 706 appears to contemplate de novo judicial determination of questions of statutory
meaning is generally acknowledged. This reading is supported by the section's failure to dis-
tinguish in any way between the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions,
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On the other hand, Adrian Vermeule observes that "on reflection" the APA
"is generally indeterminate on the crucial question" of deference, because
"Chevron might be one of the legal rules courts are to apply."34
0 That is because,
under a "plausible reading" of the APA, where "agencies are exercising delegat-
ed authority, perhaps the meaning of the relevant law just is what agencies say
that it is."341 In a similar vein, John Manning suggests that "the framers of the
APA meant its judicial review provisions to be a restatement of pre-APA stand-
ards."342 It may even be the case that, to use Justice Scalia's words, Congress
enacted section 706 under "the quite mistaken assumption that questions of
law would always be decided de novo by the courts."34
3
Against the backdrop of the historical development of the law of judicial
deference, however, the meaning of section 706 is easier to discern. The most
natural reading of section 706-one that has, to my knowledge, heretofore es-
caped scholarly or judicial attention - is that the APA's judicial review provision
adopted the traditional interpretive methodology that had prevailed from the
beginning of the Republic until the 1940s and, thereby, incorporated the cus-
tomary-and-contemporary canons of construction. In other words, when Con-
gress enacted the APA, it did in fact incorporate traditional background rules of
statutory construction. It did not, however, incorporate the rule that came to be
known as Chevron deference, because that was not (at the time) the traditional
background rule of statutory construction. Under the traditional approach, a
court would "respect" - or, to use modern parlance, "defer to" - an agency's in-
terpretation of a statute if and only if that interpretation reflected a customary
or contemporaneous practice under the statute.
the former of which has always been subject to independent judgment." (citations omit-
ted)); Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 1o MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2640 (2003) ("Argua-
bly, Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act is a broad statement delegating [inter-
pretive] authority to courts, contrary to the rule adopted in Chevron." (footnotes omitted)).
340. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION 207-08 (2006).
341. Id. at zo8. To be clear, Vermeule's account does not purport to be authoritative. In his view,
this interpretation of the APA is "[p]lausible, but not necessary; candid observers, on all
sides, acknowledge that Congress has not authoritatively required or forbidden the Chevron
principle." Id.
342. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Agency Rules, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 612, 635 n.123 (1996).
343. Scalia, supra note 22, at 514; see also BREYER & STEWART, supra note 292, at 280 ("Despite the
language of the Administrative Procedure Act instructing courts to decide 'all relevant' ques-
tions of law, the courts have consistently said that some questions of law are for the agency to
decide.").
987
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
To put the point slightly differently, the contemporanea expositio and interpres
consuetudo canons were considered part and parcel of de novo review. Courts
routinely applied (and continue to apply) the two canons in construing consti-
tutional provisions. By extension, in requiring courts to "interpret constitu-
tional and statutory provisions" equivalently, Congress would have expected
courts to apply de novo review and to apply those canons of construction to
construe statutory provisions.
To the extent that it is relevant,344 the legislative history of the APA tends to
confirm this interpretation of section 706. The APA arose out of a "fierce politi-
cal battle over administrative reform" fought between proponents and oppo-
nents of the New Deal over what both factions believed to be "the life of the
New Deal" itself.345 Proponents of the law repeatedly claimed that courts
would be authorized to review questions of law. Representative Walter, the au-
thor of the House Report on the APA and the chairman of the House Sub-
committee on Administrative Law, explained before the passage of the Act that
section 706 "requires courts to determine independently all relevant questions
of law, including the interpretation of constitutional or statutory provisions."34 6
The House and Senate reports echoed this point, providing that "questions of
law are for courts rather than agencies to decide in the last analysis." The
House report also included a "diagram synopsis" of the Act, which indicated
344. But see supra notes lo6-nii and accompanying text. The legislative history of the APA, more-
over, may be particularly unreliable because each side of a partisan debate may have "tried to
lay a foundation in the legislative history for interpretations favorable to its view." Kenneth
Culp Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Action, iS F.R.D. 411, 431 (1954); see also Shepherd,
supra note 311, at 1662-63 (reasoning that "each party to the negotiations over the bill at-
tempted to create legislative history- to create a record that would cause future reviewing
courts to interpret the new statute in a manner that would favor the party").
345. Shepherd, supra note 311, at 168o. In light of that backdrop, commentators have observed
that "[t]he APA- the basic charter governing judicial review and Chevron itself-was born
in a period of considerable distrust of agency activity." Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism
After the New Deal, io HARv. L. REV. 421, 468 (1987); see also United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950) ("The [APA] was framed against a background of rapid ex-
pansion of the administrative process as a check upon administrators whose zeal might oth-
erwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices.").
While it may well be that some parts of the APA were an effort to entrench New Deal pro-
grams against future opposition, see McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999), the distrust of agency activity appears to
have influenced the framing of the standard-of-review provision that is the subject of this
Article.
346. 92 CONG. REc. 5654 (1946) (statement of Rep. Walter).
347. H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 44 (1946); S. REP. No. 79-752, at 28 (1945); see also Duffy, supra
note 196, at 193-94 & n.406 (suggesting that, contra Chevron, Congress clearly indicated its
expectation that the APA authorized de novo review of legal questions).
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that "reviewing courts . . . are to determine all questions of law . .. and hold
unlawful action found ... in violation of any statute."4  At the same time,
there was some evidence (from a June 1945 Senate committee print prepared by
congressional staff) that an earlier version of § 706 was intended as a "restate-
ment of the scope of review ... necessary lest the proposed statute be taken as
limiting or unduly expanding judicial review."349 That "restatement" character-
ization made sense if Congress believed that the approach to statutory interpre-
tation it was "restating" approximated de novo review.
The hearings that led to the APA's passage also suggested that Congress
was aware of the confusion created by the Supreme Court's then-somewhat-
recent forays into giving agency legal interpretation deferential review. In one
of those hearings, Carl McFarland of the American Bar Association testified
that he did "not believe the principle of review or the extent of review can or
should be greatly altered"; that the "basic exception of administrative discre-
tion should be preserved"; and that "the scope of review should be as it now
is."s35 Representative Walter responded: "You say 'as it now is.' Frankly, I do
not know what it now is .... [T]he Supreme Court apparently changes its
mind daily."s' The Walters-McFarland exchange suggests that Congress was
348. H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 29. Critics of the law, by contrast, expressed concern about the
scope of judicial review. Edwin Johnson, a Democratic Senator from Colorado who was
known as an intraparty critic of the New Deal, see DAVID M. JORDAN, FDR, DEWEY, AND THE
ELECTION OF 1944, at 276 (2011), quoted an article arguing that the APA's judicial review
provision "goes entirely too far[,] is dangerous, and would result in an impossible substitu-
tion of the judicial for the administrative process and thus deprive our jurisprudence of that
process or else delay its proper and normal development," see 92 CONG. REC. 2163 (quoting
Allen Moore, The Proposed Administrative Procedure Act, 22 DICTA 1, 14-15 (1945)), reprinted in
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 335 (2d
Sess. 1946). See also Shepherd, supra note 311, at 1668-69 (arguing that Johnson's insertion
of Moore's statement into the Congressional Record reveals "an undercurrent of discontent"
among certain New Deal supporters).
349. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., REP. ON THE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT
(Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 39. Duffy suggests that this early
print should be discounted because the congressional staff who prepared this print "may
have been influenced by representatives of the Attorney General, who were working with the
staff in the spring of 1945." Duffy, supra note 196, at 132 n.95. Perhaps so-and perhaps that
is reason to ignore the legislative history altogether, resting instead on the APA's text and
structure. But it is worth noting that the "restatement" characterization might have seemed
apt to a congressional staffer writing in 1945 because much of the case law prior to the 1940s
was consistent with the APA's statutory text.
350. Federal Administrative Procedure: Hearings on H.R. 184, H.R. 339, H.R. 1117, H.R. 12o3, H.R.
12o6, and H.R. 2602 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 7 9 th Cong. 38 (1945) [hereinafter
Admin. Procedure Hearings], reprinted in S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 84.
351. Id. (statement of Rep. Walter).
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aware of the shifting jurisprudence on the Court, and sought to reject one
strand of it in codifying a standard in section 706.
To be sure, it is important to acknowledge the lack of clarity in these por-
tions of legislative history. The only case that any of the participants cited was
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, to which Representative Walter referred and
which involved the "substantial evidence" standard for review of factual find-
ings.352 At worst, however, the legislative history brings us back, full circle, to
the APA's text and the historical background against which it was adopted. In
light of the jurisprudential developments preceding the APA's adoption, the
simplest explanation for section 706's text and structure is that Congress in-
tended to direct courts to apply the standard of review that had prevailed-
almost uniformly-for nearly a century and a half prior to the codification of
section 706. The prevailing standard of review was the independent-judgment
rule, tempered by application of the traditional canons of construction, such as
contemporanea expositio and interpres consuetudo.
4. The APA' Aftermath
In the immediate aftermath of its passage, critical attention to the import
and meaning of the APA was widespread. The highest profile, and ultimately
most influential,35 3 of the contemporaneous commentaries was the Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, published a year after the
APA's enactment by Attorney General Tom Clark -who, shortly thereafter, was
352. 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). The remainder of the exchange appeared to focus on judicial re-
view of agency fact finding. See Admin. Procedure Hearings, supra note 350, at 38 (statement
of Rep. Sumners). Indeed, much of the debate surrounding the APA appeared to focus on
judicial review of agency fact finding. See Dickinson, supra note 261, at 434-37, 513-15 (re-
viewing recommendations by the American Bar Association, the Attorney General, and oth-
ers related to judicial review of agency fact finding).
353. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 103 n.22 (1981) (stating that the manual "has been 'given
some deference by this Court because of the role played by the Department of Justice in
drafting the legislation"') (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978)); see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,
218 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the manual as "the Government's own most
authoritative interpretation of the APA, . . . which we have repeatedly given great weight").
As Shepherd explains, however, this "deference is suspect,' because "[n]o reason exists to
give more weight to the Attorney General's Manual than to conservatives' contrasting inter-
pretations." Shepherd, supra note 311, at 1683; see also Scalia, supra note 159, at 917 n.228
(noting that the Attorney General "has never been particularly addicted to a broad interpre-
tation of the APA").
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appointed to the Supreme Court.3 54 The manual characterized section 706 as
"restat[ing] the present law as to the scope of judicial review" and as a "general
restatement of the principles of judicial review embodied in many statutes and
judicial decisions."3 55 That characterization, whatever its merits, was inherently
question begging when it came to section 706's command on "questions of
law": What exactly was section 706 "restating," the traditional independent-
judgment rule or the Court's then-recent forays into categorizing what ap-
peared to be legal questions as factual questions? The manual offered no analy-
sis -none at all-on that critical question.35 6
Many contemporaneous academic commentators sympathetic to the New
Deal were similarly vague about the meaning of the "decide all relevant ques-
tions of law" language contained in section 706. Some said nothing at all about
the phrase, suggesting (if anything) that they understood the rule, both before
and after the enactment of the APA, to be that a reviewing court was to use in-
dependent judgment in interpreting legal text.57 Others observed that the Act
354. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT (1947); see also S. REP. No. 79-752, app. B, at 37-45 (1945) (reprinting a letter from At-
torney General Tom C. Clark to Senator Pat McCarran containing comments on the pro-
posed APA).
355. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 354, at 93, 1o8; see also Duffy, supra note 196, at 131 & n.86
(observing that the manual repeatedly described the APA as intended to restate the existing
law). At least one commentator has criticized the manual as "damage control" in a "highly
political document designed to minimize the impact of the new statute on executive agen-
cies." Id. at 119, 133; see also Shepherd, supra note 311, at 1682 (arguing that the manual
sought "to create a record" that would influence future reviewing courts). Be that as it may,
the salient point is that, on the critical question of judicial deference to agency interpretation
of law, the manual said nothing to flesh out the principles that it believed the APA had "re-
stated."
356. An interesting piece of contemporaneous anecdotal evidence that tends to belie the "re-
statement" characterization is the following report from an article by two scholars from the
Brookings Institution: "The writers have discussed the [APA] with many persons who hold
responsible positions in a variety of government agencies, and have not found a single in-
stance of approval. On the contrary, there is practically universal opinion that the bill, if ac-
tually enforced, will wreck federal administration." Frederick F. Blachly & Miriam E. Oat-
man, Sabotage of the Administrative Process, 6 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 213, 227 n.1 (1946). It is not
clear, however, whether this anecdotal evidence accurately captures the reaction of federal
officials at the time of the AA's passage, or even whether the suggested alarm was because
of the APA's judicial review provisions. Other commentators sympathetic to the New Deal
took a more sanguine view of the Act. See, e.g., Nathanson, supra note 333, at 420 ("The Act's
greatest contribution is more likely to be, to borrow a phrase from the Attorney General, in
codifying the best existing law and practice.").
357. See Nathanson, supra note 333, at 413-18 (analyzing the Act's judicial review provisions with-
out addressing review of questions of law); S. Walter Shine, Administrative Procedure Act:
Judicial Review "Hotchpot"?, 36 GEO. L.J. 16, 30-31 (1947). Silence on the scope of judicial re-
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"preserve[d] the customary dichotomy of law and fact, in spite of argument by
distinguished commentators that these categories cannot in application be dis-
tinguished, and in spite of recent Supreme Court decisions giving support to
such argument"s5 8 - thereby more strongly indicating that legal questions
would be subject to a court's independent judgment. Still others appeared to
start from the premise that review of legal questions was generally de novo,ase
but that section 706 incorporated the then-recent jurisprudence establishing a
deferential carve out for "mixed questions of law and fact."360 Notably, some
commentators believed that section 706's language would expand the scope of
judicial review of questions of law, though in some unspecified way.361
On the other side of the ledger, critics of the Court's recent case law had a
different take on section 706. Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada, the chairman
view of questions of law reflected the view, held by many, that the dispute over the applica-
tion of the "substantial evidence" test was "[t]he most important, and perhaps the widest
disagreement" about section 706. Alfred Long Scanlan, Judicial Review Under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act - In Which Judicial Offspring Receive a Congressional Confirmation, 23 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 501, 536 (1948). Some commentators had interpreted then-recent Supreme
Court decisions as blessing administrative determinations supported by a "scintilla" of evi-
dence, and believed that section 706 reversed those precedents. Dickinson, supra note 261, at
515-18; see, e.g., NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318, 343 (1940) (noting that courts
should be "mindful of the separate responsibilities Congress has imposed upon the Board
and the courts"); NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 208 (1940) (declaring
that "courts [may] not encroach upon this exclusive power of the Board" to find facts). Oth-
ers believed that those particular precedents did not embrace the "scintilla" standard, but
that Congress intended to "exhort[]" those courts that had "fallen into the vice of relaxing"
the substantial evidence rule. Scanlan, supra, at 539.
358. Ray A. Brown, The Federal 'Administrative Procedure Act," 19 4 7 WIs. L. REv. 66, 86.
359. Scanlan, supra note 357, at 528-29 (reasoning that section 706's directive to "decide all rele-
vant questions of law" was "simply a restatement of the present powers which reviewing
courts possess, and frequently exercise, of reviewing relevant questions of constitutional and
statutory law").
360. Id. at 531 (reasoning that "mixed" questions are "merely another ramification of the substan-
tial evidence rule").
361. See Frederick F. Blachly & Miriam E. Oatman, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 34
GEO. L.J. 407, 427-30 (1946) (arguing that the Act "greatly widens the scope of judicial re-
view," while seeming to assume that both before and after the Act, courts were to use inde-
pendent judgment to review questions of law); Julius Cohen, Legislative Injustice and the Su-
premacy "of Law," 26 NEB. L. REV. 323, 339 (1947) (claiming, albeit without expressly
considering judicial review of legal questions, that, notwithstanding the Attorney General's
"assurance" that section 706 merely restated preexisting standards of judicial review, "the
language of the section leaves no doubt that it was the major purpose of the drafters to
tighten substantially the judicial grip on administrative action."). The title of Cohen's article
is a self-conscious reference to Dickinson's manuscript Administrative Justice and the Suprema-
cy of Law. See Cohen, supra, at 323 n.* (reflecting the influence that the book played two dec-
ades after its 1927 publication).
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of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary at the time of the APA's enactment,
wrote an article in the American Bar Association Journal stating that the APA
"simply and expressly provides that Courts 'shall decide all relevant questions
of law"' -with discretion committed "by law" to an agency only if "intentional-
ly given to the agency by the Congress, rather than assumed by it in the ab-
sence of express statement of law to the contrary."362 This provision, in McCar-
ran's view, "cut down the 'cult of discretion"' that had "gained considerable
currency in the last decade or so."363
A notable contribution to the debate came from John Dickinson - the same
John Dickinson who, drawing on the scholarship of James Bradley Thayer, had
in important respects originated the notion that agencies should receive defer-
ence when applying law to facts.36" Surveying the APA's review provisions,
Dickinson said, effectively, that the Act had repudiated the legal realist's per-
spective on the law-fact distinction.6 s He made three important points. First,
he observed that the APA "stands at the end of a long history which illumines
every part of it; and aside from that history, no provisions of the Act, least of all
those having to do with judicial review, can be adequately construed."366 The
terms of art that the statute used, on this sensible view, had to be understood
against the history of those terms' use in the preexisting jurisprudence.
Second, Dickinson noted that then-recent Supreme Court decisions had de-
parted from the longstanding tradition of applying independent judgment to
362. Pat McCarran, Improving "Administrative Justice": Hearings and Evidence; Scope of judicial Re-
view, 32ABAJ. 827, 831 (1946).
363. Id. at 828, 893.
364. See supra notes 267-274 and accompanying text.
365. Dickinson, supra note 261. I do not know whether Dickinson's perspective on issues of defer-
ence had undergone an evolution in the two decades between his 1927 publication of Admin-
istrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States and his 1947 article. In the inter-
im, Dickinson had played a role in the Roosevelt Administration as Assistant Secretary of
Commerce and Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, before returning to
Pennsylvania Law School as a professor and also joining the Pennsylvania Railroad as gen-
eral counsel. See Haskins, supra note 275, at 9-13; see also Steve Thel, The Original Cofiception
of Section io(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385, 417 (1990) (detailing
Dickinson's role in establishing a committee to study stock exchange legislation while at the
Department of Commerce, and characterizing Dickinson as "markedly more sympathetic to
business interests than were most of the others involved in formulating federal stock ex-
change policy"); id. at 453 (noting that Dickinson was likely responsible for inclusion of the
word "deceptive" in section lo(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
366. Dickinson, supra note 261, at 434.
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review statutory questions.6 7 It had "previously been understood that in a re-
view proceeding questions of law are for the determination of the reviewing
Court," Dickinson observed, but "[i]ncreasingly, in recent years the Supreme
Court has tended to treat many issues, which, when subjected to adequate
analysis, would be seen to be issues of law, as lying within the discretion of an
administrative agency, and, therefore, non-reviewable." 68 The notion that
courts possess the "discretion to decide between doubtful rules of law has
gradually permeated," such that courts "have begun" to distinguish "between
two kinds of questions of law: Those which involve what are sometimes spo-
ken of as general law or legal principles, and others which involve the construc-
tion of technical terms and the application of knowledge thought to be expert
and specialized."36 9 Dickinson noted that, far from being a sign of judicial qui-
escence, the Court's ability to redraw the line between questions of law and
fact - and, hence, to "draw the line between what is 'general' and what is 'tech-
nical"' - necessarily lodged great power in the Justices by "leaving to the
Court's discretion the determination of whether it would or would not review a
legal question." 7 0
Third, Dickinson interpreted section 706 as a "clear mandate" repudiating
this tendency. Section 706 required a reviewing court to decide questions of
law "for itself, and in the exercise of its own independent judgment.""' In
Dickinson's view, "[m] ore explicit words to impose this mandate could hardly
be found than those . .. employed" in section 706.372
Leaving to one side its merits, the terms of the debate in the immediate
aftermath of the APA's passage tell us much about how a neutral observer
would have understood the plain text of section 706. Both sides of the debate
appeared to understand that the background presumption for interpretation of
legal questions was de novo review. The debate occurred on the margins: did
367. See id. (remarking that Dickinson found "no room for doubt that Congress intended to
broaden judicial review as it had lately been limited by the Supreme Court" (emphasis add-
ed)).
368. Id. at 516 (citing, as support for the traditional independent-judgment rule, Justice Brande-
is's concurring opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73-92
(1936)).
369. Id. at 516-17.
370. Id. at 517. For a similar point made post-Chevron, see Duffy, supra note 196, at 192-93, which
remarks on "Chevron's capacity to aggrandize judicial power" and observes that "if the com-
mon-law premises underlying Chevron are accepted, the courts have authority . .. to allocate
lawmaking authority."
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the independent-judgment rule govern "mixed questions of law and fact"?
Dickinson, notwithstanding his earlier scholarship, argued that it did and that
section 706 did not incorporate the Supreme Court's recent interpretive exper-
imentation. Some New Deal supporters, by contrast, claimed that section 706
incorporated the recent cases. The critical debate in the immediate period fol-
lowing enactment of the APA occurred against this backdrop - and not over the
generalized rule of deference later articulated in Chevron.
C. The Irrelevancy of Text, the Forgetting of the Traditional Canons, and the
Confusion Before 1984
The revival of the independent-judgment rule that the APA appeared to
augur did not occur. Over time, interpreters of the APA failed to distinguish
between the background rules that Congress sought to incorporate in section
706, and those it sought to reject. And they failed to appreciate that implicit in
the incorporated-rule theory was the notion that the Court could no longer in-
novate on the appropriate rules for judicial review, but rather would have to
subordinate its preferences to the balance struck by the 1946 Congress. The
end result of these failures was the widely shared perspective that the doctrine
of Gray v. Powell and NLRB v. Hearst Publications not only remained good law,
but could be elaborated upon by the Court. As that process of elaboration oc-
curred, it exerted a gravitational pull on each of the various strands of preexist-
ing deference case law-resulting in a mishmash jurisprudence incorporating
cases applying the mandamus standard, the traditional canons, and the princi-
ples of the 1940s. And as this elaboration occurred, the distinction between the
many cases setting forth a de novo standard of judicial review and the cases ar-
ticulating a deferential standard began to grow starker and ever more irrecon-
cilable.m
373. For a recent summary of the immediate pre-Chevron period, see Gary Lawson & Stephen
Kam, Making Law out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1 (2013). The authors note that, although "[t]here is considerable ambiguity
about . .. the pre-Chevron baseline," the "key inquiry" in the immediate pre-Chevron period
was "whether the legal question decided by the agency and under judicial review is a pure
question of legal interpretation or a mixed question of law application to a particular set of
facts." Id. at 6, 9 (emphasis omitted); see GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 545-
60 (7 th ed. 2016); see also MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 36, at 747 ("For better or
worse, the enactment of the APA did not seem to have any noticeable impact on how courts
reviewed agency interpretations of statutes."); id. at 754 ("In the four decades following
Hearst and Skidmore, the doctrine developed into a more standard-like multifactor approach,
rather than a more rule-like categorical approach."); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Ques-
tions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986) ("[C]ourts will defer more when
the agency has special expertise that it can bring to bear on the legal question .... A court
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Judge Friendly gave voice to these concerns when he observed that "there
are two lines of Supreme Court decisions" on the subject of judicial deference
"which are analytically in conflict." Likewise, in a dissent from the Court's
decision to reject an agency interpretation of a statute, Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall contended that, by ignoring principles of judicial deference, the Court had
opened itself to the "frequently voiced criticism" that deference was invoked
"only when the Court finds itself in substantive agreement with the agency ac-
tion at issue."75
The views of the two leading scholars of administrative law during this era,
Davis and Jaffe, exemplify some of the problems with the various approaches.
In his influential 1951 administrative law treatise, Davis categorically asserted
may also ask whether the legal question is an important one."). Others have noted that "the
enactment of the APA did little to displace the domination of common law in the field. If an-
ything, the growth of purely judge-made law accelerated." Duffy, supra note 196, at 115; see
also 1 KENNETH CULP DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2:18, at 140 (2d ed. 1978)
("Perhaps about nine-tenths of American administrative law is judge-made law, and the
other tenth is statutory.. . . Most of it is common law in every sense, that is, it is law made
by judges in absence of [a] relevant constitutional or statutory provision.. . ."); JAFFE, supra
note 64, at 337 ("In most cases the scope of review, whether statutory or common law, is
very much the same."). Duffy attributes the comfort that courts and commentators dis-
played toward judge-made law in part to the fact that the decades following the APA's en-
actment were the era of the "New Federal Common Law." Duffy, supra note 196, at 136-37;
see also Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie -and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 383, 408-10 (1964) (tracing the beginning of the "New Federal Common Law" era to
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)). On the other hand, one of Judge
Friendly's former clerks, Raymond Randolph (now a judge himself on the D.C. Circuit),
finds it "doubtful" that Judge Friendly "influenced the Court's deference formula" and spec-
ulates that Judge Friendly "would have been somewhat critical" of Chevron because he
"would have preferred not to dole out deference in such a large dose." A. Raymond Ran-
dolph, Administrative Law and the Legacy of Henry J. Friendly, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 15-16
(1999).
374. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cit. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Ne.
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
37s. Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 712 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); see also United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 595 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (iccus-
ing Court's analysis of being "nothing more than a substitution of what it deems meet and
proper for the wholly reasonable views of the [agency] as to the meaning of its own regula-
tion and of the statutory provisions"); Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, Perspectives on
Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 780-81 (1975) ("At best, concepts such as 'sub-
stantial evidence' tend to be little more than convenient labels attached to results reached
without their aid. As evidence of their unimportance, judicial opinions commonly do not
even articulate the standards of review employed, and when they do the articulation is sel-
dom useful to understanding the result or predicting future results.").
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that "the doctrine of Gray v. Powell has survived the APA."376 At the same time,
Davis observed that "sometimes the Supreme Court applies [the doctrine of
Gray] and sometimes it does not," with the "criteria that guide the use or non-
use of the doctrine . .. exceedingly elusive" and "not necessarily all disclosed by
judicial language.".7 The upshot appeared to be that Gray had emphatically
survived the APA- but only to be acknowledged in some subset of the Court's
cases. For his part, Jaffe acknowledged that Gray and Hearst Publications had
"recognized perhaps more openly than had been customary in the recent past
the law- or policy-making function of the agencies" and could be construed as
"an abdication of the customary power and responsibility of the judiciary.""'
He nevertheless claimed that the doctrine was "as traditional as it is sound" be-
cause it echoed Justice Brown's reasoning in Bates."' While expressing a pref-
erence for a deferential standard of review, Jaffe observed that the "practice of
the Supreme Court... show[ed] the Court sometimes asserting the correct-
ness of the agency rule, at other times going no further than to hold the admin-
istrator can but is not required to adopt such a rule," with "this latter practice"
having "given rise to profound difficulties of description and analysis, and to
intense controversy"o3 80
D. Chevron Revisited: From Confusion to Clarity and the Repudiation of the
Traditional Canons
With this past as prologue, it is fruitful to revisit the Court's 1984 opinion
in Chevron. The Court's opinion famously neglected to analyze the text of the
APA in announcing its canonical two-part test.381 Instead, the Court relied on
376. DAVIS, supra note 79, § 246, at 885. For this proposition, Davis relied on the Court's opinion
in O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951), which in turn contained no rea-
soning on this issue.
377. DAvIs, supra note 79, § 248, at 893; id. § 251, at 9o5; see also id. § 247, at 887 (noting that the
doctrine of Gray v. Powell is not consistently applied).
378. JAFFE, supra note 64, at 575.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 557-58 (footnotes omitted).
381. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("There is
some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of the [APA], which it did not even
bother to cite.") ; Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just
Don't Get It, 1o ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 2-3 (1996) (noting that in Chevron, "the Court entirely
neglects to mention the APA, even where the statutory charter should be central to the
Court's deliberations"); Duffy, supra note 196, at 189 (reasoning that Chevron "provides one
of the best examples of a pure common-law method" because the Court "justified its ruling
with case law and its own assessment of the policy reasons (agency expertise and democratic
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two principal kinds of arguments: (a) an appeal to abstract political theory and
(b) an appeal to the precedents of the Court. While a comprehensive evalua-
tion of the first is outside the scope of this Article, the Court's reliance on the
latter is cast in a new light when compared to the historical record.
Of the several dozen cases that the Court cited to support Chevron's two-
part test,382 seven were decided before 1940. Each of those cases is consistent
with the model of the traditional canons of statutory construction. Indeed, in
one of them, Chief Justice Hughes rejected a party's invocation of the "familiar
principle . .. that great weight is attached to the construction consistently given
to a statute by the executive department charged with its administration" by
noting the following "qualification of that principle [that was] as well estab-
lished as the principle itself": "The Court is not bound by an administrative
construction, and if that construction is not uniform and consistent, it will be
taken into account only to the extent that it is supported by valid reasons.""
accountability) for preferring agency interpretation over judicial interpretation"); cf Darby
v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1993) (holding that, to determine "[w]hether courts are
free to impose an exhaustion requirement as a matter of judicial discretion," the starting
point "is congressional intent" as expressed in the APA (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503
U.S. 140, 144 (1992))).
382. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 & nn.9, 11-14
(1984); id. at 865-66 & nn.39-41.
383. Burnet v. Chi. Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16 (1932). The remaining cases cited in Chevron are to
the same effect and applied the contemporanea expositio and interpres consuetudo canons in one
fashion or another-save for one that addressed the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. See
McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 481 (1921) (invoking the "rule that the practical construc-
tion given to an act of Congress, fairly susceptible of different constructions, by those
charged with the duty of executing it is entitled to great respect and, if acted upon for a
number of years, will not be disturbed except for cogent reasons"); Webster v. Luther, 163
U.S. 331, 342 (1896) ("The practical construction given to an act of Congress, fairly suscep-
tible of different constructions, by one of the Executive Departments of the government, is
always entitled to the highest respect, and in doubtful cases should be followed by the
courts, especially when important interests have grown up under the practice adopted.");
Brown v. United States, 113 U.S. 568, 571 (1885) ( "This contemporaneous and uniform in-
terpretation is entitled to weight in the construction of the law, and in a case of doubt ought
to turn the scale."); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 76o, 762-63 (1878) (noting a construc-
tion of a statute that had "always heretofore obtained in the Navy Department" was "entitled
to the most respectful consideration, and ought not to be overruled without cogent rea-
sons"); Edward's Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (i Wheat) 206, 210 (1827) ("In the construction of
a doubtful and ambiguous law, the cotemporaneous construction of those who were called
upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled
to very great respect."); see also Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 235-36
(1936) (holding that, in the case where the order was "attacked as arbitrary," the Court "is
not at liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of administrative officers who have
kept within the bounds of their administrative powers" in construing a statute that allowed
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Chevron cited Chief Justice Hughes's opinion, but failed to engage with his rea-
soning.
Justice Stevens punctuated this list of cases with a citation of Pound's The
Spirit of the Common Law.38 That was certainly ironic. During the debates that
preceded the passage of the APA, while serving as chairman of the American
Bar Association's Special Committee on Administrative Law, Pound had sharp-
ly criticized what he viewed as an emerging "administrative absolutism" posed
by the modern administrative state,385 and had equated "tak[ing] away inter-
pretation by the courts" and "leav[ing] interpretation of the provisions and di-
rections of the law to the executive" with "enter[ing] upon the path leading to a
lex regia."" 6 One wonders what Pound would have thought of being cited as
the sole academic authority in favor of the presumption of delegation an-
nounced in Chevron.
But the supreme irony of Chevron is that, to support the interpretive theory
that it adopted, the Court cited cases like Edward's Lessee that applied the con-
temporaneous-construction canon. Those cases had, consistent with Chief Jus-
tice Hughes' opinion in Burnet, long been understood to require a court to hold
an agency to its longstanding and contemporaneously adopted position. The
rule adopted in Chevron said the opposite.
Relying on the same nineteenth-century cases Chevron cited, Justice Harlan
in his 1904 Bates dissent had rejected a newly stated position by the govern-
the Commission "in its discretion, [to] prescribe the forms of any and all accounts, records,
and memoranda").
384. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (citing ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 174-75
(1921)). Justice Stevens's citation of Pound can be seen as an excuse for the Court's failure to
interpret section 706. In the cited pages of The Spirit of the Common Law, Pound argued that
"even after the legislator has acted it is seldom if ever that his foresight extends to all the de-
tails of his problem or that he is able to do more than provide a broad if not crude outline"
ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw 174 (1921). Thus, according to Pound,
"even in the field of the enacted law," the common law plays a "chief part," because the inter-
preter "must rely upon it to fill the gaps in legislation, to develop the principles introduced
by legislation, and to interpret them." Id. The common law "is and must be used, even in an
age of copious legislation, to supplement, round out and develop the enacted element; and
in the end it usually swallows up the latter and incorporates the results in the body of tradi-
tion." Id. at 174-75. In the case of section 706, the citation of Pound was apropos, because the
statute does incorporate a preexisting common-law approach to interpretation. But the
Court misidentified the import and foundations of the common-law precedents that it cited.
See id. at 175 (noting that jurisprudence "works with the materials" of the common law, "an-
alyzes them and systematizes them, . . . traces their history, [and] seeks their philosophical
foundations").
385. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, supra note 277.
386. Pound, supra note 316, at 136-37.
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ment because he "had supposed it to be firmly settled that the established prac-
tice of an Executive Department charged with the execution of a statute will be
respected and followed."387 According to Justice Harlan, the Court's decision
not to "regard[]" the "practice of the Post Office Department, covering a period
of sixteen years and more," had "overthrown" "[t] he rule of construction which
[the Supreme Court] ha[d] recognized for more than three quarters of a centu-
ry."a Nowhere in the Bates majority opinion did Justice Brown dispute that
Justice Harlan had accurately captured the holdings of cases like Edward's Les-
see.389 It appeared to be shared ground among the Justices in Bates that the con-
temporary and customary canons of construction did not apply when the agen-
cy changed its legal position.
Within eight decades -between Justice Harlan's opinion in 1904 and the
Chevron decision in 1984- the true meaning of the cases applying the contempo-
ranea expositio and interpres consuetudo canons had been completely and entirely
forgotten. The traditional rules of construction, to use Justice Harlan's words,
had finally been "overthrown."
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have traced the origins and development of the doctrine of
judicial deference to executive interpretation. The fundamental payoff of the
historical analysis has been the insight that judicial deference -as an interpre-
tive theory practiced from the mid-twentieth century onwards and especially
after the Court's opinion in Chevron -is an innovation. Although some forms
of "respect" for executive constructions did exist in traditional interpretive
methodology, the modern doctrine finds no true historical antecedent in the
nineteenth century, neither in the cases applying the traditional canons of con-
struction on which Chevron relied, nor in the cases applying the standard for
obtaining a writ of mandamus. The doctrine, moreover, cannot be squared
with the text of section 706 of the APA, which is best read as an attempt to cod-
ify the traditional approach to statutory interpretation in the wake of experi-
mentation with that approach by the Supreme Court in the 1940s. The doctri-
nal flaw of Chevron, thus, is that the case failed to understand the rationale
behind the precedents on which it relied, thereby severing the doctrine of judi-
cial deference from both the text of the statute Congress enacted to govern ju-
387. Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 111 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
388. Id. at 111-12.
389. See id. at lo9 (relying on mandamus cases and cases deferring to agency factual determina-
tions to support its deferential stance toward the agency's then-current legal position).
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dicial review of agency action and the interpretive framework that Congress in-
corporated.
Perhaps Chevron can be justified on some other ground. Perhaps, in the
modern administrative state, the cost-benefit analysis of different interpretive
methodologies weighs so heavily in favor of judicial deference that the twenti-
eth-century abandonment of the traditional canons should be viewed as a net
positive.o90 Perhaps, in light of the thirty-year run of the Chevron doctrine,
Congress now actually intends to delegate lawmaking authority to agencies to
fill gaps in statutes determined to be ambiguous."' Or perhaps, given Chev-
ron's thirty-year run, it is simply too late to upset the deference applecart and
return to the views that prevailed before the mid-twentieth century.3 92 But the
proposition that Chevron has a basis in traditional interpretive methodology,
the views of the Framers of the United States Constitution, or section 706 of
the Administrative Procedure Act should be abandoned -that proposition is a
fiction. To be sure, the canons of construction with which the Framers of the
Constitution and the lawyers of the nineteenth century would have been famil-
iar-those privileging customary and contemporary interpretations of legal
texts-use terminology that bears a passing resemblance to the words now
used to articulate the concept of Chevron deference. But those canons were far
removed from Chevron, both in spirit and in application. The true story of the
origins of judicial deference is that the current doctrine, as an interpretive theo-
ry, originated much later-during the twentieth century-out of a desire to
abandon the formalism of the traditional framework.
390. Cf VERMEULE, supra note 340, at 207-29 (presenting justifications for Chevron).
391. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Em-
pirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV.
901, 925 & n.25, 995-loo6 (2013).
392. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 755
(2014) ("Chevron has now been invoked in far too many decisions to make overruling it a
feasible option for the Court."). But see Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1214
n.i (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Although the Court has appeared to treat our agency
deference regimes as precedents entitled to stare decisis effect, some scholars have noted that
they might instead be classified as interpretive tools ... [which] might not be entitled to
such effect."); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 320
(2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing willingness, notwithstanding statutory stare
decisis, to overrule precedents interpreting the federal-question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
"[i]n an appropriate case, and perhaps with the benefit of better evidence as to the original
meaning of [the statute's] text").
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